Campaign promises like the so-called “24-hour economy” are nothing more than desperate rhetoric—empty, convoluted phrases that quickly devolve into a modern-day Tower of Babel. These projects are built on unattainable ambitions and serve only to deceive the electorate, securing electoral victory while masking a lack of substantive vision. Far from offering real solutions, such schemes threaten to plunge the nation deeper into debt, squandering resources on impractical policies rather than addressing pressing developmental needs. The cycle of debt and wasted human capital persists, all for the sake of political expediency.
In this paper, I directly challenge the architects of the so-called “24-hour economy.” What does this term actually mean, and what are its practical requirements? Which nation—especially one with Ghana’s sprawling informal sector, widespread aversion to hard work, rampant crime, dilapidated infrastructure, unreliable internet, and unstable power supply—has ever succeeded in implementing such a model (Ayee, 2012; Whitfield, 2018)? Who conceived this doomed project, and what expertise, if any, informed its creation? How much were these “experts” compensated, and what political offices do they now occupy for peddling a concept that, while rhetorically appealing, collapses under scrutiny (Arthur, 2015)?
Ghana’s political class has perfected the art of walking before crawling—a form of policy insanity and inverted logic that prioritizes flashy slogans over grounded, evidence-based solutions (Gyimah-Boadi & Prempeh, 2012). The “24-hour economy” is a hollow fantasy, engineered for electoral gain rather than real national progress.
In the lead-up to the election, John Dramani Mahama, flagbearer of the National Democratic Congress, unleashed a torrent of campaign promises, stopping just short of guaranteeing voters a ticket to heaven (Daily Graphic, 2024; Modern Ghana, 2024). With corporate pastors and so-called moral entrepreneurs at his side—some claiming direct lines to the divine—Mahama publicly submitted to their blessings in a televised spectacle that left many Ghanaians incredulous (JoyNews, 2024; Asamoah, 2023).
His “24-hour economy” rhetoric promised an economic utopia: ghost jobs running three shifts, perpetual employment, and universal prosperity for the youth. Yet, the reality is a hollow performance. The newly minted “Office of 24-Hour Economy Secretariat,” with its polished website, offers little substance and no concrete benchmarks for success (Business & Financial Times, 2024). This is classic political theatre—grandiose promises with no roadmap, designed to seduce an electorate desperate for hope but left with nothing but empty slogans (Abdulai & Hickey, 2016; Owusu, 2023).
My review of the 24-Hour Economy Secretariat website exposes little more than a façade: glossy AI-generated images and recycled Marxist slogans are paired with utopian economic promises from President Mahama—promises that ring hollow on closer inspection (Business & Financial Times, 2024; Owusu, 2023). Mahama’s assertion that the “24H+ is a holistic integrated multisectoral program” enabling producers to “attack key bottlenecks” in agriculture, fisheries, and manufacturing is classic political theatre—grand rhetoric detached from the daily realities of Ghana’s working poor.
In truth, most farmers and fishers remain trapped in poverty, lacking the capital, education, and infrastructure to overcome production barriers (Anarfi & Osei, 2017; Daily Graphic, 2024). Their urgent needs—capital, fair pricing, and motorable roads—are ignored by technocratic platitudes and virtual marketing (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). The 24-Hour Economy Secretariat website, with its curated images and distant speeches, caters to political convenience while leaving the real problems unsolved. This spectacle is yet another example of how Ghanaian leadership remains disconnected from the lived experience of its most vulnerable citizens (Modern Ghana, 2024).
President Mahama’s claim that “The 24-Hour Economy is a catalyst for industrialization, export promotion and job creation…for everyone, every hour of the day” is pure paternalism—detached from the harsh realities of rural Ghana (The Chronicle, 2024; Anarfi & Osei, 2017). This rhetoric glosses over the fact that Ghana’s industrial base remains small, fragmented, and heavily reliant on imports (Baah-Boateng, 2019; Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). The idea that a 24-hour economy can “work for everyone” is a political fantasy, not grounded in the lived experience of farmers and fishers who struggle daily with poverty, lack of infrastructure, and minimal state support (Dzanku, 2015; Daily Graphic, 2024).
Mahama’s top-down, lecture-style delivery ignores the realities of those who form the backbone of Ghana’s economy—uneducated and marginalized labourers enduring harsh conditions. His vision does not reach those it purports to serve, reinforcing the disconnect between political elites and the nation’s working poor (Modern Ghana, 2024; Ofori-Atta, 2022). Without addressing structural deficiencies, the 24-hour economy is nothing more than hollow rhetoric.
President Mahama’s claim that “The 24-H+ programme will work to realize the full economic and commercial value of the largest man-made lake in the world [The Volta Lake]” is pure speculation—an exercise in political fantasy rather than actionable policy (The Chronicle, 2024; Joy Business, 2024). Praising Volta Lake’s potential is not a substitute for concrete planning or capital investment. Ghanaian politicians have long mastered the art of leveraging natural beauty and grand promises for electoral gain, yet fail to deliver verifiable, sustainable results (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016; Ofori-Atta, 2022).
What Volta Lake needs is a rigorous, transparent blueprint—subject to public scrutiny and rooted in adequate funding—not empty rhetoric or “mini-Singapore” daydreams. So far, the 24-hour economy is nothing more than a vision board, not a result-driven plan (Modern Ghana, 2024; Daily Graphic, 2024). Until leaders move from wishful thinking to accountable action, such pronouncements are little more than political theatre.
This paper is not a personal attack—I do not make policy—but it is an indictment of Ghana’s political class for routinely sending the electorate on wild goose chases with empty slogans and unworkable dreams (Adu-Gyamfi, 2023; The Chronicle, 2024). The 24-hour economy, while rhetorically appealing, is a fantasy in a nation plagued by youth unemployment, online fraud, and a rising culture of self-enrichment through illicit means (Aning, 2016; Owusu, 2023). Without a fundamental shift in youth mindset through targeted public education and enforceable job training programs, the promise of a 24-hour economy will remain a mirage.
Armed robbery, cybercrime, and institutional indifference make around-the-clock commerce dangerous and unsustainable (Boateng, 2021; Ghanaian Times, 2024). The very notion of a 24-hour economy collapses in the face of traffic gridlock, unmotorable roads, and chronic power outages—structural failures that successive governments have failed to address despite endless promises (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). No serious investor will risk capital in a country where basic infrastructure is neglected, and government agencies are reactive at best, waiting for disaster before taking action. Until these foundational issues are resolved, the 24-hour economy will remain nothing more than political theatre.
In conclusion, real change will remain elusive until the Ghanaian electorate seizes control—demanding accountability, rejecting political handouts, and asserting their power to determine the nation’s trajectory. Only when citizens make politicians uncomfortable with hard truths, expose hypocrisy, and show habitual liars the door will the toxic cycle of deception end. Until then, the public will continue to be force-fed deadlier lies, all in the name of political self-preservation, not national service.
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