The New Patriotic Party (NPP) has mastered the art of hollow slogans—branding itself as “technocratic,” “doyens of democracy,” “property-owning” millionaires, “God-fearing,” and “law-abiding,” yet consistently failing to explain or substantiate these claims (Gyampo, 2021; Boafo-Arthur, 2007). The party’s recent rhetoric—exemplified by Dr. Stephen Amoah (“Sticka”) declaring, “‘I will sack every NDC member from my constituency if I am wrongly arrested’”—is a case study in political recklessness (Daily Graphic, 2024). Such threats are not just divisive; they stoke ethnic and partisan tensions, undermining national security and the rule of law (Arthur, 2015; Osei, 2017).
Let’s be clear: the NPP has contributed to Ghana’s democratic experiment, but its addiction to overpromising and underdelivering is legendary—whether promising to “arrest the dollar,” clean up Accra, or reform the Ghana Police Service, only to leave the capital drowning in filth and the police under-resourced and politicized (Gyimah-Boadi & Prempeh, 2012; Transparency International, 2022). Senior officers luxuriate in political patronage while frontline law enforcement is left toothless, shifting the burden onto crime victims.
Dr. Amoah’s schizophrenic outbursts reflect a deeper malaise: a political culture that tolerates, even rewards, incendiary language and impunity at the expense of national cohesion (Gyampo, 2021; Osei, 2017). Such rhetoric must be unequivocally condemned—if Ghana is to avoid spiralling into violence and dysfunction.
On 3 October 2026, during an appearance on Owia TV, Dr. Stephen Amoah (Sticka), MP for Nhyiaeso, shamelessly hijacked the discourse on the failed arrest of his colleague, Nana Agyei Baffour Awuah, by EOCO—a debacle that drew sharp criticism from human rights advocates, including Martin Kpebu (Daily Graphic, 2026; Joy News, 2026). Rather than address the core issue of due process and abuse of state power, Amoah narcissistically redirected attention to himself, a hallmark of his political persona (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015).
Such self-aggrandizing theatrics typify the toxic individualism and ego-driven politics plaguing Ghana’s Fourth Republic, where politicians, desperate for relevance, routinely exploit national crises for personal gain (Osei, 2017; Modern Ghana, 2026). Amoah’s conduct is not merely unbecoming; it is symptomatic of a broader malaise—an elite culture more invested in self-promotion than public service or democratic accountability.
In a characteristic display, Amoah defiantly declared, “If the NDC wants, they should arrest me. If I am arrested after committing an offence, I am okay. But if I do not commit an offence and I am arrested, after my release, Ghanaians will see what will happen” (GhanaWeb, 2026). Such rhetoric, especially from a legislator, is not only reckless but borders on criminal incitement. No serious democracy would tolerate a lawmaker threatening national stability in retaliation for lawful arrest (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Arthur, 2015).
Amoah must remember that the NDC, as the party in government, is constitutionally mandated to safeguard public order (Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Art. 12). His threats undermine the very rule of law he is sworn to uphold and expose a culture of elite impunity where politicians, shielded by privilege and immunity, resort to jungle justice while preaching peaceful legal resolution to the masses (Ayee, 2020; Boafo-Arthur, 2007).
Such behaviour perpetuates the colonial stereotype of African leaders as lawless and unfit for self-governance—a narrative weaponized by figures like Donald Trump to disparage Africa globally (BBC News, 2018). Until Ghanaian elites are held accountable to the constitution, the nation will remain shackled by the weight of external contempt and internal dysfunction.
During a panel discussion, Amoah declared, “every NDC member will leave the place [his constituency]. I swear by the God I serve, if you arrest me for no offence” (GhanaWeb, 2026). Such inflammatory rhetoric is not just reckless—it undermines the very foundation of Ghana’s constitutional order. Amoah would do well to process his thoughts in his mother tongue before releasing such crude threats; the English language, in this context, only amplifies his lack of self-restraint (Arthur, 2015; Gyimah-Boadi, 2017).
Amoah must be reminded: his constituency is not his personal estate, and Ghana is a republic governed by the rule of law. The Constitution explicitly guarantees freedom of movement and residence to all citizens (Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Art. 21). As a doctoral holder, Amoah should know that higher education demands critical reflection and sober judgment, not incendiary, ethnically charged outbursts (Boafo-Arthur, 2007; Osei, 2017). Weaponizing politics with threats and ethnic undertones corrodes democracy and betrays the responsibilities of public office.
What is most alarming about Amoah’s incendiary threats is the complicit silence from his party, especially Kennedy Agyapong, notorious for ad hominem assaults and calls for ethnic violence (Gyampo, 2021; Daily Graphic, 2023). Equally damning is the lack of condemnation from Ghana’s churches, pastors, and the National Peace Council—institutions that routinely invoke God’s name but conveniently “miss” such abuses when it serves their interests (Osei, 2017; GhanaWeb, 2026). The defence that they did not hear the invocation of God’s name in vain is intellectually dishonest.
Most politicians and pastors in Ghana are not the moral paragons they claim to be. Instead, they function as enablers—by action or omission—of the nation’s culture of insult and impunity (Arthur, 2015; Modern Ghana, 2024). The charismatic and prophetic clergy, many of whom profited handsomely under the PNDC and subsequent governments, operate much like a Ghanaian Sicilian Mafia. So-called “spiritual fathers” such as Nicholas Duncan-Williams, Mensah Otabil, Sam Korankye Ankrah, Charles Agyin Asare, and Dag Heward-Mills wield immense political and economic influence under the guise of spiritual leadership, while exporting religion and amassing wealth at the expense of their congregations (Asamoah-Gyadu, 2015; BBC News, 2019).
Amoah’s reckless threats are not isolated incidents—they are harbingers of greater danger for an already fragile nation. Tolerating such incendiary rhetoric from a Member of Parliament, rather than enforcing constitutional and penal provisions, signals a perilous willingness to forsake justice for political convenience (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Arthur, 2015). History is replete with warnings: the lead-up to the Rwandan genocide saw politicians like Léon Mugesera and Colonel Théoneste Bagosora weaponize hate speech and media to ignite ethnic violence, resulting in nearly a million deaths while the world looked away (Des Forges, 1999; Straus, 2006).
Ghana must heed these lessons. The failure to hold leaders like Amoah accountable—regardless of status—invites the erosion of civic order and opens the door to xenophobia and mass violence. The law must act decisively, not only for justice but as a stark deterrent to those who would exploit democracy’s freedoms to incite division (Transparency International, 2022; Daily Graphic, 2023). In a nation where every citizen’s fate is interlinked, the time to act is now. Letting a stitch save nine is far better than losing all to complacency.
References
Arthur, J. (2015). Political corruption and public accountability in Ghana. African Journal of Public Affairs, 8(2), 34-48.
Asamoah-Gyadu, J. K. (2015). Sighs and Signs of the Spirit: Ghanaian Perspectives on Pentecostalism and Renewal in Africa. Regnum Books International.
Ayee, J. R. A. (2020). Political economy of rule of law in Ghana. African Affairs, 119(475), 557-577.
BBC News. (2018, January 12). Trump ‘shithole’ remarks spark outrage across Africa. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42661049
Boafo-Arthur, K. (2007). Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State. Zed Books.
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), Art. 21.
Daily Graphic. (2026, October 4). EOCO’s botched arrest sparks outrage. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/eocos-botched-arrest-sparks-outrage.html
Daily Graphic. (2024, May 10). Sticka’s threat sparks controversy in Nhyiaeso. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/stickas-threat-sparks-controversy-in-nhyiaeso.html
Daily Graphic. (2023, March 21). Kennedy Agyapong under fire for threats and insults.https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/kennedy-agyapong-under-fire-for-threats-and-insults.html
Des Forges, A. (1999). Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. Human Rights Watch.
GhanaWeb. (2026, October 8). Churches and Peace Council silent on Amoah’s threats. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/churches-and-peace-council-silent-on-amoahs-threats-2026
GhanaWeb. (2026, October 3). I’ll sack every NDC member if I’m wrongly arrested – Sticka warns. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Ill-sack-every-NDC-member-if-Im-wrongly-arrested-Sticka-warns-2026
Gyampo, R. (2021). Political leadership and the decline of public trust. Ghana Journal of Politics, 12, 88-104.
Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2017). Corruption in Ghana: Trends, causes, and consequences. Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
Gyimah-Boadi, E., & Prempeh, H. K. (2012). Oil, politics, and Ghana’s emerging democracy. Journal of Democracy, 23(3), 94-108.
Joy News. (2026, October 5). Human rights groups condemn EOCO’s handling of MP’s arrest. https://www.myjoyonline.com/human-rights-groups-condemn-eocos-handling-of-mps-arrest/
Modern Ghana. (2026, October 7). Amoah’s TV tirade: Ego before accountability. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1432571/amoahs-tv-tirade-ego-before-accountability.html
Osei, M. (2017). Gender, media, and politics in Ghana: The case of female politicians. Journal of African Media Studies, 9(2), 265-279.
Straus, S. (2006). The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda. Cornell University Press.
Transparency International. (2022). Corruption Perceptions Index 2022: Ghana. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/gha
The Mahama government’s handling of the Labadi Beach demolition is a masterclass in narrative failure. Instead of clear governance, we see a government scrambling to spin events, transforming property destruction into a public relations circus (Daily Graphic, 2026; JoyNews, 2026). Since when did demolitions become partisan showcases rather than legal matters? When victims, even after securing interlocutory injunctions, find no recourse in the courts, it signals a collapse of the rule of law (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Arthur, 2015). The role of “police and military personnel” as demolition contractors is a gross abuse of mandate—state resources are misused, and legal boundaries are trampled (Modern Ghana, 2026). When government action turns arbitrary, citizens are left with the political equivalent of a frog leaping from boiling water: intolerant, unstable, and desperate for justice.
This paper offers no defence for business owners who broke the law, nor for the official narrative of the Laboma demolition—one riddled with contradictions and sanitized falsehoods. Ghana cannot progress by institutionalizing lawlessness or by legitimizing corruption through bribes for planning documents, permits, or environmental approvals (Ayee, 2020; Ampratwum, 2008). Development rhetoric is now a smokescreen for elite self-enrichment, turning public policy into a tool for enriching a privileged few while the majority languish in poverty (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016).
On September 13, 2026, the Post Flood Mitigation Task Force and the Greater Accra Regional Security Council, backed by the Ghana Armed Forces’ 48 Engineer Regiment, razed businesses across the Laboma enclave, including the Pink Flamingo Lounge. The stated aim—flood mitigation and basin restoration—rings hollow, as the official justification is contested by business owners denied due process (Daily Graphic, 2026; MyJoyOnline, 2026).
The Task Force’s selective demolition, as justified by Deputy Chief of Staff Stanislav Xoese Dogbe, raises the question: what political or economic interests dictated which structures survived? Such arbitrary enforcement reflects a corrupt system where power, not law, determines outcomes. Until such abuses are confronted, Ghana’s development will remain a façade for elite predation and growing inequality (Transparency International, 2022; Owusu, 2023).
Dogbe’s narrative on the Labadi Beach demolition epitomizes the linguistic acrobatics Ghanaian officials employ to obscure the obvious and rationalize the indefensible (Daily Graphic, 2026; GhanaWeb, 2026). On Facebook, Dogbe insisted, “Let’s not get it twisted: Friday’s action along a section of the beach was not a flood-mitigation action by the government task force,” and instead claimed it was conducted by National Security at the behest of Labadi Beach Hotel (GhanaWeb, 2026).
This disingenuous wordplay—substituting “action” for “demolition”—is a classic maneuver to muddy public discourse and evade accountability (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017). The coincidence of simultaneous demolitions by different state actors, while legal challenges were pending, reveals a deliberate disregard for due process and a strategy of governance by obfuscation (Transparency International, 2022; MyJoyOnline, 2026).
Dogbe’s projection that others are “twisting” facts, while he himself twists the narrative, mirrors a broader political culture in which leaders, as John Dramani Mahama is alleged to have admitted in 2020, embrace deception as a governing tool: “If you have to lie to them, you do so, and this is our way of doing things as political actors” (Modern Ghana, 2020). Such admissions, even if disputed, expose the rot at the core of Ghanaian political communication—where truth is sacrificed for expediency, and public trust is the casualty.
Building on Dogbe’s invocation of “National Security,” one must ask: what does “National Security” actually mean, and what is its constitutional function? As any Security Studies 101 student knows, National Security is not a monolithic agency but a coordinated framework of institutions—military, police, immigration, and others—charged with ensuring national stability and peace (Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Art. 83; Aning, 2006). Dogbe and his ilk have reduced “National Security” to a partisan militia, staffed with irregulars and loyalists whose primary allegiance is to the sitting government, not the Ghanaian state (Aning & Lartey, 2022; Daily Graphic, 2023).
Decades of politicization have transformed what should be a national safeguard into a blunt instrument of executive power—used to intimidate, silence, and even unlawfully demolish businesses while legal proceedings are ongoing (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Transparency International, 2022). No serious democracy deploys its military against private citizens when cases are sub judice. The military’s role is to defend against external threats, not terrorize the domestic population for political convenience.
Pivoting to a critical document, the Board of Trustees of the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) issued a letter dated 2 October 2026, asserting its ownership of Labadi Beach Hotel and La Palm Royal Beach Hotel. SSNIT claimed it had called for urgent intervention from the National Security Council Secretariat to combat ongoing illegal occupation, encroachment, and unauthorized activities on beachfront property adjacent to these hotels (Daily Graphic, 2026; GhanaWeb, 2026).
The agency cited escalating threats to guest and employee safety, unauthorized access to sensitive areas, fire and sanitation risks, environmental destruction, and the erosion of hotel privacy and operations—all jeopardizing revenue and financial sustainability. SSNIT warned that unchecked encroachment would make land recovery increasingly difficult and costly, underscoring the gravity of the situation and its broader implications for public asset management (MyJoyOnline, 2026; Transparency International, 2022).
Turning to the heart of the matter, while SSNIT—like any legal entity—has the right to defend its property, bypassing judicial remedies and resorting to state force before securing an interlocutory injunction is nothing short of corporate lawlessness (Aning, 2006; Daily Graphic, 2026). When did SSNIT first perceive such an acute threat as to warrant direct national security intervention? The suspicious haste with which armed personnel demolished multimillion-dollar properties reeks of political manipulation and a shadowy agenda (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; GhanaWeb, 2026).
The swiftness and violence of the Labadi demolitions suggest more than routine enforcement—it signals abuse of state machinery for partisan retribution. The viral video of CEO Raymond Archer, lamenting tit-for-tat demolitions targeting opposition businesses, only reinforces public suspicion of politically motivated vendettas (MyJoyOnline, 2026). This cycle of vindictiveness, where justice is equated with revenge, undermines the rule of law and deepens national cynicism (Transparency International, 2022; Owusu, 2023). By allowing SSNIT and National Security to circumvent legal process, the Mahama administration is complicit—whether by direct orchestration or willful neglect. This is governance by vendetta, not by law. History will judge whether the president’s claim that Ghanaians have “short memory” proves prophetic; the 2028 elections will offer the verdict.
In closing, Ghanaian politics since the advent of the Fourth Republic has degenerated into a vicious cycle of vendetta—“an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth,” or more aptly, “boot for boot.” Once admired for its democratic sanity, Ghana is now defined by the NDC and NPP’s relentless campaigns to undermine each other, prioritizing political score-settling over the urgent needs of citizens (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Arthur, 2015). This toxic rivalry has reduced governance to a zero-sum game, with public welfare relegated to an afterthought (Ayee, 2020; Daily Graphic, 2026).
Let us not mince words: politics in Ghana is now economics by other means. With rare exceptions—such as Dan Botwe—politicians are motivated by personal gain, eagerly attaching themselves to the corporate gravy train while their constituents languish (Transparency International, 2022; Owusu, 2023). Morality in Ghanaian politics ends where financial interests begin. Unless citizens wake up and scrutinize official narratives, the nation will remain stuck in mediocrity and corruption. The Laboma demolition is not an outlier; it is a symptom of a deeper malaise.
References
Ampratwum, E. F. (2008). The fight against corruption and its implications for development in Ghana. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 11(1), 67-83.
Aning, K. (2006). Security, the State, and the Politics of Protection in Ghana. African Affairs, 105(419), 419-436.
Aning, K., & Lartey, E. (2022). The Politicization of National Security in Ghana. African Security Review, 31(1), 15-29.
Arthur, J. (2015). Political corruption and public accountability in Ghana. African Journal of Public Affairs, 8(2), 34-48.
Aryeetey, E., & Baah-Boateng, W. (2016). Understanding Ghana’s growth success story and job creation challenges. Brookings Africa Growth Initiative.
Ayee, J. R. A. (2020). Political economy of rule of law in Ghana. African Affairs, 119(475), 557-577.
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), Art. 83.
Daily Graphic. (2026, October 3). SSNIT claims ownership of Labadi and La Palm hotels amid demolition row. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/ssnit-claims-ownership-of-labadi-la-palm-hotels-amid-demolition.html
Daily Graphic. (2026, September 14). Flood mitigation or land grab? Laboma demolition controversy deepens. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/flood-mitigation-or-land-grab-laboma-demolition.html
Daily Graphic. (2026, September 14). Flood mitigation or land grab? Laboma demolition controversy deepens. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/flood-mitigation-or-land-grab-laboma-demolition.html
Daily Graphic. (2026, April 18). Government under fire over Labadi Beach demolition. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/government-under-fire-over-labadi-beach-demolition.html
Daily Graphic. (2023, May 22). National Security—State protector or government enforcer? https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/national-security-state-protector-or-government-enforcer.html
GhanaWeb. (2026, October 4). SSNIT demands National Security intervention over Labadi Beach encroachment. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/ssnit-demands-national-security-intervention-over-labadi-beach-encroachment-2026
GhanaWeb. (2026, September 15). Dogbe clarifies Labadi Beach demolition: Not a flood-mitigation exercise. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Dogbe-clarifies-Labadi-Beach-demolition-Not-a-flood-mitigation-exercise-2026
Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2017). Corruption in Ghana: Trends, causes, and consequences. Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
JoyNews. (2026, April 19). Victims of Labadi demolition left in legal limbo. https://www.myjoyonline.com/victims-of-labadi-demolition-left-in-legal-limbo/
Modern Ghana. (2026, April 20). National Security oversteps mandate in Labadi Beach demolition. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1432567/national-security-oversteps-mandate-in-labadi-beach-demol.html
Modern Ghana. (2020, October 5). Mahama’s confession: Politicians must sometimes lie to win public support. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1033499/mahamas-confession-politicians-must-sometimes-lie.html
MyJoyOnline. (2026, October 5). SSNIT raises alarm over threats to hotel operations at Labadi Beach. https://www.myjoyonline.com/ssnit-raises-alarm-over-threats-to-hotel-operations-at-labadi-beach/
MyJoyOnline. (2026, September 16). Legal wrangling continues over Laboma demolitions. https://www.myjoyonline.com/legal-wrangling-continues-over-laboma-demolitions/
MyJoyOnline. (2026, September 15). Business owners dispute Laboma demolition notices; court battle looms. https://www.myjoyonline.com/business-owners-dispute-laboma-demolition-notices-court-battle-looms/
Owusu, G. (2023). Electoral populism and the hollowing out of policy in Ghana. Journal of African Elections, 22(2), 41-56.
Transparency International. (2022). Corruption Perceptions Index 2022: Ghana. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/gha
This commentary confronts a central malaise in Ghana: the selective application of the law and its corrosive impact on justice. I write as a friend of Ghana and an advocate for true justice, not as a partisan for the National Democratic Congress (NDC) or New Patriotic Party (NPP)—both of which have weaponized legal processes to serve Machiavellian ends (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Arthur, 2015). The law, as a tool of the state, must be wielded with integrity, guided by constitutional principles—not as a blunt instrument for political retribution. When justice is politicized, today’s rulers set a dangerous precedent for tomorrow’s adversaries, perpetuating cycles of vengeance and impunity (Ayee, 2020; Ampratwum, 2008). Only the principled, even-handed application of law can safeguard Ghana’s fragile democracy.
This commentary dissects the botched September 2026 attempt to arrest Baffour Nana Agyei Baffour Awuah, MP for ManhyiaSouth, by purported Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO) operatives. These officers, who refused to provide proper identification or legal justification, staged a broad daylight operation that looked more like an attempted kidnapping than a lawful arrest (Daily Graphic, 2026; MyJoyOnline, 2026). The NPP predictably labeled it a “witch-hunt”—a refrain used by both major parties when convenient—casting further doubt on Ghana’s commitment to the rule of law (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Arthur, 2015).
The above statement is not a defense of Baffour Awuah; the courts must decide his fate. The real question is: Why the rush to arrest him immediately after he posted bail for Salomay BafohAwiti, linked to the controversial “Ghana Jollof” case? Such actions reek of power abuse—an endemic “I will show you who’s boss” mentality that plagues Ghanaian politics (Ayee, 2020; Ampratwum, 2008). EOCO’s subsequent scramble to obtain a judicial order only underscores their initial disregard for due process. Are EOCO’s legal staff truly committed to the law, or are they partisan actors wielding the sledgehammer of anti-corruption as a political weapon? This spectacle exposes deep flaws in Ghana’s justice system, where legal procedures are too often sacrificed for political theater.
The NDC, under Mahama’s leadership, has lost credibility in the fight against corruption, positioning itself as both persecutor, jury, and judge—wielding EOCO as a partisan tool to settle political scores (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Transparency International, 2022). This brazen disregard for due process has inadvertently turned Baffour Nana Agyei Baffour Awuah into a political martyr, fueling his public profile and transforming him into a symbol of resistance, regardless of the evidence against him (Daily Graphic, 2026; MyJoyOnline, 2026). The spectacle of his confident walk to court, surrounded by supporters and a media circus, underscores how easily the line between perpetrator and victim is blurred in Ghanaian politics—where public perception routinely trumps justice (Arthur, 2015).
Further undermining its anti-corruption rhetoric, the NDC’s invocation of nolle prosequi to halt the trial of Stephen Kwabena Opuni and the opaque return and release of Sedina Christine Attionu Tamakloe—both facing serious charges of financial mismanagement—exposes the party’s selective justice and deep-seated institutional rot (Joy News, 2024; GhanaWeb, 2024). These actions signal not commitment to reform, but calculated political maneuvering. Should power shift again, the NPP is likely to continue this cycle, weaponizing anti-corruption to target opponents (Adusei & Ofori, 2023; Ampratwum, 2008). The result is a nation trapped in a perpetual witch-hunt, where public resources are squandered on political vendettas rather than genuine reform.
As youth unemployment soars, rural migration accelerates, teacher strikes over unpaid salaries grow, and government demolitions decimate businesses, public trust in the NDC government is evaporating. Citizens watch as party loyalists enrich themselves overnight, while others are told to “wait their turn” for opportunities that never materialize (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016; Daily Graphic, 2024). The NDC’s electoral prospects for 2028 are bleak—a reality party insiders dismiss as “treasonous” critique rather than hard truth (Joy News, 2024). As Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. remarked, “The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” No government can sustain itself by crushing its opponents and sanitizing its own corruption; eventually, the truth emerges, exposing systemic decay and fueling calls for genuine justice and accountability (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Transparency International, 2022). Power is not a birthright; it is a fleeting trust, and those who abuse it will be held to account.
References
Adusei, M., & Ofori, B. (2023). Political patronage and corruption in Ghana: Policy failures and elite complicity. Journal of Modern African Studies, 61(1), 99-120.
Ampratwum, E. F. (2008). The fight against corruption and its implications for development in Ghana. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 11(1), 67-83.
Arthur, J. (2015). Political corruption and public accountability in Ghana. African Journal of Public Affairs, 8(2), 34-48.
Aryeetey, E., & Baah-Boateng, W. (2016). Understanding Ghana’s growth success story and job creation challenges. Brookings Africa Growth Initiative.
Ayee, J. R. A. (2020). Political economy of rule of law in Ghana. African Affairs, 119(475), 557-577.
Daily Graphic. (2026, September 29). Botched arrest of Manhyia South MP by EOCO stirs controversy. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/botched-arrest-of-manhyia-south-mp-by-eoco-stirs-controversy.html
Daily Graphic. (2024, May 13). Public anger mounts over business demolitions and unpaid salaries. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/public-anger-business-demolitions-unpaid-salaries.html
MyJoyOnline. (2026, September 30). NPP slams EOCO over attempted arrest of Manhyia South MP. https://www.myjoyonline.com/npp-slams-eoco-over-attempted-arrest-of-manhyia-south-mp/
Joy News. (2024, April 12). Teachers’ strikes and rising discontent threaten NDC prospects. https://www.myjoyonline.com/teachers-strikes-rising-discontent-threaten-ndc-prospects/
Joy News. (2024, March 18). Nolle prosequi and the politics of selective justice. https://www.myjoyonline.com/nolle-prosequi-and-the-politics-of-selective-justice/
GhanaWeb. (2024, February 4). Sedina Tamakloe: The return, release, and political implications. https://www.ghanaweb.com
Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2017). Corruption in Ghana: Trends, causes, and consequences. Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
MyJoyOnline. (2026, September 30). NPP slams EOCO over attempted arrest of Manhyia South MP. https://www.myjoyonline.com/npp-slams-eoco-over-attempted-arrest-of-manhyia-south-mp/
Transparency International. (2022). Corruption Perceptions Index 2022: Ghana. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/gha
Addressing Ghana’s most urgent issues is not an antagonistic exercise, but a scholarly imperative. Despite my profound respect for Ghana’s anticolonial legacy—especially under Kwame Nkrumah, whose administration sacrificed scarce resources to support African liberation from colonialism and apartheid (Boafo-Arthur, 2007; Rooney, 2007)—the country now staggers under the weight of endemic corruption. Rationalizations that corruption is merely a “perception problem” are intellectually dishonest, given its documented depth and reach (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Asante & Ayee, 2021). On Ghana’s moral landscape, corruption is both vertical and horizontal, permeating every stratum of society. Finding a truly honest public servant is as rare as the proverbial needle in a haystack (Ampratwum, 2008; Transparency International, 2022). This paper interrogates a foundational question: Where did Ghana lose its moral and ethical footing?
I open this paper with the words of Lee Kuan Yew, the late Prime Minister of Singapore, whose legacy of servant leadership remains profoundly relevant to 21st-century postcolonial Ghanaian politics (Barr, 2014; Lee, 2000). While Nkrumah’s contributions to national and continental development are undeniable, I deliberately set him aside to avoid charges of bias from his critics and to invite a wider spectrum of scholarly and public engagement. This approach is essential for a candid discourse on Ghana’s entrenched systemic corruption, particularly among its leadership (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Ampratwum, 2008). For the purposes of this debate, I define corruption not narrowly as mere financial impropriety, but broadly through a cosmopolitan and eclectic lens—encompassing the moral decay of inaction and complicity, especially when individuals shield wrongdoers due to kinship or personal connections (Asante & Ayee, 2021; Hasty, 2005). This is not a reductionist critique; it is a call to confront the full spectrum of Ghana’s corrosive malaise
Lee Kuan Yew’s warning is clear and uncompromising: once corruption infects a political system from top to bottom, no revolution can cure it. Cleansing must start at the top, led by courageous, morally upright leaders with unquestioned integrity—an arduous, systematic process (Lee, 2000; Barr, 2014). Singapore’s success was not accidental; it was the product of relentless leadership and zero tolerance for corruption.
In contrast, 21st-century Ghana is plagued by a normalization of corruption—patronage, political protection, and the relentless pursuit of wealth are celebrated, not condemned (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Ampratwum, 2008). Neither the political class nor anti-corruption organizations have demonstrated the courage or integrity to break this cycle. The collective rot is pervasive, and Ghana’s so-called watchdogs are either complicit or powerless (Asante & Ayee, 2021; Hasty, 2005). Until true moral leadership emerges, Ghana’s fight against corruption is lost before it begins.
No analysis of Ghana’s crisis is complete without addressing illegal mining (galamsey), rampant online romance scams, and transnational cocaine trafficking. These scourges are not simply failures of weak leadership or bureaucratic inertia—they are the predictable outcome of entrenched political protection, elite impunity, and a judiciary compromised by patronage (Hilson, 2017; Aning & Kwarkye, 2022). Politicians, shielded by parliamentary immunity, and corrupt law enforcement officials collude with wealthy benefactors, while activist judges—whose career advancement depends on political loyalty—turn a blind eye to high-level criminality (Boateng & Darko, 2016; Ampratwum, 2008). The result: miners and small-time offenders are prosecuted, while the true architects of Ghana’s criminal economy remain untouchable, mocking justice from the shadows.
Ghana’s so-called fight against illegal mining, led by military detachments and the National Anti-Illegal Mining Operations Secretariat (NAIMOS) under the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, is a farce masquerading as reform. NAIMOS, along with costly military deployments, has produced little more than staged arrests of impoverished youth and the occasional Chinese nationals—many of whom are quietly released or deported only to return to business as usual, courtesy of diplomatic arm-twisting from Beijing (Hilson, 2021; Ayee, 2020; Alhassan & Boakye, 2022).
Televised excavator burnings are political theater, designed to project governmental resolve while the real financiers—party elites from both the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP)—enjoy total impunity, their generous donations shielding them from prosecution (Adusei & Ofori, 2023; Transparency International, 2022). The immunity of these political patrons is so entrenched that, under Nana Akufo-Addo’s administration, seized excavators vanished from state custody, only to reappear at illegal mining sites—a textbook case of elite capture and systemic corruption (Daily Graphic, 2021; Lee, 2000). As Lee Kuan Yew cautioned, corruption at the top echelons infects the whole system, crippling national development and making a mockery of any anti-corruption campaign (Lee, 2000; Barr, 2014). Ghana’s anti-galamsey crusade is not a fight—it is a charade, perpetuated by the very actors who profit most from the status quo.
The Minerals Commission stands as a glaring weak link in Ghana’s chain of official corruption. Officials routinely issue “prospecting” licenses fully aware that these are merely a cover for actual mining operations, not mineral exploration (Hilson, 2021; Adusei & Ofori, 2023). The regulatory charade is transparent: no legitimate exploration requires three years to confirm mineral presence—this is regulatory capture masquerading as due process (Ayee, 2020; Transparency International, 2022). The illegality is brazen. Licence holders descend on mining communities with an entourage of paid journalists, chiefs, local officials, and security agents. Uneducated villagers are paraded on TV, coached to feign support for the project, all to manufacture public consent (Alhassan & Boakye, 2022). Once the cameras leave, the “prospecting” license is quietly converted or sold as a mining concession, with state actors pocketing kickbacks and environmental devastation left unchecked (Daily Graphic, 2021; Adusei & Ofori, 2023). The Minerals Commission, instead of safeguarding Ghana’s resources, has become a facilitator of elite predation and ecological destruction.
Transitioning to the sham of “community mining” and “responsible mining,” these policy rebrands are nothing but cynical ploys to legitimize illegal mining and funnel concessions to party loyalists, wealthy patrons, and their families (Hilson, 2021; Adusei & Ofori, 2023). These hollow terms mask the environmental devastation—deforestation, poisoned water bodies, and loss of biodiversity—wrought by galamsey, while politicians trumpet job creation to pacify restless youth (Boateng & Darko, 2016; Alhassan & Boakye, 2022).
There is a glaring absence of transparent, evidence-based reporting from the Minerals Commission Inspectorate on the outcomes of these so-called reforms. The two dominant parties, NDC and NPP, when in power, are more invested in manufacturing the illusion of progress than in genuine environmental stewardship (Daily Graphic, 2023; Transparency International, 2022). Political elites and their clients operate as a predatory class, enriching themselves and funding their electoral ambitions on the back of environmental ruin (Owusu, 2023). As Lee Kuan Yew argued, unchecked corruption and self-dealing at the top will ultimately demand a revolutionary reckoning—a warning Ghana’s leadership ignores at its peril (Lee, 2000).
Turning to the rampant online romance scams and the extradition of Ghanaian nationals to the United States, it strains credulity to believe that the state—armed with substantial intelligence and law enforcement resources—was unaware of the scale of these crimes. Ghanaians have long whispered about the identities of perpetrators and their American victims, with social media figures like “Show Boy,” a self-confessed ex-convict and deportee, publicly naming scammers and exposing their deep political and business connections (Boateng, 2022; Osei-Tutu et al., 2016). The persistent inaction by authorities points to institutional complicity and protection for well-connected criminals (Aning & Kwarkye, 2022; Transparency International, 2022). As these networks become increasingly visible online, the state’s failure to act is not ignorance—it is a symptom of entrenched patronage and systemic rot.
In the United States and Canada, anti-money laundering (AML) statutes mandate that financial institutions report deposits exceeding $10,000, triggering scrutiny by state agencies (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network [FinCEN], 2023; Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada [FINTRAC], 2022). These laws ensure every sizeable bank deposit leaves an audit trail, allowing investigators to track the legitimacy of funds. Violators face swift prosecution and severe penalties under the criminal justice system. The rigorous enforcement of AML laws in these jurisdictions has fostered investor confidence and reinforced the integrity of the banking sector, making both countries respected destinations for global capital (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2023; Transparency International, 2022).
In Ghana, AML laws are little more than legal window dressing—statutes that exist to appease the international community while doing nothing to curb transnational crime (Adusei & Ofori, 2023; Transparency International, 2022). Like many failing states, Ghana’s AML framework is hollow, a façade for membership in the global fight against corruption while online romance scams and other financial crimes run rampant. Under the passive watch of compromised law enforcement, young scammers openly flaunt their illicit wealth—luxury cars, designer brands, ostentatious parties, and conspicuous philanthropy—all brazenly displayed on social media (Boateng, 2022; Aning & Kwarkye, 2022).
Security and intelligence agencies, some of whose members fraternize with these criminals, routinely turn a blind eye. Many Ghanaians perversely rationalize online fraud as payback for slavery, hailing perpetrators as “tech-whiz kids” and branding foreign victims as greedy fools who deserved their fate (Osei-Tutu et al., 2016). This defense of criminality is a moral travesty, echoing Lee Kuan Yew’s warning: where corruption is endemic at every level, governance collapses into autopilot and national sovereignty is forfeited (Lee, 2000; Gyimah-Boadi, 2017). The result: Ghana is compelled to extradite its citizens at the behest of foreign powers or face crippling cuts to aid, training, and intelligence cooperation (U.S. Department of State, 2023).
Turning to Ghana’s entrenched role as a cocaine transshipment hub, the recent seizure of 3.9 metric tons of cocaine—valued at €225 million ($261.45 million)—at Dunkirk port in France is merely the latest chapter in a long history of narcotics trafficking routed through Ghana (Aning & Kwarkye, 2022; Ellis, 2009; Daily Guide Network, 2023). This is not an isolated incident, but part of a persistent pattern. What is truly alarming is not just the familiar foot-dragging by authorities—a tactic long used to stifle investigations—but the total absence of comprehensive, transparent inquiry involving public oversight (Boateng, 2022).
Allegations implicating figures, such as Musa Attah (“Kromo”), reportedly a former member of President John Dramani Mahama’s security detail, remain unaddressed, while the state parades low-level operatives to feign seriousness (GhanaWeb, 2023). This scapegoating, with its calculated avoidance of powerful masterminds, is systemic; it perpetuates impunity, erodes public trust, and signals to criminal networks that Ghana remains open for business (Adu-Gyamfi, 2023; Transparency International, 2022). Until the state commits to real accountability at every level, the cycle of narco-politics will continue unabated.
On 26 September 2026, Deputy Director-General of NACOC, Alexander Twum-Barimah, declared that background checks on the Dunkirk cocaine seizure suspects revealed no links to President Mahama’s or Vice President Opoku-Agyemang’s security details. He asserted, “according to the information NACOC holds, [Musa] Attah is a farmer, not a member of any presidential protection unit” (Joy News, 2023). Yet, this claim raises critical questions: Is this “farmer” Attah the same individual photographed with President Mahama? What investigative rigor substantiates this assertion? Was information triangulated across intelligence agencies, community sources, and public records, or did NACOC simply parrot a sanitized narrative for political expediency (Boateng, 2022; Aning & Kwarkye, 2022)?
Twum-Barimah’s appeal to his own credentials as a trained presidential security officer reeks of institutional gatekeeping, foreclosing alternative explanations and reinforcing the culture of official secrecy that fuels Ghana’s status as a narco-transit hub (Adusei & Ofori, 2023; Transparency International, 2022). When security investigations are reduced to self-referential assurances from insiders, public trust is eroded, and criminal networks flourish under the protection of political and bureaucratic patronage (Ellis, 2009; Gyimah-Boadi, 2017). Ghana’s persistent vulnerability to international drug trafficking is rooted in this very culture of opacity and unaccountability.
In conclusion, I invoke Dr. Ephraim Amu’s enduring admonition from “Yen Ara Asaase Ni”: the destiny of Ghana rests squarely on the moral fiber of its leaders and citizens. When the state, either through inertia or complicity, treats crises as inevitable and shrugs off responsibility, it cultivates delusion—problems do not fade; they metastasize and threaten national security and state functionality (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Ampratwum, 2008; Transparency International, 2022).
Leadership, as Lee Kuan Yew demonstrated, is not about donning fine suits or delivering empty speeches on global stages. Nor is it about orchestrating photo-ops with security chiefs or basking in past glory. True leadership requires a relentless, uncompromising stand against threats to national stability—even if it means confronting allies, severing patronage networks, or enacting severe measures, including constitutionally sanctioned capital punishment when warranted (Barr, 2014; Lee, 2000; Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). Ghana’s survival demands moral courage, not cosmetic reforms.
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Adusei, M., & Ofori, B. (2023). Political patronage and illegal mining in Ghana: Policy failures and elite complicity.Journal of Modern African Studies, 61(1), 99-120.
Alhassan, R., & Boakye, K. (2022). State response to illegal mining in Ghana: The case of NAIMOS. Extractive Industries and Society, 9(3), 101-115.
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Barr, M. D. (2014). The Ruling Elite of Singapore: Networks of Power and Influence. I.B. Tauris.
Boafo-Arthur, K. (2007). Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State. Zed Books.
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This paper confronts the epidemic of media violence in contemporary Ghanaian politics. When did insults and buffoonery replace the intellectual rigour and visionary leadership exemplified by Nkrumah? When did vitriol and public ridicule become qualifications for political office, lucrative salaries, and social status (Osei, 2017; Gyampo, 2021)? Ghana’s public arena, once defined by respect and collective purpose, is now a theatre for loudmouth opportunists who thrive on division and insult.
Rooted in African tradition, I reject this descent. Our customs demand respect, restraint, and the elevation of community over ego. The African adage is clear: a hunter who arms himself with rabid dogs sows his own destruction, just as fostering cycles of verbal aggression breeds reciprocal violence and instability (Mbiti, 1990; Gyekye, 1997). Another African adage delivers a hard lesson: when a lion is devouring your kin, do not plead with the beast—act decisively to save your brother, or you will surely be the next victim. This proverb underscores the necessity of swift, uncompromising action against threats to the collective good, warning that passivity invites destruction (Mbiti, 1990; Gyekye, 1997). Inaction in the face of danger is complicit. This is not folklore; it is a profound warning. Ubuntu teaches that harm to one is harm to all, and unchecked political insult and aggression will consume the nation (Tutu, 1999; Nussbaum, 2003). Ghana teeters on the brink. To ignore the media-fueled partisan conflagration is to invite national decay and the spectre of interethnic and internecine violence. Silence and complacency are complicity.
I open this paper with a stark contrast: Ghanaian politics in the immediate post-independence era under Kwame Nkrumah was not a playground for reckless or divisive rhetoric. Even amidst fierce opposition from Kofi Abrefa Busia and his allies, political debates never descended into insult or vulgarity (Austin, 1964; Rooney, 2007). Under the regimes of Generals Ignatius Kutu Acheampong and Frederick William Kwasi Akuffo, public discourse, though autocratic, remained disciplined and free from the gutter politics and condescension that now plague the nation (Boafo-Arthur, 2007). As media veteran Cameron Duodu observed, parliamentary debate reached its zenith during Nkrumah’s tenure, when national interests superseded personal ego (Duodu, 2011). Today’s descent into insult-laden exchanges is a disgraceful betrayal of this legacy.
As a public intellectual, my sole commitment is to present facts for rigorous debate and scrutiny—not to malign any leader or orchestrate partisan subterfuge. Let the historical record stand: the normalization of insults in Ghanaian politics began under the late Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings. Rawlings both practiced and institutionalized ad hominem attacks, setting a precedent for political discourse that rewarded personal denigration over substantive policy (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015). His condemnation of “babies with sharp teeth”—a reference to National Democratic Congress (NDC) youth who turned their vitriol against him and his wife, Nama Agyemang Konadu Rawlings, during the 2011 Sunyani congress—was a belated awakening to the culture he enabled (Graphic Online, 2018; Modern Ghana, 2011). The revolution, as history shows, inevitably devours its own.
In the tumultuous early years of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), officials like Warrant Officer Isaac Frimpong weaponized rhetoric, openly declaring at a durbar at El-Wak Sports Stadium that citizens’ calls for free expression would be answered with “freedom of beating and assassination.” This threat, delivered in the presence of Rawlings and broadcast nationally, was conveniently omitted by state-controlled newspapers like the Ghana Times and Daily Graphic—a chilling testament to media censorship (Agyeman-Duah, 2008; Boafo-Arthur, 2007).
Rawlings, a self-styled populist Marxist turned capitalist, was notorious for inciting violence through abrasive language, branding critics as “enemies of the people,” “greedy bastards,” and “nation wreckers” (Gyampo, 2021; Oquaye, 2004). Such rhetoric was not mere bluster: it emboldened supporters to intimidate, silence, and even attack opponents, as seen in the infamous incidents of feces being thrown at dissenting media houses. Under Rawlings’s PNDC—and later the NDC—verbal aggression became a sanctioned tool of political intimidation, often serving as a prelude to outright violence and the suppression of dissent (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994; Graphic Online, 2018).
Rawlings’s rhetoric was relentlessly combative, often sacrificing statesmanship for partisan assault. His attacks on John Agyekum Kufuor’s administration, branding it as “the worst form of governance Ghana has ever seen,” were not grounded in evidence or legal action but in political theatre and self-righteous posturing (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015; Agyeman-Duah, 2008). Rawlings weaponized allegations of corruption and incompetence to elevate the NDC as paragons of virtue, while refusing to substantiate his claims through any formal legal mechanisms (Oquaye, 2004).
This tradition of incendiary politics persists. In September 2020, Isaac Adongo, MP for Bolgatanga Central constituency, inflamed Ghanaian discourse by labelling President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo and his cabinet’s Akyem members as the “Akyem Sakawa Boys”—accusing them, without evidence, of criminality and intent to plunder the nation (Joy News, 2020). Adongo’s refusal to apologize, and President John Dramani Mahama’s endorsement of this ethnic slur, not only insulted individuals but stereotyped an entire ethnic group, stoking the risk of ethnic conflict and undermining national cohesion (Gyampo, 2021; Daily Graphic, 2020). Such rhetoric is divisive, inflammatory, and antithetical to democratic norms.
In 2016, Felix Ofosu-Kwakye, now Government Spokesperson to President Mahama, publicly alleged that the New Patriotic Party (NPP) flagbearer Nana Akufo-Addo was terminally ill with prostate cancer, kidney failure, and a coronary blockage, insinuating his imminent death and portraying a vote for him as a national risk (Daily Graphic, 2016; Gyampo, 2021). This was not an isolated incident. Journalists-for-hire such as Blessed Godsbrain Smart, Kevin Ekow Baidoo Taylor, and Nana Kwadwo Jantuah have unleashed unprecedented waves of vitriol, often targeting Akufo-Addo with unchecked ferocity (Joy News, 2022). The NDC leadership’s silence in the face of this relentless abuse amounts to tacit endorsement, normalizing insult as political currency.
In 2022, during the “Arise Ghana” protest, NDC Communications Officer Sammy Gyamfi—now the Chief Executive Officer of the Ghana Gold Board—publicly called for the death of President Nana Akufo-Addo, a move that sharply escalated political incitement and undermined democratic norms (Modern Ghana, 2022). This kind of rhetoric transcends mere offensiveness; it corrodes public discourse and erodes the democratic fabric of Ghana (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015). The relentless barrage of insults from NDC officials and their surrogates is unmatched in frequency and severity, demanding robust scholarly and civic condemnation.
The NPP is not blameless. While their use of abusive language is less prolific than the NDC’s, recent incidents—such as the vile online attacks from the “Ghana Jollof” account, allegedly linked to NPP sympathizers—are equally deplorable and must be condemned unequivocally (Daily Graphic, 2022; Joy News, 2022). It is critical to note that these outbursts often emerge as reactions to the sustained provocations from figures like Kevin Ekow Baidoo Taylor, whose relentless denigration of public figures has heightened polarization and incited retaliatory abuse (Gyampo, 2021). Both camps are complicit in the degradation of Ghanaian political discourse, and the cycle of insult and escalation must be broken for the sake of national cohesion and democratic integrity.
Recent calls from both political camps for a cessation of insults and a national dialogue are nothing but hollow gestures—too little, too late. Such appeals are futile, raising the critical question: why now and what prompted this sudden desire for civility after years of mutual abuse and incitement (Gyampo, 2021; Osei, 2017)? These performative overtures lack sincerity and only underscore the entrenched culture of political hypocrisy and rhetorical violence in Ghanaian politics.
In September 2026, President Mahama’s claim of “immunity” to insults—likening his resilience to the skin of a crocodile—was a regrettable and tone-deaf response, particularly from a national leader (JoyNews, 2026). As a scholar, I contend that public vilification of a president is not merely personal; it degrades his family, with First Lady Lordina Mahama unfairly subjected to unwarranted abuse despite her dignified restraint (Osei, 2017). The collateral damage extends to his children, party, and ultimately the nation, as Ghana’s political discourse devolves into a cesspool where insults are rewarded rather than condemned (Gyampo, 2021; Modern Ghana, 2026). Mahama’s assertion that insults “roll off” him is not bravery, but a disingenuous dismissal of the corrosive effect such rhetoric has on Ghana’s democratic fabric (Arthur, 2015). Once celebrated as a beacon of civility, Ghana now risks becoming a cautionary tale of political decay.
As the tide of insults threatens to overwhelm Ghana, the nation urgently needs robust anti-defamation and criminal libel laws that have real consequences—not statutes treated as partisan suggestions by the judiciary (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015). Effective legal frameworks must impose meaningful penalties, including imprisonment and substantial fines, for those who weaponize speech to malign others or incite violence (Amegatcher, 2020; Daily Graphic, 2023). No democratic society tolerates free speech as a license to call for the death of a sitting president or to vilify his family without cause; such conduct is criminalized across advanced democracies (BBC News, 2022). Until Ghana enforces laws that bind all citizens—regardless of status or location—to responsible expression and accountability, the country will remain vulnerable to the chaos and violence that unchecked rhetoric can unleash. One reckless statement could ignite catastrophe, a risk no responsible nation should accept. President Mahama must show decisive leadership to avert disaster; the time for complacency is over.
References
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Amegatcher, Y. (2020). Defamation law and freedom of expression in Ghana: Striking a balance. Ghana Law Journal, 53, 101-119.
Arthur, J. (2015). Political corruption and public accountability in Ghana. African Journal of Public Affairs, 8(2), 34-48.
Austin, D. (1964). Politics in Ghana: 1946-1960. Oxford University Press.
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Boafo-Arthur, K. (2007). Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State. Zed Books.
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Osei, M. (2017). Gender, media, and politics in Ghana: The case of female politicians. Journal of African Media Studies, 9(2), 265-279.
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Campaign promises like the so-called “24-hour economy” are nothing more than desperate rhetoric—empty, convoluted phrases that quickly devolve into a modern-day Tower of Babel. These projects are built on unattainable ambitions and serve only to deceive the electorate, securing electoral victory while masking a lack of substantive vision. Far from offering real solutions, such schemes threaten to plunge the nation deeper into debt, squandering resources on impractical policies rather than addressing pressing developmental needs. The cycle of debt and wasted human capital persists, all for the sake of political expediency.
In this paper, I directly challenge the architects of the so-called “24-hour economy.” What does this term actually mean, and what are its practical requirements? Which nation—especially one with Ghana’s sprawling informal sector, widespread aversion to hard work, rampant crime, dilapidated infrastructure, unreliable internet, and unstable power supply—has ever succeeded in implementing such a model (Ayee, 2012; Whitfield, 2018)? Who conceived this doomed project, and what expertise, if any, informed its creation? How much were these “experts” compensated, and what political offices do they now occupy for peddling a concept that, while rhetorically appealing, collapses under scrutiny (Arthur, 2015)?
Ghana’s political class has perfected the art of walking before crawling—a form of policy insanity and inverted logic that prioritizes flashy slogans over grounded, evidence-based solutions (Gyimah-Boadi & Prempeh, 2012). The “24-hour economy” is a hollow fantasy, engineered for electoral gain rather than real national progress.
In the lead-up to the election, John Dramani Mahama, flagbearer of the National Democratic Congress, unleashed a torrent of campaign promises, stopping just short of guaranteeing voters a ticket to heaven (Daily Graphic, 2024; Modern Ghana, 2024). With corporate pastors and so-called moral entrepreneurs at his side—some claiming direct lines to the divine—Mahama publicly submitted to their blessings in a televised spectacle that left many Ghanaians incredulous (JoyNews, 2024; Asamoah, 2023).
His “24-hour economy” rhetoric promised an economic utopia: ghost jobs running three shifts, perpetual employment, and universal prosperity for the youth. Yet, the reality is a hollow performance. The newly minted “Office of 24-Hour Economy Secretariat,” with its polished website, offers little substance and no concrete benchmarks for success (Business & Financial Times, 2024). This is classic political theatre—grandiose promises with no roadmap, designed to seduce an electorate desperate for hope but left with nothing but empty slogans (Abdulai & Hickey, 2016; Owusu, 2023).
My review of the 24-Hour Economy Secretariat website exposes little more than a façade: glossy AI-generated images and recycled Marxist slogans are paired with utopian economic promises from President Mahama—promises that ring hollow on closer inspection (Business & Financial Times, 2024; Owusu, 2023). Mahama’s assertion that the “24H+ is a holistic integrated multisectoral program” enabling producers to “attack key bottlenecks” in agriculture, fisheries, and manufacturing is classic political theatre—grand rhetoric detached from the daily realities of Ghana’s working poor.
In truth, most farmers and fishers remain trapped in poverty, lacking the capital, education, and infrastructure to overcome production barriers (Anarfi & Osei, 2017; Daily Graphic, 2024). Their urgent needs—capital, fair pricing, and motorable roads—are ignored by technocratic platitudes and virtual marketing (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). The 24-Hour Economy Secretariat website, with its curated images and distant speeches, caters to political convenience while leaving the real problems unsolved. This spectacle is yet another example of how Ghanaian leadership remains disconnected from the lived experience of its most vulnerable citizens (Modern Ghana, 2024).
President Mahama’s claim that “The 24-Hour Economy is a catalyst for industrialization, export promotion and job creation…for everyone, every hour of the day” is pure paternalism—detached from the harsh realities of rural Ghana (The Chronicle, 2024; Anarfi & Osei, 2017). This rhetoric glosses over the fact that Ghana’s industrial base remains small, fragmented, and heavily reliant on imports (Baah-Boateng, 2019; Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). The idea that a 24-hour economy can “work for everyone” is a political fantasy, not grounded in the lived experience of farmers and fishers who struggle daily with poverty, lack of infrastructure, and minimal state support (Dzanku, 2015; Daily Graphic, 2024).
Mahama’s top-down, lecture-style delivery ignores the realities of those who form the backbone of Ghana’s economy—uneducated and marginalized labourers enduring harsh conditions. His vision does not reach those it purports to serve, reinforcing the disconnect between political elites and the nation’s working poor (Modern Ghana, 2024; Ofori-Atta, 2022). Without addressing structural deficiencies, the 24-hour economy is nothing more than hollow rhetoric.
President Mahama’s claim that “The 24-H+ programme will work to realize the full economic and commercial value of the largest man-made lake in the world [The Volta Lake]” is pure speculation—an exercise in political fantasy rather than actionable policy (The Chronicle, 2024; Joy Business, 2024). Praising Volta Lake’s potential is not a substitute for concrete planning or capital investment. Ghanaian politicians have long mastered the art of leveraging natural beauty and grand promises for electoral gain, yet fail to deliver verifiable, sustainable results (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016; Ofori-Atta, 2022).
What Volta Lake needs is a rigorous, transparent blueprint—subject to public scrutiny and rooted in adequate funding—not empty rhetoric or “mini-Singapore” daydreams. So far, the 24-hour economy is nothing more than a vision board, not a result-driven plan (Modern Ghana, 2024; Daily Graphic, 2024). Until leaders move from wishful thinking to accountable action, such pronouncements are little more than political theatre.
This paper is not a personal attack—I do not make policy—but it is an indictment of Ghana’s political class for routinely sending the electorate on wild goose chases with empty slogans and unworkable dreams (Adu-Gyamfi, 2023; The Chronicle, 2024). The 24-hour economy, while rhetorically appealing, is a fantasy in a nation plagued by youth unemployment, online fraud, and a rising culture of self-enrichment through illicit means (Aning, 2016; Owusu, 2023). Without a fundamental shift in youth mindset through targeted public education and enforceable job training programs, the promise of a 24-hour economy will remain a mirage.
Armed robbery, cybercrime, and institutional indifference make around-the-clock commerce dangerous and unsustainable (Boateng, 2021; Ghanaian Times, 2024). The very notion of a 24-hour economy collapses in the face of traffic gridlock, unmotorable roads, and chronic power outages—structural failures that successive governments have failed to address despite endless promises (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). No serious investor will risk capital in a country where basic infrastructure is neglected, and government agencies are reactive at best, waiting for disaster before taking action. Until these foundational issues are resolved, the 24-hour economy will remain nothing more than political theatre.
In conclusion, real change will remain elusive until the Ghanaian electorate seizes control—demanding accountability, rejecting political handouts, and asserting their power to determine the nation’s trajectory. Only when citizens make politicians uncomfortable with hard truths, expose hypocrisy, and show habitual liars the door will the toxic cycle of deception end. Until then, the public will continue to be force-fed deadlier lies, all in the name of political self-preservation, not national service.
References
Abdulai, A., & Hickey, S. (2016). The politics of development under competitive clientelism: Insights from Ghana’s education sector. African Affairs, 115(458), 44-72.
Adu-Gyamfi, S. (2023). Political marketing and unmet promises: Ghana’s electoral cycle and public trust. African Studies Quarterly, 24(2), 53-71.
Anarfi, J. K., & Osei, R. D. (2017). Rural poverty and agricultural development in Ghana: The case of smallholder farmers. Journal of Agriculture and Rural Development in the Tropics and Subtropics, 118(2), 183-195.
Aning, K. (2016). Organized crime in West Africa: Options for response. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Policy Brief, 8, 1-6.
Arthur, J. (2015). Political corruption and public accountability in Ghana. African Journal of Public Affairs, 8(2), 34-48.
Aryeetey, E., & Baah-Boateng, W. (2016). Understanding Ghana’s growth success story and job creation challenges. Brookings Africa Growth Initiative.
Asamoah, M. (2023, December 15). Politicians and pastors: The new alliance in Ghanaian campaigning. African Arguments. https://africanarguments.org/2023/12/politicians-and-pastors-the-new-alliance-in-ghanaian-campaigning/
Ayee, J. R. A. (2012). Manifestos and electoral promises in Ghana: An analysis of the 2008 general elections. Journal of African Elections, 11(2), 1-20.
Baah-Boateng, W. (2019). The youth unemployment challenge in Africa: What are the drivers? Economic and Political Weekly, 54(9), 41-47.
Boateng, F. D. (2021). Crime trends and policing in Ghana: An empirical overview. Journal of African Law, 65(2), 315-334.
Business & Financial Times. (2024, March 21). 24-Hour Economy Secretariat: More show than substance? https://thebftonline.com/2024/03/21/24-hour-economy-secretariat-more-show-than-substance/
Daily Graphic. (2024, February 24). Volta Lake potential remains untapped. https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/volta-lake-potential-remains-untapped.html
Daily Graphic. (2024, February 10). Farmers lament poor roads and low prices. https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/farmers-lament-poor-roads-and-low-prices.html
Daily Graphic. (2024, January 10). Election promises and the politics of hope. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/election-promises-and-the-politics-of-hope.html
Dzanku, F. M. (2015). Transient rural livelihoods and poverty in Ghana. Journal of Rural Studies, 40, 102-110.
Ghanaian Times. (2024, April 5). Floods, choked drains and government’s yearly ritual of blame. https://www.ghanaiantimes.com.gh/floods-choked-drains-and-governments-yearly-ritual-of-blame/
Gyimah-Boadi, E., & Prempeh, H. K. (2012). Oil, politics, and Ghana’s emerging democracy. Journal of Democracy, 23(3), 94-108.
Joy Business. (2024, March 10). Mahama’s 24-Hour Economy: Vision or mirage? https://www.myjoyonline.com/business/mahamas-24-hour-economy-vision-or-mirage/
JoyNews. (2024, February 17). Mahama’s prayer rally raises eyebrows. https://www.myjoyonline.com/mahamas-prayer-rally-raises-eyebrows/
Modern Ghana. (2024, January 12). Campaign promises vs. reality: The 24-hour economy in question. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1292448/campaign-promises-vs-reality-the-24-hour-economy-in-question.html
Modern Ghana. (2024, January 12). Election campaign rhetoric: Promises, prayers, and the politics of spectacle. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1292448/election-campaign-rhetoric-promises-prayers-and-the.html
Ofori-Atta, K. (2022). Political elitism and rural neglect: Ghana’s development paradox. African Affairs, 121(482), 128-146.
Owusu, G. (2023). Electoral populism and the hollowing out of policy in Ghana. Journal of African Elections, 22(2), 41-56.
The Chronicle. (2024, March 5). Mahama’s 24-hour economy: Promise or pipe dream? https://thechronicle.com.gh/mahamas-24-hour-economy-promise-or-pipe-dream/
Whitfield, L. (2018). Economies after Colonialism: Ghana and the Struggle for Power. Cambridge University Press.
In her incisive article, “The First Lady’s job is to serve the people, not to pass an English examination” (GhanaWeb, 2026), Victoria Hammah rightly asserts that Lordina Mahama’s primary duty is national service—not linguistic prowess. This exposes a toxic national obsession: equating fluency in colonial languages with brilliance and competence. I argue that this fetish for English fluency, while disparaging mastery of indigenous languages, is a lingering symptom of (neo)colonialism—one that perpetuates the fallacy that intelligence is measured by proficiency in the colonizer’s tongue (Bamgbose, 2011; Prah, 2018). Such a standard not only undermines local identity but also continues the colonial project of intellectual subjugation.
In contemporary Ghana, an incurable linguistic insecurity grips the elite—politicians, policymakers, and even ordinary citizens—who contort themselves to croak in English, often butchering syntax and diction in a misguided pursuit of colonial approval (Prah, 2018; Bamgbose, 2011). This obsession reached new comedic heights when Stephen Amoah (“Sticka”), MP for Nhyiaeso, boasted that his European education granted him “phonetics” prowess, despite his pronounced accent (GhanaWeb, 2023). Such episodes, whether intended as humour or not, lay bare the deep-seated inferiority complex that plagues Ghana’s elite. The compulsion to showcase English proficiency—no matter how fractured—reveals a nation still shackled by colonial linguistic standards, where broken English is performed to a mesmerized but ultimately subjugated audience.
Building on Nkrumah’s legacy, it is clear that accent or limitations in speaking a colonial language are not intellectual deficits. Nkrumah insisted that Black intellectual freedom and sovereignty are not measured by colonial fluency but by the ability to connect with and mobilize one’s people in their own languages—languages that carry the collective spirit, values, and responsibilities of the community (Nkrumah, 1961; Prah, 2018).
In a country grappling with poverty, disease, escalating living costs, and rising teenage pregnancy, the insistence that Lordina Mahama—or any Ghanaian leader—must address the nation in the Queen’s English is both misplaced and elitist (Bamgbose, 2011; Ansre, 1979). True leadership demands engagement in local languages, fostering genuine dialogue with those most affected by national crises (Prah, 2018; Bamgbose, 2011). In Ghana’s context, the power to inspire and lead lies in cultural authenticity, not linguistic mimicry of former colonial masters.
Would Lordina Mahama’s critics apply the same linguistic standards to European leaders’ wives who lack English fluency? Unlikely. This double standard exposes a deep-rooted colonial mentality among many Ghanaians and, more broadly, Africans who continue to valorize everything Western while disparaging African identity and linguistic heritage (Bamgbose, 2011; Prah, 2018; Mazrui, 2003). The insidious effects of colonial education persist, producing generations trained to think, speak, and even eat “White,” while rejecting African authenticity and agency (Ansre, 1979; Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, 1986).
Nowhere is this self-loathing more evident than in the resistance to elevating Twi—spoken by a majority of Ghanaians—to official status, or in the pride some Ghanaian diaspora parents take in depriving their children of African languages and culture, despite the children’s own interest (Prah, 2018; Bamgbose, 2011). Such attitudes reinforce racist stereotypes of Africans as peripheral to history and human achievement, perpetuating the myth that African contributions are merely nominal (Mazrui, 2003; Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, 1986). Until this colonial hangover is confronted, true African renaissance and self-determination will remain elusive.
Hammah’s robust defence of Lordina Mahama is a critical intervention in Ghana’s toxic political landscape. It exposes the nation’s corrosive political culture—one driven by shadowy financiers and lacking substantive policy discourse, especially regarding the role and impact of the First Lady (Osei, 2017; Tamale, 2020). More importantly, Hammah’s stance is a clarion call to decolonize Ghanaian feminism and reject the tired, patriarchal notion that women like Lordina Mahama should be confined to domestic roles and excluded from public life (Bamgbose, 2011; Prah, 2018; Tamale, 2020).
The evidence is clear: women in Ghana, as globally, have been pillars of national progress—excelling in public office, shaping transformative policies, and driving socioeconomic advancement (Tsikata, 2009; Adomako Ampofo, 2010). Lordina Mahama’s contributions to free education, youth employment, and programs for girls and young women mark her as a force for much-needed policy reform in a country grappling with urgent social challenges. Dismissing her activism is not just regressive—it is a disservice to Ghana’s future.
In conclusion, the personal attacks on Lordina Mahama are not only deeply sexist but also corrosive to Ghana’s national character. Demeaning the First Lady to score political points or tarnish the country’s image is intellectually dishonest and reflects a broader malaise in Ghanaian political discourse (Bamgbose, 2011; Tamale, 2020). Rather than engaging in substantive, evidence-based critique of public service, critics have resorted to ad hominem slander, dragging Ghana’s reputation through the mud (Ansre, 1979; Osei, 2017). This toxic culture of fabrication and personal vilification, unchecked by meaningful accountability, undermines the very fabric of a society once respected for its civility and democratic values. Freedom of expression does not license character assassination or gendered abuse (Republic of Ghana, 1992, Art. 21). If Ghana is to reclaim its standing as a model in African democracy, it must reject such base tactics and restore dignity to national debate. Lordina Mahama, like any public servant, deserves critique rooted in facts and respect—not insults, however veiled.
References
Adomako Ampofo, A. (2010). Female leadership and democratic development in Africa: Ghana in perspective. African and Asian Studies, 9(2), 217-241.
Ansre, G. (1979). Four rationalizations for maintaining the European languages in education in Africa. African Languages, 5(2), 10-17.
Bamgbose, A. (2011). African languages today: The challenge of and prospects for empowerment under globalization. In E. G. Bokamba et al. (Eds.), Selected Proceedings of the 40th Annual Conference on African Linguistics (pp. 1-14). Cascadilla Proceedings Project.
GhanaWeb. (2026, September 25). The First Lady’s job is to serve the people, not to pass an English examination. https://www.ghanaweb.com
GhanaWeb. (2023, May 19). Sticka’s phonetics: The MP’s latest comedy on the floor of parliament. https://www.ghanaweb.com
Mazrui, A. A. (2003). The language of Africa and the politics of translation. Journal of Modern African Studies, 41(1), 1-20.
Nkrumah, K. (1961). I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology. Heinemann.
Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o. (1986). Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. Heinemann.
Osei, M. (2017). Gender, media, and politics in Ghana: The case of female politicians. Journal of African Media Studies, 9(2), 265-279.
Prah, K. K. (2018). The Language of Instruction Conundrum in Africa. CASAS Book Series.
Republic of Ghana. (1992). Constitution of the Republic of Ghana.
Tamale, S. (2020). Decolonization and Afro-Feminism. Daraja Press.
Tsikata, D. (2009). Women’s organizing in Ghana since the 1990s: From individual organizations to three coalitions. Development, 52(2), 185-192.
This essay interrogates whether Ghanaian police possess constitutional authority to search a suspect’s phone without a court warrant. The debate pivots on the presumption of innocence and the balance between law enforcement imperatives and constitutional rights. While Oliver Barker-Vormawor asserts that police must always obtain a court order to access seized phone data—a position grounded in the Ghanaian Constitution’s protection of privacy (Constitution of Ghana, 1992, art. 18)—the law is far from absolute. There exist notable exceptions, both in Ghanaian and comparative jurisprudence, that require rigorous scholarly scrutiny.
British and American case law illustrate that warrantless searches may be justified in exigent circumstances—such as imminent threats to public safety or the risk of evidence destruction. In the United States, Riley v. California (2014) held that police generally require a warrant to search a mobile phone, but recognized exceptions for exigent circumstances (Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 2014). Similarly, British courts have accepted that immediate searches can be justified to prevent crime or protect the public (see R v. Grant [2005] UKHL 2; R v. Khan [1997] AC 558). Ghanaian courts have echoed these principles. In Republic v. Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & Others (2018), the Supreme Court of Ghana recognized that privacy rights are not absolute and may be lawfully abridged in the interest of public order or crime prevention.
Thus, while the default rule demands judicial oversight, the Constitution and relevant case law acknowledge that exceptions exist where immediate action is necessary to avert crime or threats to public order. The legal landscape is clear: a blanket prohibition on warrantless searches is intellectually unsound and constitutionally incomplete.
The gap in Vormawor’s submission is its overgeneralization—a common shortcoming among Ghanaian elites and scholars who often present incomplete legal arguments, leaving audiences confused and ill-informed. Such generic claims, especially in the context of legal education, do little to advance substantive discourse or clarify the nuanced realities of constitutional law (Amegatcher, 2020; Nyarko, 2022).
Jurisprudence from Ghana, the UK, and the US makes clear that while warrants are generally required to search suspects’ phones, critical exceptions exist. Republic v. Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & Others (2018) acknowledges that constitutional privacy rights are not absolute in Ghana. British law, as in R v. Grant [2005] UKHL 2, and American law, as in Riley v. California (2014), both recognize exigent circumstances where immediate searches are lawful. Legal analysis requires specificity, not sweeping generalization. Scholars must engage with the complex interplay of rights and exceptions or risk perpetuating legal confusion.
In law enforcement, time is paramount. A police officer with reasonable grounds to suspect imminent criminal activity—especially when involving a phone as a potential instrument of crime—is fully empowered under Ghanaian, British, and American law to act without a warrant in exigent circumstances. The collective right to public safety outweighs the individual’s right to privacy when national security, homicide, or the prevention of serious crime is at stake (Republic v. Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & Others, 2018; R v. Grant [2005] UKHL 2; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 2014).
Insisting that police must always obtain a court warrant before searching a suspect’s phone is a legal fiction that undermines effective policing and public safety (Nyarko, 2022). No competent law enforcement officer would allow bureaucratic delays to jeopardize lives or national security. The law is clear: public interest and the prevention of crime justify immediate action, and legal systems worldwide recognize this necessity.
Alternatively, when a police officer determines that a suspected crime poses no imminent threat to national security, the community, or individuals, procedure dictates that the officer seek a court warrant before searching a suspect’s phone. In such cases, where time is not of the essence and the anticipated crime is not imminent, judicial oversight is both practical and required (Criminal Procedure Code Act 30, Ghana; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 1983; R v. Chief Constable of Lancashire, ex parte Parker [1993] QB 519). Ghanaian law and international best practices demand this balance between effective policing and constitutional protections (Mensah-Bonsu, 2018; Kwarteng, 2021).
It must be said, however, that Vormawor’s broad assertion on phone searches is undermined by its failure to distinguish between urgent and non-urgent circumstances. His critique appears less a good-faith legal argument than a sweeping indictment of the Ghana Police Service—a force not without fault, but one that operates within a legal system that recognizes both the necessity of judicial warrants and the reality of exceptions (Republic v. Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & Others, 2018; United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 1984; R v. Chief Constable of Lancashire, ex parte Parker [1993]). Rather than a personal attack, my analysis offers a rigorous, critical reconstruction of the issue, underscoring the need for nuance and fidelity to legal frameworks.
For rigorous debate, Vormawor’s position requires a more nuanced engagement with comparative constitutional law. The U.S. Fourth Amendment generally protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, while the Fifth guards against self-incrimination. Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court in Riley v. California (2014) held that police “generally” need a warrant to search cell phones, but recognized exceptions—such as exigent circumstances, probable cause, or voluntary consent (Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 2014; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 1973; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 1973).
Moreover, American courts have upheld warrantless searches during emergencies or when evidence is at risk of destruction (Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 2011). Law enforcement may seize phones while seeking a warrant and can use technological tools to access data, further eroding the notion of absolute privacy (Smith & Chin, 2021). These exceptions are disproportionately applied to marginalized communities, notably African American men, raising civil liberties concerns (Carbado, 2017).
British law echoes these principles. Under R v. Grant [2005] UKHL 2 and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), police may conduct searches without a warrant under reasonable suspicion or in emergencies, especially in cases involving serious crimes or public safety threats (Fenwick, 2017).
Ghana’s 1992 Constitution protects privacy and due process but allows for exceptions in the interest of national security or crime prevention (Mensah-Bonsu, 2018). Ghanaian law, like its American and British counterparts, recognizes that absolute rights yield in the face of compelling state interests—leaving the door open to both judicial oversight and necessary exceptions.
Legal rights are not a one-way street; they exist within a labyrinth of judicial interpretation and practical exceptions. The balance between individual liberties and collective security is a battle fought in every legal system, and seasoned counsel know how to exploit its twists and turns. I invite critical feedback and further scholarly engagement on this evolving terrain.
References
Amegatcher, Y. (2020). The Ghana Legal System. Accra: Advanced Legal Publications.
Carbado, D. W. (2017). From Stop and Frisk to Shoot and Kill: Terry v. Ohio at Fifty. Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 15, 61-85.
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992). Accra: Government Printer.
Fenwick, H. (2017). Civil Liberties and Human Rights. Routledge.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011).
Kwarteng, A. (2021). Search and seizure in Ghana: Constitutional and statutory perspectives. Ghana Law Journal, 53, 71-92.
Mensah-Bonsu, H. J. A. N. (2018). Criminal justice and constitutional rights in Ghana. African Journal of Legal Studies, 11(1), 55-70.
Nyarko, M. G. (2022). Privacy and Digital Evidence in Ghanaian Criminal Procedure. Journal of African Law, 66(1), 103-125.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), UK.
Republic v. Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & Others, Supreme Court of Ghana, [2018] GHASC 20.
R v. Chief Constable of Lancashire, ex parte Parker [1993] QB 519 (UK).
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
R v. Grant [2005] UKHL 2.
R v. Khan [1997] AC 558.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
Smith, R., & Chin, A. (2021). Digital privacy and law enforcement: Forensics, encryption, and the law. International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 29(1), 1-23.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
In this article, I interrogate the enduring bond of siblinghood between Ghana and South Africa—a relationship far deeper than the sensationalist narratives advanced by “March and March” protestors and amplified by Western media would suggest (Adogamhe, 2008; Mbeki, 2012). While calls for the expulsion of Ghanaians and other Africans have captured headlines, such divisive rhetoric ignores the profound historical and political connections forged through shared struggles against colonial domination and apartheid (Akyeampong & Gates, 2012).
Ghana’s pivotal role under Kwame Nkrumah in supporting the Pan-Africanist Congress, led by Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, remains a cornerstone of Pan-African solidarity (Adi, 2012). Both Nkrumah and Sobukwe believed fiercely in African self-governance, resisting both external colonial impositions and internal attempts to dilute the Pan-African flame (Zeleza, 2014). Despite contemporary pressures from foreign interests and opportunistic political actors seeking to sow discord, the historical ties and shared destinies of Ghana and South Africa must be recognized, preserved, and celebrated. Only through critical reflection and mutual engagement can the Pan-African spirit endure and flourish.
Building on his early political career, Nkrumah’s tenure as general secretary of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was marked by growing frustration with the complacency and elitism of his peers—many of whom were content with the British government’s empty promises of gradual reform (Adi, 2012; Biney, 2011). Nkrumah recognized that these promises were calculated to placate the Gold Coast’s elite and indefinitely postpone true independence. Rejecting this conservative approach, he championed “Positive Action” and “Freedom Now” as more than slogans—they were urgent calls for ideological confrontation and mass mobilization, rooted in the conviction that genuine national and continental freedom could only be achieved through direct, assertive action (Nkrumah, 1961; Zeleza, 2014). For Nkrumah, independence was inseparable from the restoration of Black dignity and the broader liberation of Africa from colonial rule.
Transitioning to his vision for continental liberation, Nkrumah forcefully argued that imprisonment for anti-colonial activism was preferable to a life of submission and servitude under colonial rule (Biney, 2011). For Nkrumah, Ghana’s struggle for independence was inseparable from the broader African fight against colonialism—a conviction immortalized in his historic declaration: “The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked-up with the total liberation of the African Continent” (Nkrumah, 1961, p. 93). He acknowledged the immense challenges ahead but insisted that a transformed African mindset would enable the continent to reclaim agency and dignity: “a new Africa is ready to fight his own battles and show that, after all, the Black man is capable of managing his own affairs.” This radical message reverberated throughout the Pan-Africanist Congress under Sobukwe’s leadership, galvanizing a generation to pursue uncompromising continental emancipation (Adi, 2012; Zeleza, 2014).
Shifting to the pivotal moment of the All-African People’s Conference in Accra on December 8, 1958, Nkrumah—then Prime Minister of newly independent Ghana—delivered a powerful indictment of colonialism and an impassioned call for African self-representation (Adi, 2012; Biney, 2011). He leveraged the gathering of freedom fighters, nationalist organizations, and trade unionists to assert that Africans must speak for Africa, demanding unity and collective action for continental freedom and independence. Nkrumah’s address explicitly spotlighted the plight of Black South Africans and the peoples of neighbouring dependent territories, making the struggle against apartheid and settler colonialism a continental mandate (Zeleza, 2014; Mazrui, 2003).
Fully cognizant of the risks Ghana faced in defying imperial interests, Nkrumah declared Ghana’s unyielding commitment to supporting oppressed peoples, vowing to resist imperialism and all its variants—including “racialism,” his pointed reference to White settler domination and anti-Black violence (Biney, 2011; Adi, 2012). He challenged African leaders to remain courageously committed to the cause of liberation, undeterred by the inevitable hardships ahead.
Continuing his uncompromising stance, Nkrumah framed the 1958 All-African People’s Conference as the beginning of a decisive new chapter in Africa’s anti-colonial struggle (Adi, 2012; Biney, 2011). He rallied liberation movements from across the continent and dependent territories to adopt bolder, even armed, strategies to “wipe out imperialism and colonialism and erect in their places a union of free [and] independent African States” (Nkrumah, 1961, p. 132). Nkrumah demanded that Africans seize opportunities to strike against their oppressors at moments of weakness, unapologetically pursuing the imperative to shatter the grip of White domination. He further pledged to share Ghana’s revolutionary experience, fully aware of the risks—a commitment that ultimately cost him his presidency in the 1966 coup but never shook his resolve (Biney, 2011; Mazrui, 2003). Nkrumah’s militant vision and sacrifice remain a clarion call for continental self-determination.
Expanding on his fierce advocacy for African self-determination, Nkrumah’s address to the United Nations on October 5, 1961, was a scathing indictment of Western imperialism and UN inaction, particularly in the wake of Patrice Lumumba’s assassination in the Congo (Nkrumah, 1961; Biney, 2011). Nkrumah condemned the West’s grudging concessions of independence and declared that only African unity could provide authentic solutions to the continent’s crises. For Nkrumah, solidarity was not optional—Africa had a duty to extend tangible support to territories still suffering under colonial and white minority rule (Adi, 2012).
Shifting focus to continental affairs, Nkrumah’s landmark “We Must Unite or Perish” speech at the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa on May 25, 1963, challenged African leaders to transcend empty rhetoric and forge a united front against colonial domination (Biney, 2011; Mazrui, 2003). He demanded that independent African states not only commit to charter ideals but actively assist liberation movements. Nkrumah’s vision of a common African destiny was foundational in Ghana’s support for the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa and beyond
Expanding on this ideological legacy, striking parallels emerge between Nkrumah and Sobukwe in their uncompromising rejection of colonial structures and their unwavering belief in the African personality, identity, capability, and humanity (Adi, 2012; Biney, 2011). Both leaders positioned the reclamation of African agency as central to the continent’s liberation, insisting that Africans must define their destiny on their own terms, free from the vestiges of colonial subjugation (Mangcu, 2012; Zeleza, 2014).
Sobukwe’s formative years and emergence as a formidable political activist began at Fort Hare University, where he joined the African National Congress Youth League and became President of the Student Representative Council in 1948—the year South Africa officially adopted apartheid under Prime Minister D. F. Malan (Lodge, 1983; Maaba, 2001; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). Sobukwe quickly recognized the corrosive impact of racist legislation on Black students and the broader Black population (Posel, 2001; Worden, 2012). The veneer of dignity afforded by campus life could not mask the brutal realities of colonial violence, humiliation, and even death at the hands of the state (Mangcu, 2012). Sobukwe viewed colonial education at Fort Hare as a tool designed to co-opt Black students into serving the interests of the apartheid regime, turning them into willing adjuncts against their own people (Pityana et al., 1991). Rejecting this insidious agenda, Sobukwe chose the revolutionary path—confronting the regime and challenging the myriad forms of institutionalized racism with unwavering resolve (Posel, 2001; Worden, 2012; Zeleza, 2014).
Further sharpening his critique, Sobukwe was not only a student of Black history and experience but also rigorously analyzed the mechanics of apartheid through his studies in Native Administration, exposing the racial engineering behind the governance of Black South Africans (Lebakeng, 2018; Posel, 2001; Worden, 2012). This academic grounding fueled his commitment to a militant, Pan-Africanist anti-apartheid campaign that centred the plight of all colonized peoples across the continent (Lodge, 1983; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). Like Nkrumah, Sobukwe believed that South Africa’s liberation struggle was fundamentally intertwined with Africa’s collective fight against colonial domination; oppression anywhere in Africa was oppression everywhere (Lebakeng, 2018; Lodge, 1983; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).
Sobukwe fiercely rejected the artificial borders and ethnic divisions imposed by colonial administrators, insisting that African fraternity was rooted in a shared destiny—not in identities or cultures fractured for colonial convenience. He condemned Black local authorities—Native Representative Councils and Native Advisory Boards—who aligned themselves with colonial power for personal gain, oblivious to the damage wrought upon the Black collective (Lebakeng, 2018).
Intensifying his divergence from the mainstream, Sobukwe’s move to Mofolo (now part of Soweto) and his lecturer post at the University of Witwatersrand marked a new phase of militant intellectual activism (Lebakeng, 2018). He leveraged Beware, Pan-Africanist social commentaries as an uncompromising platform to denounce the ANC’s collaboration with the White establishment, arguing that such alliances fractured Black unity and ultimately prolonged the stranglehold of the apartheid regime (Lodge, 1983; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).
Sobukwe, a staunch Pan-Africanist, insisted that African liberation required a wholesale rejection of White supremacy and the inferiority myth imposed on Africans—a vision resonant with Nkrumah’s demand for continental solidarity against colonial oppressors (Lodge, 1983; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). Unlike the ANC’s incrementalist approach, which Sobukwe saw as timid and complicit, he called for immediate, continent-wide emancipation and condemned the concept of multiracialism in a Black-majority country as an affront to democratic principles (Lodge, 1983).
In 1959, Sobukwe’s frustration with the ANC’s caution and acceptance of the Freedom Charter—a document he deemed a betrayal of Black self-determination—led him to found the Pan-Africanist Congress. For Sobukwe, the Charter’s rhetoric that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it” (Maaba, 2001, p. 421) was a capitulation, diluting Black suffering and deferring genuine liberation in favour of political expediency (Lodge, 1983; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).
Expanding on this ideological lineage, Sobukwe distinguished himself through an uncompromising commitment to immediacy in the struggle for Black liberation, mirroring Nkrumah’s radical call for “Independence Now” and “Positive Action”—methods that included mass mobilizations, sit-ins, and boycotts against colonial and White minority rule (Adi, 2012; Biney, 2011; Nkrumah, 1961). Sobukwe categorically rejected the gradualism favoured by reformist elites, viewing any attempt to partition South Africa into Bantustans or to acquiesce to ethnic and cultural compartmentalization as a betrayal of the anti-colonial cause and a perpetuation of apartheid’s logic (Lodge, 1983; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Posel, 2001).
Sobukwe advanced a Pan-African vision, insisting that the struggle in South Africa was inseparable from broader continental liberation movements. He warned that deferring freedom or accepting fragmented sovereignty would only embolden oppressors and prolong Black subjugation (Mangcu, 2012; Zeleza, 2014). This conviction was forcefully echoed in Nkrumah’s declaration on March 6, 1957: “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked to the total liberation of Africa” (Nkrumah, 1961, p. 93). Both leaders insisted that Africa’s strength lies in unity—transcending artificial geographic, ethnic, and cultural boundaries imposed by colonial powers. For Sobukwe, embracing African unity was not mere rhetoric but a strategic imperative for dismantling the structures of White supremacy and achieving genuine emancipation for all Black people (Adi, 2012; Lebakeng, 2018). Critically, Sobukwe’s legacy as an aggressive proponent of immediate, collective action continues to inspire contemporary movements that resist not only racial oppression but also the political inertia and factionalism that still threaten African progress (Mangcu, 2012; Zeleza, 2014; Adogamhe, 2008). His example serves as a powerful reminder that liberation is achieved not through compromise or gradual reform, but through courageous, united resistance.
Escalating the anti-apartheid struggle to its most defiant phase, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) under Sobukwe’s uncompromising leadership orchestrated a national protest against South Africa’s Pass Laws on March 21, 1960—a campaign that culminated in the Sharpeville massacre, where police killed 69 unarmed protesters (Worden, 2012; South African History Online, n.d.; The New York Times, 1960). Sobukwe, demonstrating unparalleled resolve, led his supporters to surrender their passbooks at the Soweto police station, an act of direct confrontation with state power (Lebakeng, 2018).
Sobukwe was arrested, charged with incitement, and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment—a sentence he accepted without appeal or legal counsel, underscoring his commitment to the cause (Posel, 2001; Lebakeng, 2018). The apartheid regime, recognizing his influence, amended the General Law Amendment Act in 1963 to include the notorious “Sobukwe Clause,” allowing indefinite detention of political prisoners—legislation crafted explicitly to neutralize Sobukwe by extending his imprisonment beyond his sentence (Republic of South Africa, 1963; Posel, 2001; Worden, 2012).
Under the Sobukwe Clause, he endured an additional six years in solitary confinement on Robben Island, marking him as one of the apartheid state’s most feared and isolated political prisoners (South African Government, 1963; Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1997; Lebakeng, 2018). Upon release in 1969, Sobukwe was exiled to Kimberley, where state surveillance and isolation continued until his death from lung complications on February 27, 1978 (SouthAfrica-Info, 2026). He is buried in Graaff Reinet, his legacy immortalized as a relentless adversary of White supremacy and a martyr of African liberation (Lebakeng, 2018; Mangcu, 2012).
Moving forward, I sharply delineate Ghana’s unwavering commitment to the liberation of Southern African nations, with a particular focus on South Africa. This analysis challenges the revisionist narrative that Ghana and other independent African states abandoned Black South Africans during apartheid’s darkest hours. In fact, Ghana provided critical diplomatic, financial, and moral support to anti-apartheid movements, often at great risk and sacrifice (Adi, 2012; Biney, 2011; Zeleza, 2014).
Despite limited resources, Ghana’s solidarity was uncompromising. Nkrumah’s government extended the “widow’s mite,” sending funds, logistics, and sanctuary to exiled activists, while enduring relentless pressure and reprisals from neocolonial powers determined to punish any state that threatened the status quo (Mazrui, 2003; Rooney, 2007). Western intelligence agencies and their regional allies never forgave Nkrumah for his bold advocacy of Black emancipation and Pan-African unity; his overthrow in 1966 was, in part, a direct consequence of his anti-imperialist activism (Biney, 2011; Rooney, 2007). Ghana’s legacy is not one of indifference, but of principled resistance—proof that, despite artificial colonial borders, the struggle for African freedom is a shared, continental cause (Zeleza, 2014; Adi, 2012).
Shifting focus to concrete support, Nkrumah’s government, despite the vast distance from South Africa, directly funded and established military training camps in Ghana for Southern African liberation fighters. The goal was clear: to equip guerrillas to overthrow apartheid and dismantle regimes that trampled Black freedom and justice (Grilli, 2018; Adi, 2012). The Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), under the initial leadership of George Padmore and later David Bosumtwi-Sam, operated as a pan-African intelligence and logistics network, predating and inspiring the Organization of African Unity (Grilli, 2018; Rooney, 2007). Nkrumah was no pacifist. He recognized that the apartheid regime would not yield to diplomacy alone. Armed struggle, supported by Ghana’s limited but resolute resources, was a necessary and legitimate path to liberation (Biney, 2011; Grilli, 2018). He advocated a dual strategy—combining positive action with military resistance—to break the back of South African apartheid and ignite continental emancipation.
Turning to tactical support, Nkrumah’s commitment went far beyond rhetoric. In May 1959, he transformed the African Affairs Centre (AAC) in Accra into a hostel and staging ground for African freedom fighters—an operational hub for those en route to military training camps in Ghana (Grilli, 2018). After the Sharpeville Massacre in March 1960, Ghana became a safe haven for South African refugees, and Accra hosted the South African United Front (SAUF), a coalition of the PAC and ANC, personally funded by Nkrumah until its collapse in 1962. At the Mankrong training camp in the Eastern Region, the first course began on 3 December 1961 and ended on 23 June 1962, consisting of eight weeks of commando training and ten weeks of weapons and explosives training (Grilli, 2018, p. 67). This direct sponsorship underscores Nkrumah’s relentless drive for Black South African liberation and continental unity (Grilli, 2018; Adi, 2012).
State archival evidence confirms the scope of this intervention. Between March and September 1960, Ghana trained dozens of South African activists in martial arts and sabotage; in August alone, 22 PAC members received military training, and another 30 “Bantu from Johannesburg” followed in December (Grilli, 2018, pp. 63–64). While these numbers may seem modest, for the apartheid regime, even small cadres of trained militants represented a grave national security threat—one warranting harsh repression. Nkrumah’s Ghana, undeterred by risk, stood at the forefront of African resistance, leveraging limited resources to disrupt the machinery of White supremacy and embolden the liberation struggle (Rooney, 2007; Zeleza, 2014).
In 1961, Nkrumah committed the External Service of the Ghana Broadcasting System, enabling Radio Ghana’s broadcasts to reach almost the entire continent. Specific programmes on African liberation were delegated to the offices of parties represented in Accra, such as the PAC. This direct sponsorship underscores Nkrumah’s relentless drive for Black South African liberation and continental unity (Grilli, 2018; Adi, 2012).
Nkrumah weaponized culture—arts, radio, poetry, debate, and music—as a forceful tool for political mobilization and memorialization of apartheid’s victims and heroes. The Voice of Africa, a state-funded media platform, empowered PAC leaders like Peter Raboroko to provide literary and strategic direction, broadcasting revolutionary messages and essays to a continent-wide audience (Grilli, 2020). Radio Ghana, through the “Freedom Fighters” program, gave voice to liberation organizations aligned with Nkrumah, amplifying the South African struggle and forging pan-African solidarity. These broadcasts were more than propaganda; they were calls to action. Songs like Miriam Makeba’s “Khawuleza,” which exposed township terror, and “Beware, Verwoerd! (Ndodemnyama),” a direct warning to apartheid’s architects, became anthems of resistance. “Mombela/Umbombela,” the train song, symbolized the journey and hardship of Black South Africans under White rule. Through these cultural interventions, Nkrumah’s Ghana not only challenged apartheid’s narrative but also galvanized African unity and resistance (Allen, 2004; Coplan, 2008).
In Accra, the naming of Sobukwe Road and Steve Biko Road after Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe and Steve Biko—iconic leaders in South Africa’s anti-apartheid struggle—constitutes far more than symbolic commemoration. These streets embody the enduring, substantive alliance between Ghana and South Africa, forged in a shared resistance to White settler colonialism, imperialism, and racism (Adi, 2012; Grilli, 2018). In the African traditional context, such gestures represent kinship—two proverbial siblings united in a common cause, regardless of geographical distance or political differences (Mazrui, 2003).
These road names are living testaments to the Pan-African spirit championed by Nkrumah and the profound solidarity that transcends death, adversity, and shifting political landscapes. Sobukwe and Biko Roads are daily reminders that the Ghana-South Africa bond is not only historical but also foundational to Africa’s ongoing fight for justice and self-determination (Rooney, 2007; Zeleza, 2014).
In conclusion, the historical alliance between Ghana and South Africa is not merely a relic of the past but a living testament to the power of Pan-African solidarity. Nkrumah’s Ghana risked everything—from economic reprisal to geopolitical isolation—to support Black South Africa’s liberation, setting a standard of sacrifice and commitment that modern African states too often neglect. Today, as reactionary movements and xenophobic rhetoric threaten to fracture this bond, it is imperative that both nations reject division and reaffirm their collective destiny. True siblings do not allow temporary grievances or external pressures to destroy hard-won unity. Instead, Ghana and South Africa must engage in honest, closed-door diplomacy, recognizing that principled disagreement is a sign of respect, not enmity. Let their shared history serve as a rallying cry for Africa’s renaissance—a continent united not by convenience but by courage, commitment, and love for freedom.
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Dearest President William Ruto,
I hope this letter finds you well. I write with deep respect and concern for the future of Kenya and the continent. I urge you not to pursue divisive or xenophobic politics that risk isolating Kenya and undermining the spirit of African unity. History teaches us that scapegoating migrants and stoking xenophobia, especially during political uncertainty, has led to cycles of violence and discord across Africa.
Your recent remarks blaming African migrants for Kenya’s economic challenges threaten the Pan-African ideals championed by leaders like Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah, and Julius Nyerere—who believed in a continent united by solidarity and mutual respect. True leadership means facing economic and social difficulties with responsibility, not by fueling public fear or division.
Since your time in office, many have watched with concern as the government has responded harshly to peaceful protestors. More recently, rhetoric against fellow Africans has risked further division. Yet, I am encouraged by the Kenyan people’s resilience and their commitment to peace and accountability. I hope you will listen to their voices and choose a path of unity, justice, and inclusive leadership.
Your Excellency, I am certain you recognize that postcolonial Africa—including Kenya—faces significant challenges, some of our own making and others stemming from close ties with foreign governments and interests. Too often, external actors encourage displays of strongman leadership and pledge to overlook human rights abuses, using Western lobbyists to polish the reputations of their client states. History has shown that such alliances are transactional and rarely endure. I hope your leadership will put Kenya’s long-term interests and respect for human rights above short-term, external approval.
Your Excellency, allow me to commend the remarkable courage of the Kenyan people—men and women, young and old, from all walks of life—who peacefully took to the streets to express their concerns and protest your recent statement. These citizens showed solidarity with fellow Africans, including Congolese and Burundians, recognizing them as kin deserving of compassion and support during times of political instability. This spirit of unity and empathy echoes the legacy and vision of the late Jomo Kenyatta.
Mr. President, it is vital to recognize that political office is not permanent—leaders are entrusted with power by the electorate and can just as swiftly be replaced. Recent history shows that those who disregard citizens’ rights, like Yahya Jammeh and Macky Sall, have found themselves out of office and in exile. True leadership is not measured by force or suppression of dissent, but by the quality of policies crafted in consultation with the people, attentive listening, and a willingness to adapt for the common good. Unfortunately, your current top-down approach has not reflected this inclusive spirit.
Your Excellency, African unity is an ongoing journey and our only viable path forward. Our continent’s true strength lies in our people—our ability to feel at home across borders, to share histories and struggles, and to inspire one another. Even with limited resources, leaders like Kwame Nkrumah and Ahmed Sekou Toure demonstrated that genuine support and unity can withstand external pressures and foster lasting bonds. This spirit remains essential for Africa’s progress and resilience.
Mr. President, as a proud African, I do not define Africa—Africa defines me. The continent has given me a deep sense of happiness and belonging among fellow Africans, united by shared stories, humour, and respect for our people and leaders. Migrants from Burundi and the Congo, though sometimes perceived as poor, have contributed greatly to Kenya’s development. Through intermarriage and cultural exchange, they have enriched Kenyan society in countless ways, a fact many Kenyans themselves recognize and celebrate.
Your Excellency, I urge you to reconsider your recent remarks, address the nation, and call for peace and unity. True leadership is shown by those who reflect, change course, and make amends when needed. Apologizing for missteps is a mark of strength, not weakness. Kenya stands as a pillar of African unity, and I trust you will help ensure it remains so.
With respect and hope for our shared future,
Patrick Radebe, PhD