The Mahama government’s handling of the Labadi Beach demolition is a masterclass in narrative failure. Instead of clear governance, we see a government scrambling to spin events, transforming property destruction into a public relations circus (Daily Graphic, 2026; JoyNews, 2026). Since when did demolitions become partisan showcases rather than legal matters? When victims, even after securing interlocutory injunctions, find no recourse in the courts, it signals a collapse of the rule of law (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Arthur, 2015). The role of “police and military personnel” as demolition contractors is a gross abuse of mandate—state resources are misused, and legal boundaries are trampled (Modern Ghana, 2026). When government action turns arbitrary, citizens are left with the political equivalent of a frog leaping from boiling water: intolerant, unstable, and desperate for justice.
This paper offers no defence for business owners who broke the law, nor for the official narrative of the Laboma demolition—one riddled with contradictions and sanitized falsehoods. Ghana cannot progress by institutionalizing lawlessness or by legitimizing corruption through bribes for planning documents, permits, or environmental approvals (Ayee, 2020; Ampratwum, 2008). Development rhetoric is now a smokescreen for elite self-enrichment, turning public policy into a tool for enriching a privileged few while the majority languish in poverty (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016).
On September 13, 2026, the Post Flood Mitigation Task Force and the Greater Accra Regional Security Council, backed by the Ghana Armed Forces’ 48 Engineer Regiment, razed businesses across the Laboma enclave, including the Pink Flamingo Lounge. The stated aim—flood mitigation and basin restoration—rings hollow, as the official justification is contested by business owners denied due process (Daily Graphic, 2026; MyJoyOnline, 2026).
The Task Force’s selective demolition, as justified by Deputy Chief of Staff Stanislav Xoese Dogbe, raises the question: what political or economic interests dictated which structures survived? Such arbitrary enforcement reflects a corrupt system where power, not law, determines outcomes. Until such abuses are confronted, Ghana’s development will remain a façade for elite predation and growing inequality (Transparency International, 2022; Owusu, 2023).
Dogbe’s narrative on the Labadi Beach demolition epitomizes the linguistic acrobatics Ghanaian officials employ to obscure the obvious and rationalize the indefensible (Daily Graphic, 2026; GhanaWeb, 2026). On Facebook, Dogbe insisted, “Let’s not get it twisted: Friday’s action along a section of the beach was not a flood-mitigation action by the government task force,” and instead claimed it was conducted by National Security at the behest of Labadi Beach Hotel (GhanaWeb, 2026).
This disingenuous wordplay—substituting “action” for “demolition”—is a classic maneuver to muddy public discourse and evade accountability (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017). The coincidence of simultaneous demolitions by different state actors, while legal challenges were pending, reveals a deliberate disregard for due process and a strategy of governance by obfuscation (Transparency International, 2022; MyJoyOnline, 2026).
Dogbe’s projection that others are “twisting” facts, while he himself twists the narrative, mirrors a broader political culture in which leaders, as John Dramani Mahama is alleged to have admitted in 2020, embrace deception as a governing tool: “If you have to lie to them, you do so, and this is our way of doing things as political actors” (Modern Ghana, 2020). Such admissions, even if disputed, expose the rot at the core of Ghanaian political communication—where truth is sacrificed for expediency, and public trust is the casualty.
Building on Dogbe’s invocation of “National Security,” one must ask: what does “National Security” actually mean, and what is its constitutional function? As any Security Studies 101 student knows, National Security is not a monolithic agency but a coordinated framework of institutions—military, police, immigration, and others—charged with ensuring national stability and peace (Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Art. 83; Aning, 2006). Dogbe and his ilk have reduced “National Security” to a partisan militia, staffed with irregulars and loyalists whose primary allegiance is to the sitting government, not the Ghanaian state (Aning & Lartey, 2022; Daily Graphic, 2023).
Decades of politicization have transformed what should be a national safeguard into a blunt instrument of executive power—used to intimidate, silence, and even unlawfully demolish businesses while legal proceedings are ongoing (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Transparency International, 2022). No serious democracy deploys its military against private citizens when cases are sub judice. The military’s role is to defend against external threats, not terrorize the domestic population for political convenience.
Pivoting to a critical document, the Board of Trustees of the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) issued a letter dated 2 October 2026, asserting its ownership of Labadi Beach Hotel and La Palm Royal Beach Hotel. SSNIT claimed it had called for urgent intervention from the National Security Council Secretariat to combat ongoing illegal occupation, encroachment, and unauthorized activities on beachfront property adjacent to these hotels (Daily Graphic, 2026; GhanaWeb, 2026).
The agency cited escalating threats to guest and employee safety, unauthorized access to sensitive areas, fire and sanitation risks, environmental destruction, and the erosion of hotel privacy and operations—all jeopardizing revenue and financial sustainability. SSNIT warned that unchecked encroachment would make land recovery increasingly difficult and costly, underscoring the gravity of the situation and its broader implications for public asset management (MyJoyOnline, 2026; Transparency International, 2022).
Turning to the heart of the matter, while SSNIT—like any legal entity—has the right to defend its property, bypassing judicial remedies and resorting to state force before securing an interlocutory injunction is nothing short of corporate lawlessness (Aning, 2006; Daily Graphic, 2026). When did SSNIT first perceive such an acute threat as to warrant direct national security intervention? The suspicious haste with which armed personnel demolished multimillion-dollar properties reeks of political manipulation and a shadowy agenda (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; GhanaWeb, 2026).
The swiftness and violence of the Labadi demolitions suggest more than routine enforcement—it signals abuse of state machinery for partisan retribution. The viral video of CEO Raymond Archer, lamenting tit-for-tat demolitions targeting opposition businesses, only reinforces public suspicion of politically motivated vendettas (MyJoyOnline, 2026). This cycle of vindictiveness, where justice is equated with revenge, undermines the rule of law and deepens national cynicism (Transparency International, 2022; Owusu, 2023). By allowing SSNIT and National Security to circumvent legal process, the Mahama administration is complicit—whether by direct orchestration or willful neglect. This is governance by vendetta, not by law. History will judge whether the president’s claim that Ghanaians have “short memory” proves prophetic; the 2028 elections will offer the verdict.
In closing, Ghanaian politics since the advent of the Fourth Republic has degenerated into a vicious cycle of vendetta—“an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth,” or more aptly, “boot for boot.” Once admired for its democratic sanity, Ghana is now defined by the NDC and NPP’s relentless campaigns to undermine each other, prioritizing political score-settling over the urgent needs of citizens (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Arthur, 2015). This toxic rivalry has reduced governance to a zero-sum game, with public welfare relegated to an afterthought (Ayee, 2020; Daily Graphic, 2026).
Let us not mince words: politics in Ghana is now economics by other means. With rare exceptions—such as Dan Botwe—politicians are motivated by personal gain, eagerly attaching themselves to the corporate gravy train while their constituents languish (Transparency International, 2022; Owusu, 2023). Morality in Ghanaian politics ends where financial interests begin. Unless citizens wake up and scrutinize official narratives, the nation will remain stuck in mediocrity and corruption. The Laboma demolition is not an outlier; it is a symptom of a deeper malaise.
References
Ampratwum, E. F. (2008). The fight against corruption and its implications for development in Ghana. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 11(1), 67-83.
Aning, K. (2006). Security, the State, and the Politics of Protection in Ghana. African Affairs, 105(419), 419-436.
Aning, K., & Lartey, E. (2022). The Politicization of National Security in Ghana. African Security Review, 31(1), 15-29.
Arthur, J. (2015). Political corruption and public accountability in Ghana. African Journal of Public Affairs, 8(2), 34-48.
Aryeetey, E., & Baah-Boateng, W. (2016). Understanding Ghana’s growth success story and job creation challenges. Brookings Africa Growth Initiative.
Ayee, J. R. A. (2020). Political economy of rule of law in Ghana. African Affairs, 119(475), 557-577.
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), Art. 83.
Daily Graphic. (2026, October 3). SSNIT claims ownership of Labadi and La Palm hotels amid demolition row. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/ssnit-claims-ownership-of-labadi-la-palm-hotels-amid-demolition.html
Daily Graphic. (2026, September 14). Flood mitigation or land grab? Laboma demolition controversy deepens. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/flood-mitigation-or-land-grab-laboma-demolition.html
Daily Graphic. (2026, September 14). Flood mitigation or land grab? Laboma demolition controversy deepens. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/flood-mitigation-or-land-grab-laboma-demolition.html
Daily Graphic. (2026, April 18). Government under fire over Labadi Beach demolition. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/government-under-fire-over-labadi-beach-demolition.html
Daily Graphic. (2023, May 22). National Security—State protector or government enforcer? https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/national-security-state-protector-or-government-enforcer.html
GhanaWeb. (2026, October 4). SSNIT demands National Security intervention over Labadi Beach encroachment. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/ssnit-demands-national-security-intervention-over-labadi-beach-encroachment-2026
GhanaWeb. (2026, September 15). Dogbe clarifies Labadi Beach demolition: Not a flood-mitigation exercise. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Dogbe-clarifies-Labadi-Beach-demolition-Not-a-flood-mitigation-exercise-2026
Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2017). Corruption in Ghana: Trends, causes, and consequences. Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
JoyNews. (2026, April 19). Victims of Labadi demolition left in legal limbo. https://www.myjoyonline.com/victims-of-labadi-demolition-left-in-legal-limbo/
Modern Ghana. (2026, April 20). National Security oversteps mandate in Labadi Beach demolition. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1432567/national-security-oversteps-mandate-in-labadi-beach-demol.html
Modern Ghana. (2020, October 5). Mahama’s confession: Politicians must sometimes lie to win public support. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1033499/mahamas-confession-politicians-must-sometimes-lie.html
MyJoyOnline. (2026, October 5). SSNIT raises alarm over threats to hotel operations at Labadi Beach. https://www.myjoyonline.com/ssnit-raises-alarm-over-threats-to-hotel-operations-at-labadi-beach/
MyJoyOnline. (2026, September 16). Legal wrangling continues over Laboma demolitions. https://www.myjoyonline.com/legal-wrangling-continues-over-laboma-demolitions/
MyJoyOnline. (2026, September 15). Business owners dispute Laboma demolition notices; court battle looms. https://www.myjoyonline.com/business-owners-dispute-laboma-demolition-notices-court-battle-looms/
Owusu, G. (2023). Electoral populism and the hollowing out of policy in Ghana. Journal of African Elections, 22(2), 41-56.
Transparency International. (2022). Corruption Perceptions Index 2022: Ghana. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/gha
This commentary confronts a central malaise in Ghana: the selective application of the law and its corrosive impact on justice. I write as a friend of Ghana and an advocate for true justice, not as a partisan for the National Democratic Congress (NDC) or New Patriotic Party (NPP)—both of which have weaponized legal processes to serve Machiavellian ends (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Arthur, 2015). The law, as a tool of the state, must be wielded with integrity, guided by constitutional principles—not as a blunt instrument for political retribution. When justice is politicized, today’s rulers set a dangerous precedent for tomorrow’s adversaries, perpetuating cycles of vengeance and impunity (Ayee, 2020; Ampratwum, 2008). Only the principled, even-handed application of law can safeguard Ghana’s fragile democracy.
This commentary dissects the botched September 2026 attempt to arrest Baffour Nana Agyei Baffour Awuah, MP for ManhyiaSouth, by purported Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO) operatives. These officers, who refused to provide proper identification or legal justification, staged a broad daylight operation that looked more like an attempted kidnapping than a lawful arrest (Daily Graphic, 2026; MyJoyOnline, 2026). The NPP predictably labeled it a “witch-hunt”—a refrain used by both major parties when convenient—casting further doubt on Ghana’s commitment to the rule of law (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Arthur, 2015).
The above statement is not a defense of Baffour Awuah; the courts must decide his fate. The real question is: Why the rush to arrest him immediately after he posted bail for Salomay BafohAwiti, linked to the controversial “Ghana Jollof” case? Such actions reek of power abuse—an endemic “I will show you who’s boss” mentality that plagues Ghanaian politics (Ayee, 2020; Ampratwum, 2008). EOCO’s subsequent scramble to obtain a judicial order only underscores their initial disregard for due process. Are EOCO’s legal staff truly committed to the law, or are they partisan actors wielding the sledgehammer of anti-corruption as a political weapon? This spectacle exposes deep flaws in Ghana’s justice system, where legal procedures are too often sacrificed for political theater.
The NDC, under Mahama’s leadership, has lost credibility in the fight against corruption, positioning itself as both persecutor, jury, and judge—wielding EOCO as a partisan tool to settle political scores (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Transparency International, 2022). This brazen disregard for due process has inadvertently turned Baffour Nana Agyei Baffour Awuah into a political martyr, fueling his public profile and transforming him into a symbol of resistance, regardless of the evidence against him (Daily Graphic, 2026; MyJoyOnline, 2026). The spectacle of his confident walk to court, surrounded by supporters and a media circus, underscores how easily the line between perpetrator and victim is blurred in Ghanaian politics—where public perception routinely trumps justice (Arthur, 2015).
Further undermining its anti-corruption rhetoric, the NDC’s invocation of nolle prosequi to halt the trial of Stephen Kwabena Opuni and the opaque return and release of Sedina Christine Attionu Tamakloe—both facing serious charges of financial mismanagement—exposes the party’s selective justice and deep-seated institutional rot (Joy News, 2024; GhanaWeb, 2024). These actions signal not commitment to reform, but calculated political maneuvering. Should power shift again, the NPP is likely to continue this cycle, weaponizing anti-corruption to target opponents (Adusei & Ofori, 2023; Ampratwum, 2008). The result is a nation trapped in a perpetual witch-hunt, where public resources are squandered on political vendettas rather than genuine reform.
As youth unemployment soars, rural migration accelerates, teacher strikes over unpaid salaries grow, and government demolitions decimate businesses, public trust in the NDC government is evaporating. Citizens watch as party loyalists enrich themselves overnight, while others are told to “wait their turn” for opportunities that never materialize (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016; Daily Graphic, 2024). The NDC’s electoral prospects for 2028 are bleak—a reality party insiders dismiss as “treasonous” critique rather than hard truth (Joy News, 2024). As Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. remarked, “The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” No government can sustain itself by crushing its opponents and sanitizing its own corruption; eventually, the truth emerges, exposing systemic decay and fueling calls for genuine justice and accountability (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Transparency International, 2022). Power is not a birthright; it is a fleeting trust, and those who abuse it will be held to account.
References
Adusei, M., & Ofori, B. (2023). Political patronage and corruption in Ghana: Policy failures and elite complicity. Journal of Modern African Studies, 61(1), 99-120.
Ampratwum, E. F. (2008). The fight against corruption and its implications for development in Ghana. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 11(1), 67-83.
Arthur, J. (2015). Political corruption and public accountability in Ghana. African Journal of Public Affairs, 8(2), 34-48.
Aryeetey, E., & Baah-Boateng, W. (2016). Understanding Ghana’s growth success story and job creation challenges. Brookings Africa Growth Initiative.
Ayee, J. R. A. (2020). Political economy of rule of law in Ghana. African Affairs, 119(475), 557-577.
Daily Graphic. (2026, September 29). Botched arrest of Manhyia South MP by EOCO stirs controversy. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/botched-arrest-of-manhyia-south-mp-by-eoco-stirs-controversy.html
Daily Graphic. (2024, May 13). Public anger mounts over business demolitions and unpaid salaries. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/public-anger-business-demolitions-unpaid-salaries.html
MyJoyOnline. (2026, September 30). NPP slams EOCO over attempted arrest of Manhyia South MP. https://www.myjoyonline.com/npp-slams-eoco-over-attempted-arrest-of-manhyia-south-mp/
Joy News. (2024, April 12). Teachers’ strikes and rising discontent threaten NDC prospects. https://www.myjoyonline.com/teachers-strikes-rising-discontent-threaten-ndc-prospects/
Joy News. (2024, March 18). Nolle prosequi and the politics of selective justice. https://www.myjoyonline.com/nolle-prosequi-and-the-politics-of-selective-justice/
GhanaWeb. (2024, February 4). Sedina Tamakloe: The return, release, and political implications. https://www.ghanaweb.com
Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2017). Corruption in Ghana: Trends, causes, and consequences. Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
MyJoyOnline. (2026, September 30). NPP slams EOCO over attempted arrest of Manhyia South MP. https://www.myjoyonline.com/npp-slams-eoco-over-attempted-arrest-of-manhyia-south-mp/
Transparency International. (2022). Corruption Perceptions Index 2022: Ghana. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/gha
Addressing Ghana’s most urgent issues is not an antagonistic exercise, but a scholarly imperative. Despite my profound respect for Ghana’s anticolonial legacy—especially under Kwame Nkrumah, whose administration sacrificed scarce resources to support African liberation from colonialism and apartheid (Boafo-Arthur, 2007; Rooney, 2007)—the country now staggers under the weight of endemic corruption. Rationalizations that corruption is merely a “perception problem” are intellectually dishonest, given its documented depth and reach (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Asante & Ayee, 2021). On Ghana’s moral landscape, corruption is both vertical and horizontal, permeating every stratum of society. Finding a truly honest public servant is as rare as the proverbial needle in a haystack (Ampratwum, 2008; Transparency International, 2022). This paper interrogates a foundational question: Where did Ghana lose its moral and ethical footing?
I open this paper with the words of Lee Kuan Yew, the late Prime Minister of Singapore, whose legacy of servant leadership remains profoundly relevant to 21st-century postcolonial Ghanaian politics (Barr, 2014; Lee, 2000). While Nkrumah’s contributions to national and continental development are undeniable, I deliberately set him aside to avoid charges of bias from his critics and to invite a wider spectrum of scholarly and public engagement. This approach is essential for a candid discourse on Ghana’s entrenched systemic corruption, particularly among its leadership (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Ampratwum, 2008). For the purposes of this debate, I define corruption not narrowly as mere financial impropriety, but broadly through a cosmopolitan and eclectic lens—encompassing the moral decay of inaction and complicity, especially when individuals shield wrongdoers due to kinship or personal connections (Asante & Ayee, 2021; Hasty, 2005). This is not a reductionist critique; it is a call to confront the full spectrum of Ghana’s corrosive malaise
Lee Kuan Yew’s warning is clear and uncompromising: once corruption infects a political system from top to bottom, no revolution can cure it. Cleansing must start at the top, led by courageous, morally upright leaders with unquestioned integrity—an arduous, systematic process (Lee, 2000; Barr, 2014). Singapore’s success was not accidental; it was the product of relentless leadership and zero tolerance for corruption.
In contrast, 21st-century Ghana is plagued by a normalization of corruption—patronage, political protection, and the relentless pursuit of wealth are celebrated, not condemned (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Ampratwum, 2008). Neither the political class nor anti-corruption organizations have demonstrated the courage or integrity to break this cycle. The collective rot is pervasive, and Ghana’s so-called watchdogs are either complicit or powerless (Asante & Ayee, 2021; Hasty, 2005). Until true moral leadership emerges, Ghana’s fight against corruption is lost before it begins.
No analysis of Ghana’s crisis is complete without addressing illegal mining (galamsey), rampant online romance scams, and transnational cocaine trafficking. These scourges are not simply failures of weak leadership or bureaucratic inertia—they are the predictable outcome of entrenched political protection, elite impunity, and a judiciary compromised by patronage (Hilson, 2017; Aning & Kwarkye, 2022). Politicians, shielded by parliamentary immunity, and corrupt law enforcement officials collude with wealthy benefactors, while activist judges—whose career advancement depends on political loyalty—turn a blind eye to high-level criminality (Boateng & Darko, 2016; Ampratwum, 2008). The result: miners and small-time offenders are prosecuted, while the true architects of Ghana’s criminal economy remain untouchable, mocking justice from the shadows.
Ghana’s so-called fight against illegal mining, led by military detachments and the National Anti-Illegal Mining Operations Secretariat (NAIMOS) under the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, is a farce masquerading as reform. NAIMOS, along with costly military deployments, has produced little more than staged arrests of impoverished youth and the occasional Chinese nationals—many of whom are quietly released or deported only to return to business as usual, courtesy of diplomatic arm-twisting from Beijing (Hilson, 2021; Ayee, 2020; Alhassan & Boakye, 2022).
Televised excavator burnings are political theater, designed to project governmental resolve while the real financiers—party elites from both the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP)—enjoy total impunity, their generous donations shielding them from prosecution (Adusei & Ofori, 2023; Transparency International, 2022). The immunity of these political patrons is so entrenched that, under Nana Akufo-Addo’s administration, seized excavators vanished from state custody, only to reappear at illegal mining sites—a textbook case of elite capture and systemic corruption (Daily Graphic, 2021; Lee, 2000). As Lee Kuan Yew cautioned, corruption at the top echelons infects the whole system, crippling national development and making a mockery of any anti-corruption campaign (Lee, 2000; Barr, 2014). Ghana’s anti-galamsey crusade is not a fight—it is a charade, perpetuated by the very actors who profit most from the status quo.
The Minerals Commission stands as a glaring weak link in Ghana’s chain of official corruption. Officials routinely issue “prospecting” licenses fully aware that these are merely a cover for actual mining operations, not mineral exploration (Hilson, 2021; Adusei & Ofori, 2023). The regulatory charade is transparent: no legitimate exploration requires three years to confirm mineral presence—this is regulatory capture masquerading as due process (Ayee, 2020; Transparency International, 2022). The illegality is brazen. Licence holders descend on mining communities with an entourage of paid journalists, chiefs, local officials, and security agents. Uneducated villagers are paraded on TV, coached to feign support for the project, all to manufacture public consent (Alhassan & Boakye, 2022). Once the cameras leave, the “prospecting” license is quietly converted or sold as a mining concession, with state actors pocketing kickbacks and environmental devastation left unchecked (Daily Graphic, 2021; Adusei & Ofori, 2023). The Minerals Commission, instead of safeguarding Ghana’s resources, has become a facilitator of elite predation and ecological destruction.
Transitioning to the sham of “community mining” and “responsible mining,” these policy rebrands are nothing but cynical ploys to legitimize illegal mining and funnel concessions to party loyalists, wealthy patrons, and their families (Hilson, 2021; Adusei & Ofori, 2023). These hollow terms mask the environmental devastation—deforestation, poisoned water bodies, and loss of biodiversity—wrought by galamsey, while politicians trumpet job creation to pacify restless youth (Boateng & Darko, 2016; Alhassan & Boakye, 2022).
There is a glaring absence of transparent, evidence-based reporting from the Minerals Commission Inspectorate on the outcomes of these so-called reforms. The two dominant parties, NDC and NPP, when in power, are more invested in manufacturing the illusion of progress than in genuine environmental stewardship (Daily Graphic, 2023; Transparency International, 2022). Political elites and their clients operate as a predatory class, enriching themselves and funding their electoral ambitions on the back of environmental ruin (Owusu, 2023). As Lee Kuan Yew argued, unchecked corruption and self-dealing at the top will ultimately demand a revolutionary reckoning—a warning Ghana’s leadership ignores at its peril (Lee, 2000).
Turning to the rampant online romance scams and the extradition of Ghanaian nationals to the United States, it strains credulity to believe that the state—armed with substantial intelligence and law enforcement resources—was unaware of the scale of these crimes. Ghanaians have long whispered about the identities of perpetrators and their American victims, with social media figures like “Show Boy,” a self-confessed ex-convict and deportee, publicly naming scammers and exposing their deep political and business connections (Boateng, 2022; Osei-Tutu et al., 2016). The persistent inaction by authorities points to institutional complicity and protection for well-connected criminals (Aning & Kwarkye, 2022; Transparency International, 2022). As these networks become increasingly visible online, the state’s failure to act is not ignorance—it is a symptom of entrenched patronage and systemic rot.
In the United States and Canada, anti-money laundering (AML) statutes mandate that financial institutions report deposits exceeding $10,000, triggering scrutiny by state agencies (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network [FinCEN], 2023; Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada [FINTRAC], 2022). These laws ensure every sizeable bank deposit leaves an audit trail, allowing investigators to track the legitimacy of funds. Violators face swift prosecution and severe penalties under the criminal justice system. The rigorous enforcement of AML laws in these jurisdictions has fostered investor confidence and reinforced the integrity of the banking sector, making both countries respected destinations for global capital (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2023; Transparency International, 2022).
In Ghana, AML laws are little more than legal window dressing—statutes that exist to appease the international community while doing nothing to curb transnational crime (Adusei & Ofori, 2023; Transparency International, 2022). Like many failing states, Ghana’s AML framework is hollow, a façade for membership in the global fight against corruption while online romance scams and other financial crimes run rampant. Under the passive watch of compromised law enforcement, young scammers openly flaunt their illicit wealth—luxury cars, designer brands, ostentatious parties, and conspicuous philanthropy—all brazenly displayed on social media (Boateng, 2022; Aning & Kwarkye, 2022).
Security and intelligence agencies, some of whose members fraternize with these criminals, routinely turn a blind eye. Many Ghanaians perversely rationalize online fraud as payback for slavery, hailing perpetrators as “tech-whiz kids” and branding foreign victims as greedy fools who deserved their fate (Osei-Tutu et al., 2016). This defense of criminality is a moral travesty, echoing Lee Kuan Yew’s warning: where corruption is endemic at every level, governance collapses into autopilot and national sovereignty is forfeited (Lee, 2000; Gyimah-Boadi, 2017). The result: Ghana is compelled to extradite its citizens at the behest of foreign powers or face crippling cuts to aid, training, and intelligence cooperation (U.S. Department of State, 2023).
Turning to Ghana’s entrenched role as a cocaine transshipment hub, the recent seizure of 3.9 metric tons of cocaine—valued at €225 million ($261.45 million)—at Dunkirk port in France is merely the latest chapter in a long history of narcotics trafficking routed through Ghana (Aning & Kwarkye, 2022; Ellis, 2009; Daily Guide Network, 2023). This is not an isolated incident, but part of a persistent pattern. What is truly alarming is not just the familiar foot-dragging by authorities—a tactic long used to stifle investigations—but the total absence of comprehensive, transparent inquiry involving public oversight (Boateng, 2022).
Allegations implicating figures, such as Musa Attah (“Kromo”), reportedly a former member of President John Dramani Mahama’s security detail, remain unaddressed, while the state parades low-level operatives to feign seriousness (GhanaWeb, 2023). This scapegoating, with its calculated avoidance of powerful masterminds, is systemic; it perpetuates impunity, erodes public trust, and signals to criminal networks that Ghana remains open for business (Adu-Gyamfi, 2023; Transparency International, 2022). Until the state commits to real accountability at every level, the cycle of narco-politics will continue unabated.
On 26 September 2026, Deputy Director-General of NACOC, Alexander Twum-Barimah, declared that background checks on the Dunkirk cocaine seizure suspects revealed no links to President Mahama’s or Vice President Opoku-Agyemang’s security details. He asserted, “according to the information NACOC holds, [Musa] Attah is a farmer, not a member of any presidential protection unit” (Joy News, 2023). Yet, this claim raises critical questions: Is this “farmer” Attah the same individual photographed with President Mahama? What investigative rigor substantiates this assertion? Was information triangulated across intelligence agencies, community sources, and public records, or did NACOC simply parrot a sanitized narrative for political expediency (Boateng, 2022; Aning & Kwarkye, 2022)?
Twum-Barimah’s appeal to his own credentials as a trained presidential security officer reeks of institutional gatekeeping, foreclosing alternative explanations and reinforcing the culture of official secrecy that fuels Ghana’s status as a narco-transit hub (Adusei & Ofori, 2023; Transparency International, 2022). When security investigations are reduced to self-referential assurances from insiders, public trust is eroded, and criminal networks flourish under the protection of political and bureaucratic patronage (Ellis, 2009; Gyimah-Boadi, 2017). Ghana’s persistent vulnerability to international drug trafficking is rooted in this very culture of opacity and unaccountability.
In conclusion, I invoke Dr. Ephraim Amu’s enduring admonition from “Yen Ara Asaase Ni”: the destiny of Ghana rests squarely on the moral fiber of its leaders and citizens. When the state, either through inertia or complicity, treats crises as inevitable and shrugs off responsibility, it cultivates delusion—problems do not fade; they metastasize and threaten national security and state functionality (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Ampratwum, 2008; Transparency International, 2022).
Leadership, as Lee Kuan Yew demonstrated, is not about donning fine suits or delivering empty speeches on global stages. Nor is it about orchestrating photo-ops with security chiefs or basking in past glory. True leadership requires a relentless, uncompromising stand against threats to national stability—even if it means confronting allies, severing patronage networks, or enacting severe measures, including constitutionally sanctioned capital punishment when warranted (Barr, 2014; Lee, 2000; Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). Ghana’s survival demands moral courage, not cosmetic reforms.
References
Adu-Gyamfi, S. (2023). Political marketing and unmet promises: Ghana’s electoral cycle and public trust. African Studies Quarterly, 24(2), 53-71.
Adusei, M., & Ofori, B. (2023). Political patronage and illegal mining in Ghana: Policy failures and elite complicity.Journal of Modern African Studies, 61(1), 99-120.
Alhassan, R., & Boakye, K. (2022). State response to illegal mining in Ghana: The case of NAIMOS. Extractive Industries and Society, 9(3), 101-115.
Ampratwum, E. F. (2008). The fight against corruption and its implications for development in Ghana. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 11(1), 67-83.
Aning, K., & Kwarkye, S. (2022). Ghana’s struggle with drug trafficking: The challenges of enforcement and governance. African Security Review, 31(1), 46-60.
Asante, F. A., & Ayee, J. R. A. (2021). Public sector corruption in Ghana: Trends and policy responses. African Affairs, 120(479), 543-563.
Aryeetey, E., & Baah-Boateng, W. (2016). Understanding Ghana’s growth success story and job creation challenges.Brookings Africa Growth Initiative
Ayee, J. R. A. (2020). Political economy of illegal mining in Ghana. African Affairs, 119(475), 557-577.
Barr, M. D. (2014). The Ruling Elite of Singapore: Networks of Power and Influence. I.B. Tauris.
Boafo-Arthur, K. (2007). Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State. Zed Books.
Boateng, F. D. (2022). Corruption and law enforcement in Ghana: Implications for security and justice. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 70, 100514.
Boateng, F. D., & Darko, I. N. (2016). Corruption in Ghana: Trends, causes, and consequences. African Security Review, 25(2), 151-166.
Daily Graphic. (2023, July 15). Community mining: Policy or political expediency? https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/community-mining-policy-or-political-expediency.html
Daily Guide Network. (2023, June 29). Ghana implicated in €225m cocaine bust in France. https://dailyguidenetwork.com/ghana-implicated-in-e225m-cocaine-bust-in-france/
Daily Graphic. (2021, May 10). Vanishing excavators: State assets or party loot? https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/vanishing-excavators-state-assets-or-party-loot.html
Ellis, S. (2009). West Africa’s international drug trade. African Affairs, 108(431), 171-196.
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). (2023). Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual. https://www.fincen.gov
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC). (2022). Reporting Large Cash Transactions. https://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca
Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2017). Corruption in Ghana: Trends, causes, and consequences. Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
Hasty, J. (2005). The pleasures of corruption: Desire and discipline in Ghanaian political culture. Cultural Anthropology, 20(2), 271-301.
Hilson, G. (2021). ‘Galamsey’ and the making of a deep state in Ghana. Review of African Political Economy, 48(167), 44-63.
Lee, K. Y. (2000). From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965–2000. HarperCollins.
Osei-Tutu, E., Sarpong, S., & Owusu, B. (2016). Internet fraud and its impact on Ghana. International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 10(2), 163-180.
Owusu, G. (2023). Electoral populism and the hollowing out of policy in Ghana. Journal of African Elections, 22(2), 41-56.
Rooney, D. (2007). Kwame Nkrumah: Vision and Tragedy. Sub-Saharan Publishers.
Transparency International. (2022). Corruption Perceptions Index 2022: Ghana. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/gha
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2023). Anti-Money Laundering Laws and Regulations. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/aml-cft
This paper confronts the epidemic of media violence in contemporary Ghanaian politics. When did insults and buffoonery replace the intellectual rigour and visionary leadership exemplified by Nkrumah? When did vitriol and public ridicule become qualifications for political office, lucrative salaries, and social status (Osei, 2017; Gyampo, 2021)? Ghana’s public arena, once defined by respect and collective purpose, is now a theatre for loudmouth opportunists who thrive on division and insult.
Rooted in African tradition, I reject this descent. Our customs demand respect, restraint, and the elevation of community over ego. The African adage is clear: a hunter who arms himself with rabid dogs sows his own destruction, just as fostering cycles of verbal aggression breeds reciprocal violence and instability (Mbiti, 1990; Gyekye, 1997). Another African adage delivers a hard lesson: when a lion is devouring your kin, do not plead with the beast—act decisively to save your brother, or you will surely be the next victim. This proverb underscores the necessity of swift, uncompromising action against threats to the collective good, warning that passivity invites destruction (Mbiti, 1990; Gyekye, 1997). Inaction in the face of danger is complicit. This is not folklore; it is a profound warning. Ubuntu teaches that harm to one is harm to all, and unchecked political insult and aggression will consume the nation (Tutu, 1999; Nussbaum, 2003). Ghana teeters on the brink. To ignore the media-fueled partisan conflagration is to invite national decay and the spectre of interethnic and internecine violence. Silence and complacency are complicity.
I open this paper with a stark contrast: Ghanaian politics in the immediate post-independence era under Kwame Nkrumah was not a playground for reckless or divisive rhetoric. Even amidst fierce opposition from Kofi Abrefa Busia and his allies, political debates never descended into insult or vulgarity (Austin, 1964; Rooney, 2007). Under the regimes of Generals Ignatius Kutu Acheampong and Frederick William Kwasi Akuffo, public discourse, though autocratic, remained disciplined and free from the gutter politics and condescension that now plague the nation (Boafo-Arthur, 2007). As media veteran Cameron Duodu observed, parliamentary debate reached its zenith during Nkrumah’s tenure, when national interests superseded personal ego (Duodu, 2011). Today’s descent into insult-laden exchanges is a disgraceful betrayal of this legacy.
As a public intellectual, my sole commitment is to present facts for rigorous debate and scrutiny—not to malign any leader or orchestrate partisan subterfuge. Let the historical record stand: the normalization of insults in Ghanaian politics began under the late Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings. Rawlings both practiced and institutionalized ad hominem attacks, setting a precedent for political discourse that rewarded personal denigration over substantive policy (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015). His condemnation of “babies with sharp teeth”—a reference to National Democratic Congress (NDC) youth who turned their vitriol against him and his wife, Nama Agyemang Konadu Rawlings, during the 2011 Sunyani congress—was a belated awakening to the culture he enabled (Graphic Online, 2018; Modern Ghana, 2011). The revolution, as history shows, inevitably devours its own.
In the tumultuous early years of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), officials like Warrant Officer Isaac Frimpong weaponized rhetoric, openly declaring at a durbar at El-Wak Sports Stadium that citizens’ calls for free expression would be answered with “freedom of beating and assassination.” This threat, delivered in the presence of Rawlings and broadcast nationally, was conveniently omitted by state-controlled newspapers like the Ghana Times and Daily Graphic—a chilling testament to media censorship (Agyeman-Duah, 2008; Boafo-Arthur, 2007).
Rawlings, a self-styled populist Marxist turned capitalist, was notorious for inciting violence through abrasive language, branding critics as “enemies of the people,” “greedy bastards,” and “nation wreckers” (Gyampo, 2021; Oquaye, 2004). Such rhetoric was not mere bluster: it emboldened supporters to intimidate, silence, and even attack opponents, as seen in the infamous incidents of feces being thrown at dissenting media houses. Under Rawlings’s PNDC—and later the NDC—verbal aggression became a sanctioned tool of political intimidation, often serving as a prelude to outright violence and the suppression of dissent (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994; Graphic Online, 2018).
Rawlings’s rhetoric was relentlessly combative, often sacrificing statesmanship for partisan assault. His attacks on John Agyekum Kufuor’s administration, branding it as “the worst form of governance Ghana has ever seen,” were not grounded in evidence or legal action but in political theatre and self-righteous posturing (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015; Agyeman-Duah, 2008). Rawlings weaponized allegations of corruption and incompetence to elevate the NDC as paragons of virtue, while refusing to substantiate his claims through any formal legal mechanisms (Oquaye, 2004).
This tradition of incendiary politics persists. In September 2020, Isaac Adongo, MP for Bolgatanga Central constituency, inflamed Ghanaian discourse by labelling President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo and his cabinet’s Akyem members as the “Akyem Sakawa Boys”—accusing them, without evidence, of criminality and intent to plunder the nation (Joy News, 2020). Adongo’s refusal to apologize, and President John Dramani Mahama’s endorsement of this ethnic slur, not only insulted individuals but stereotyped an entire ethnic group, stoking the risk of ethnic conflict and undermining national cohesion (Gyampo, 2021; Daily Graphic, 2020). Such rhetoric is divisive, inflammatory, and antithetical to democratic norms.
In 2016, Felix Ofosu-Kwakye, now Government Spokesperson to President Mahama, publicly alleged that the New Patriotic Party (NPP) flagbearer Nana Akufo-Addo was terminally ill with prostate cancer, kidney failure, and a coronary blockage, insinuating his imminent death and portraying a vote for him as a national risk (Daily Graphic, 2016; Gyampo, 2021). This was not an isolated incident. Journalists-for-hire such as Blessed Godsbrain Smart, Kevin Ekow Baidoo Taylor, and Nana Kwadwo Jantuah have unleashed unprecedented waves of vitriol, often targeting Akufo-Addo with unchecked ferocity (Joy News, 2022). The NDC leadership’s silence in the face of this relentless abuse amounts to tacit endorsement, normalizing insult as political currency.
In 2022, during the “Arise Ghana” protest, NDC Communications Officer Sammy Gyamfi—now the Chief Executive Officer of the Ghana Gold Board—publicly called for the death of President Nana Akufo-Addo, a move that sharply escalated political incitement and undermined democratic norms (Modern Ghana, 2022). This kind of rhetoric transcends mere offensiveness; it corrodes public discourse and erodes the democratic fabric of Ghana (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015). The relentless barrage of insults from NDC officials and their surrogates is unmatched in frequency and severity, demanding robust scholarly and civic condemnation.
The NPP is not blameless. While their use of abusive language is less prolific than the NDC’s, recent incidents—such as the vile online attacks from the “Ghana Jollof” account, allegedly linked to NPP sympathizers—are equally deplorable and must be condemned unequivocally (Daily Graphic, 2022; Joy News, 2022). It is critical to note that these outbursts often emerge as reactions to the sustained provocations from figures like Kevin Ekow Baidoo Taylor, whose relentless denigration of public figures has heightened polarization and incited retaliatory abuse (Gyampo, 2021). Both camps are complicit in the degradation of Ghanaian political discourse, and the cycle of insult and escalation must be broken for the sake of national cohesion and democratic integrity.
Recent calls from both political camps for a cessation of insults and a national dialogue are nothing but hollow gestures—too little, too late. Such appeals are futile, raising the critical question: why now and what prompted this sudden desire for civility after years of mutual abuse and incitement (Gyampo, 2021; Osei, 2017)? These performative overtures lack sincerity and only underscore the entrenched culture of political hypocrisy and rhetorical violence in Ghanaian politics.
In September 2026, President Mahama’s claim of “immunity” to insults—likening his resilience to the skin of a crocodile—was a regrettable and tone-deaf response, particularly from a national leader (JoyNews, 2026). As a scholar, I contend that public vilification of a president is not merely personal; it degrades his family, with First Lady Lordina Mahama unfairly subjected to unwarranted abuse despite her dignified restraint (Osei, 2017). The collateral damage extends to his children, party, and ultimately the nation, as Ghana’s political discourse devolves into a cesspool where insults are rewarded rather than condemned (Gyampo, 2021; Modern Ghana, 2026). Mahama’s assertion that insults “roll off” him is not bravery, but a disingenuous dismissal of the corrosive effect such rhetoric has on Ghana’s democratic fabric (Arthur, 2015). Once celebrated as a beacon of civility, Ghana now risks becoming a cautionary tale of political decay.
As the tide of insults threatens to overwhelm Ghana, the nation urgently needs robust anti-defamation and criminal libel laws that have real consequences—not statutes treated as partisan suggestions by the judiciary (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015). Effective legal frameworks must impose meaningful penalties, including imprisonment and substantial fines, for those who weaponize speech to malign others or incite violence (Amegatcher, 2020; Daily Graphic, 2023). No democratic society tolerates free speech as a license to call for the death of a sitting president or to vilify his family without cause; such conduct is criminalized across advanced democracies (BBC News, 2022). Until Ghana enforces laws that bind all citizens—regardless of status or location—to responsible expression and accountability, the country will remain vulnerable to the chaos and violence that unchecked rhetoric can unleash. One reckless statement could ignite catastrophe, a risk no responsible nation should accept. President Mahama must show decisive leadership to avert disaster; the time for complacency is over.
References
Agyeman-Duah, B. (2008). Ghana: Governance in the Fourth Republic. CODESRIA.
Amegatcher, Y. (2020). Defamation law and freedom of expression in Ghana: Striking a balance. Ghana Law Journal, 53, 101-119.
Arthur, J. (2015). Political corruption and public accountability in Ghana. African Journal of Public Affairs, 8(2), 34-48.
Austin, D. (1964). Politics in Ghana: 1946-1960. Oxford University Press.
BBC News. (2022, July 14). Free speech limits: When can you be prosecuted for incitement? https://www.bbc.com/news/world-61976999
Boafo-Arthur, K. (2007). Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State. Zed Books.
Daily Graphic. (2022, August 10). Online abuse and the politics of insult in Ghana. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/online-abuse-and-the-politics-of-insult-in-ghana.html
Daily Graphic. (2020, September 5). Akufo-Addo condemns ‘Akyem Sakawa Boys’ tag; calls for restraint. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/akufo-addo-condemns-akyem-sakawa-boys-tag.html
Duodu, C. (2011, October 3). Ghana’s best parliamentary debates under Nkrumah. New African Magazine.
Daily Graphic. (2023, April 30). Calls for reform as defamation cases rise. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/calls-for-reform-as-defamation-cases-rise.html
Graphic Online. (2018, June 4). Babies with sharp teeth—How Rawlings coined the term for NDC youth. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/babies-with-sharp-teeth-how-rawlings-coined-the-term-for-ndc-youth.html
Daily Graphic. (2016, November 1). Ofosu-Kwakye makes damning health claims against Akufo-Addo. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/ofosu-kwakye-makes-damning-health-claims-against-akufo-addo.html
Gyampo, R. (2021). Political leadership and the decline of public trust. Ghana Journal of Politics, 12, 88-104.
Gyekye, K. (1997). Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. Oxford University Press.
Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1994). Ghana’s Unfinished Business. Journal of Democracy, 5(2), 78-91.
JoyNews. (2026, September 15). Mahama says insults don’t bother him: “I have crocodile skin.” https://www.myjoyonline.com/mahama-says-insults-dont-bother-him-i-have-crocodile-skin/
Joy News. (2022, September 14). Political insults escalate on social media platforms. https://www.myjoyonline.com/political-insults-escalate-on-social-media-platforms/
Joy News. (2020, September 3). Adongo stands by ‘Akyem Sakawa Boys’ comment. https://www.myjoyonline.com/adongo-stands-by-akyem-sakawa-boys-comment/
Joy News. (2022, July 1). Insult politics: Media personalities target Akufo-Addo. https://www.myjoyonline.com/insult-politics-media-personalities-target-akufo-addo/
Mbiti, J. S. (1990). African Religions and Philosophy (2nd ed.). Heinemann.
Modern Ghana. (2026, September 18). Ghana’s politics of insult: A dangerous new normal. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1315699/ghanas-politics-of-insult-a-dangerous-new-normal.html
Modern Ghana. (2022, June 29). Sammy Gyamfi calls for divine intervention at Arise Ghana protest. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1167997/sammy-gyamfi-calls-for-divine-intervention-at-arise-ghana-prot.html
Nussbaum, B. (2003). Ubuntu: Reflections of a South African on Our Common Humanity. Reflections, 4(4), 21-26.
Osei, M. (2017). Gender, media, and politics in Ghana: The case of female politicians. Journal of African Media Studies, 9(2), 265-279.
Oquaye, M. (2004). Politics in Ghana, 1982–1992: Rawlings, Revolution, and Populist Democracy. Tornado Publications.
Rooney, D. (2007). Kwame Nkrumah: Vision and Tragedy. Sub-Saharan Publishers.
Tutu, D. (1999). No Future Without Forgiveness. Random House.
I begin this essay with a note of lamentation: If tears could mend a nation, I would weep a well for Ghana—a country that has lost the will to speak truth and instead crafts its own undoing. This paper sharply scrutinizes the recent, extravagant send-off for seven retiring generals and an air force commodore. While their service may be acknowledged, the necessity of such a publicized celebration, complete with envelopes of perks, is deeply questionable (Daily Graphic, 2026). What message does this send to the nation’s teachers—pillars of intellectual growth—and other dedicated public servants who continue to endure salary arrears and neglect? Such spectacles valorize privilege and hierarchy, while the true stewards of Ghana’s future are left abandoned and unrecognized.
This paper is not an assault on military tradition; rather, it exposes the stark disparity between the grand send-offs for retiring generals and the neglect of teachers and public servants—the true backbone of national development. Elevating military ceremonies while minimizing the invaluable contributions of educators and civil servants is unjustifiable and demands urgent national debate (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015). Such practices reinforce a culture of hierarchy and privilege, undermining meritocracy and the principle of equal recognition for service to the nation.
On 26 September 2026, the Ghana Armed Forces honoured seven retiring generals and an air commodore with a formal parade at Burma Camp, attended by top military brass and dignitaries. While ceremonial recognition is standard, the author finds it ethically indefensible that, beyond citations, each officer received 20,000 Ghanaian Cedis and lavish gifts—including high-end electronics and luxury items—donated by corporate elites such as Michael Zormelo and Francis Biney (Daily Graphic, 2026). The Ghana Armed Forces itself, in line with global best practices, limited its public contribution to plaques and citations.
These extravagant gifts from private businesses to high-ranking officers raise serious questions about undue influence and the erosion of military ethics (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015). Such gestures risk casting the Armed Forces as susceptible to bribery, recalling the public outrage over judicial corruption revealed in Anas Aremeyaw Anas’s investigation (Anas, 2015). Meanwhile, teachers and public servants—unpaid for months—must strike for basic recognition, reinforcing the perception that Ghana values hierarchy and patronage over genuine public service (Osei, 2017; Modern Ghana, 2024). These practices deepen mistrust and undermine the principles of meritocracy and integrity in national institutions.
President Mahama’s cash gifts to retiring officers, regardless of intent, reflect poor judgment and undermine the dignity of military service. By rewarding officers with money instead of meaningful citations, he reduces their legacy to mere patronage—reinforcing the corrosive notion that national service is measured by cash, not honour or inspiration for future generations (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015). Such gestures are not tokens of appreciation but thinly veiled acts of daylight bribery, eroding public trust in leadership and the Armed Forces (Daily Graphic, 2026; Anas, 2015).
Now to the hard questions: What drove the Ghana Armed Forces and these retiring generals and air commodore to accept gifts from the president and corporate entities? Where is the oversight—does the Armed Forces have an Ethics Officer or an effective Oversight Committee? Would military leadership tolerate a junior or non-commissioned officer accepting money from private individuals or companies, or would it provoke swift disciplinary action (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015)? Allowing senior officers with generous pensions to supplement their earnings via external gifts undermines military integrity and sets a dangerous precedent (Daily Graphic, 2026; Transparency International, 2023). The Directorate and Defence Ministry must urgently review and reform their policies on gifts, establishing clear, enforceable standards that shield the institution from undue influence and align with best practices globally (Transparency International, 2023; OECD, 2019). The credibility and honour of the Armed Forces must not be traded for cash or corporate favours.
Unlike the privileged ranks of the Ghana Armed Forces, teachers in Ghana are systematically marginalized by the Ministry of Education and the Ghana Education Service. These professionals—key to national socialization and human capital formation—are consigned to poverty wages, substandard living conditions, and harsh, remote postings (Akyeampong, 2017; Osei, 2017). Many teach under trees, buy their own teaching materials, and retire on incomes barely sufficient for a month’s survival (Daily Graphic, 2024; UNICEF, 2022). Delayed salaries are routine; teachers travel from distant regions to the Service’s headquarters, only to beg for overdue pay and receive empty promises (JoyNews, 2024).
The government and ministry leadership, shielded by their regular salaries and perks, treat teachers as expendable—echoing Marx’s critique of workers exploited to exhaustion (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). Strike threats are dismissed as childish tantrums, met with hollow reassurances to “exercise patience,” a euphemism for indefinite neglect. This persistent disregard has rendered teaching—once a noble profession—so unattractive that new graduates shun it entirely. The infantilization and exploitation of teachers is a national disgrace demanding urgent reform.
Transitioning to the issue of corruption, allegations of teacher misconduct—such as neglecting curriculum coverage and running exploitative private classes—are direct consequences of chronic policy failures by the Ministry of Education and the Ghana Education Service (Akyeampong, 2017; Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). Neglected and underpaid, some teachers resort to unethical, even criminal, means to supplement their income, exploiting students and parents (Daily Graphic, 2024; UNICEF, 2022). The rot extends to the school placement and feeding programmes. Headmasters and headmistresses reportedly extort desperate parents for high-tier school admissions and exploit the feeding programme for personal gain by hiring relatives as matrons and siphoning food supplies for private resale (JoyNews, 2024; Modern Ghana, 2023). These scandals are symptomatic of systemic governance failures, not merely individual lapses.
In conclusion, Ghana’s crisis of public sector ethics and educational decline demands urgent, unapologetic reform. The Ghana Armed Forces must abolish extravagant send-off ceremonies for senior officers; those funds should support housing and welfare programs for junior ranks. Corporate and private gifts to officers should be banned outright, replaced by citations and plaques that honour genuine service, not patronage.
Teachers’ contracts must specify clear, enforceable terms of employment and payment—no more vague promises or bureaucratic evasions. The Ministry of Education and Ghana Education Service must slash wasteful spending on luxury vehicles, perks, and patronage contracts, redirecting resources to pay teachers promptly and fairly. It is time to end the empty rhetoric and confront pay inequity and salary arrears head-on. Ghana’s education system, once a continental model, is now in freefall, as reflected in soaring teacher attrition and abysmal exam results. The government’s inertia is indefensible; only radical, honest action—not wishful thinking—will reverse this decline and restore Ghana’s standing in Africa and beyond.
References
Anas, A. A. (2015, September 10). Ghana judges face suspension after bribe scandal. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34204927
Akyeampong, K. (2017). Teacher motivation and quality education in Ghana: Lessons for policy and practice. International Journal of Educational Development, 55, 43-50.
Arthur, J. (2015). Political corruption and public accountability in Ghana. African Journal of Public Affairs, 8(2), 34-48.
Aryeetey, E., & Baah-Boateng, W. (2016). Understanding Ghana’s growth success story and job creation challenges.Brookings Africa Growth Initiative.
Daily Graphic. (2026, September 27). Retiring generals feted with lavish gifts at Burma Camp. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/retiring-generals-feted-with-lavish-gifts-at-burma-camp.html
Daily Graphic. (2026, May 18). Military honors retiring generals with send-off party. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/military-honors-retiring-generals-with-send-off-party.html
Daily Graphic. (2024, January 25). Teachers lament poor pay and working conditions. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/teachers-lament-poor-pay-and-working-conditions.html
Gyampo, R. (2021). Political leadership and the decline of public trust. Ghana Journal of Politics, 12, 88-104.
JoyNews. (2024, April 10). Unpaid teachers protest at GES headquarters. https://www.myjoyonline.com/unpaid-teachers-protest-at-ges-headquarters/
Modern Ghana. (2024, March 2). Striking teachers demand months of unpaid salaries. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1301002/striking-teachers-demand-months-of-unpaid-salaries.html
OECD. (2019). OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service. OECD Publishing.
Osei, M. (2017). Gender, media, and politics in Ghana: The case of female politicians. Journal of African Media Studies, 9(2), 265-279.
Transparency International. (2023). Global Corruption Barometer: Africa. https://www.transparency.org/en/gcb/africa/africa-2023
UNICEF. (2022). Ghana: Education. https://www.unicef.org/ghana/education
Campaign promises like the so-called “24-hour economy” are nothing more than desperate rhetoric—empty, convoluted phrases that quickly devolve into a modern-day Tower of Babel. These projects are built on unattainable ambitions and serve only to deceive the electorate, securing electoral victory while masking a lack of substantive vision. Far from offering real solutions, such schemes threaten to plunge the nation deeper into debt, squandering resources on impractical policies rather than addressing pressing developmental needs. The cycle of debt and wasted human capital persists, all for the sake of political expediency.
In this paper, I directly challenge the architects of the so-called “24-hour economy.” What does this term actually mean, and what are its practical requirements? Which nation—especially one with Ghana’s sprawling informal sector, widespread aversion to hard work, rampant crime, dilapidated infrastructure, unreliable internet, and unstable power supply—has ever succeeded in implementing such a model (Ayee, 2012; Whitfield, 2018)? Who conceived this doomed project, and what expertise, if any, informed its creation? How much were these “experts” compensated, and what political offices do they now occupy for peddling a concept that, while rhetorically appealing, collapses under scrutiny (Arthur, 2015)?
Ghana’s political class has perfected the art of walking before crawling—a form of policy insanity and inverted logic that prioritizes flashy slogans over grounded, evidence-based solutions (Gyimah-Boadi & Prempeh, 2012). The “24-hour economy” is a hollow fantasy, engineered for electoral gain rather than real national progress.
In the lead-up to the election, John Dramani Mahama, flagbearer of the National Democratic Congress, unleashed a torrent of campaign promises, stopping just short of guaranteeing voters a ticket to heaven (Daily Graphic, 2024; Modern Ghana, 2024). With corporate pastors and so-called moral entrepreneurs at his side—some claiming direct lines to the divine—Mahama publicly submitted to their blessings in a televised spectacle that left many Ghanaians incredulous (JoyNews, 2024; Asamoah, 2023).
His “24-hour economy” rhetoric promised an economic utopia: ghost jobs running three shifts, perpetual employment, and universal prosperity for the youth. Yet, the reality is a hollow performance. The newly minted “Office of 24-Hour Economy Secretariat,” with its polished website, offers little substance and no concrete benchmarks for success (Business & Financial Times, 2024). This is classic political theatre—grandiose promises with no roadmap, designed to seduce an electorate desperate for hope but left with nothing but empty slogans (Abdulai & Hickey, 2016; Owusu, 2023).
My review of the 24-Hour Economy Secretariat website exposes little more than a façade: glossy AI-generated images and recycled Marxist slogans are paired with utopian economic promises from President Mahama—promises that ring hollow on closer inspection (Business & Financial Times, 2024; Owusu, 2023). Mahama’s assertion that the “24H+ is a holistic integrated multisectoral program” enabling producers to “attack key bottlenecks” in agriculture, fisheries, and manufacturing is classic political theatre—grand rhetoric detached from the daily realities of Ghana’s working poor.
In truth, most farmers and fishers remain trapped in poverty, lacking the capital, education, and infrastructure to overcome production barriers (Anarfi & Osei, 2017; Daily Graphic, 2024). Their urgent needs—capital, fair pricing, and motorable roads—are ignored by technocratic platitudes and virtual marketing (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). The 24-Hour Economy Secretariat website, with its curated images and distant speeches, caters to political convenience while leaving the real problems unsolved. This spectacle is yet another example of how Ghanaian leadership remains disconnected from the lived experience of its most vulnerable citizens (Modern Ghana, 2024).
President Mahama’s claim that “The 24-Hour Economy is a catalyst for industrialization, export promotion and job creation…for everyone, every hour of the day” is pure paternalism—detached from the harsh realities of rural Ghana (The Chronicle, 2024; Anarfi & Osei, 2017). This rhetoric glosses over the fact that Ghana’s industrial base remains small, fragmented, and heavily reliant on imports (Baah-Boateng, 2019; Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). The idea that a 24-hour economy can “work for everyone” is a political fantasy, not grounded in the lived experience of farmers and fishers who struggle daily with poverty, lack of infrastructure, and minimal state support (Dzanku, 2015; Daily Graphic, 2024).
Mahama’s top-down, lecture-style delivery ignores the realities of those who form the backbone of Ghana’s economy—uneducated and marginalized labourers enduring harsh conditions. His vision does not reach those it purports to serve, reinforcing the disconnect between political elites and the nation’s working poor (Modern Ghana, 2024; Ofori-Atta, 2022). Without addressing structural deficiencies, the 24-hour economy is nothing more than hollow rhetoric.
President Mahama’s claim that “The 24-H+ programme will work to realize the full economic and commercial value of the largest man-made lake in the world [The Volta Lake]” is pure speculation—an exercise in political fantasy rather than actionable policy (The Chronicle, 2024; Joy Business, 2024). Praising Volta Lake’s potential is not a substitute for concrete planning or capital investment. Ghanaian politicians have long mastered the art of leveraging natural beauty and grand promises for electoral gain, yet fail to deliver verifiable, sustainable results (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016; Ofori-Atta, 2022).
What Volta Lake needs is a rigorous, transparent blueprint—subject to public scrutiny and rooted in adequate funding—not empty rhetoric or “mini-Singapore” daydreams. So far, the 24-hour economy is nothing more than a vision board, not a result-driven plan (Modern Ghana, 2024; Daily Graphic, 2024). Until leaders move from wishful thinking to accountable action, such pronouncements are little more than political theatre.
This paper is not a personal attack—I do not make policy—but it is an indictment of Ghana’s political class for routinely sending the electorate on wild goose chases with empty slogans and unworkable dreams (Adu-Gyamfi, 2023; The Chronicle, 2024). The 24-hour economy, while rhetorically appealing, is a fantasy in a nation plagued by youth unemployment, online fraud, and a rising culture of self-enrichment through illicit means (Aning, 2016; Owusu, 2023). Without a fundamental shift in youth mindset through targeted public education and enforceable job training programs, the promise of a 24-hour economy will remain a mirage.
Armed robbery, cybercrime, and institutional indifference make around-the-clock commerce dangerous and unsustainable (Boateng, 2021; Ghanaian Times, 2024). The very notion of a 24-hour economy collapses in the face of traffic gridlock, unmotorable roads, and chronic power outages—structural failures that successive governments have failed to address despite endless promises (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). No serious investor will risk capital in a country where basic infrastructure is neglected, and government agencies are reactive at best, waiting for disaster before taking action. Until these foundational issues are resolved, the 24-hour economy will remain nothing more than political theatre.
In conclusion, real change will remain elusive until the Ghanaian electorate seizes control—demanding accountability, rejecting political handouts, and asserting their power to determine the nation’s trajectory. Only when citizens make politicians uncomfortable with hard truths, expose hypocrisy, and show habitual liars the door will the toxic cycle of deception end. Until then, the public will continue to be force-fed deadlier lies, all in the name of political self-preservation, not national service.
References
Abdulai, A., & Hickey, S. (2016). The politics of development under competitive clientelism: Insights from Ghana’s education sector. African Affairs, 115(458), 44-72.
Adu-Gyamfi, S. (2023). Political marketing and unmet promises: Ghana’s electoral cycle and public trust. African Studies Quarterly, 24(2), 53-71.
Anarfi, J. K., & Osei, R. D. (2017). Rural poverty and agricultural development in Ghana: The case of smallholder farmers. Journal of Agriculture and Rural Development in the Tropics and Subtropics, 118(2), 183-195.
Aning, K. (2016). Organized crime in West Africa: Options for response. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Policy Brief, 8, 1-6.
Arthur, J. (2015). Political corruption and public accountability in Ghana. African Journal of Public Affairs, 8(2), 34-48.
Aryeetey, E., & Baah-Boateng, W. (2016). Understanding Ghana’s growth success story and job creation challenges. Brookings Africa Growth Initiative.
Asamoah, M. (2023, December 15). Politicians and pastors: The new alliance in Ghanaian campaigning. African Arguments. https://africanarguments.org/2023/12/politicians-and-pastors-the-new-alliance-in-ghanaian-campaigning/
Ayee, J. R. A. (2012). Manifestos and electoral promises in Ghana: An analysis of the 2008 general elections. Journal of African Elections, 11(2), 1-20.
Baah-Boateng, W. (2019). The youth unemployment challenge in Africa: What are the drivers? Economic and Political Weekly, 54(9), 41-47.
Boateng, F. D. (2021). Crime trends and policing in Ghana: An empirical overview. Journal of African Law, 65(2), 315-334.
Business & Financial Times. (2024, March 21). 24-Hour Economy Secretariat: More show than substance? https://thebftonline.com/2024/03/21/24-hour-economy-secretariat-more-show-than-substance/
Daily Graphic. (2024, February 24). Volta Lake potential remains untapped. https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/volta-lake-potential-remains-untapped.html
Daily Graphic. (2024, February 10). Farmers lament poor roads and low prices. https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/farmers-lament-poor-roads-and-low-prices.html
Daily Graphic. (2024, January 10). Election promises and the politics of hope. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/election-promises-and-the-politics-of-hope.html
Dzanku, F. M. (2015). Transient rural livelihoods and poverty in Ghana. Journal of Rural Studies, 40, 102-110.
Ghanaian Times. (2024, April 5). Floods, choked drains and government’s yearly ritual of blame. https://www.ghanaiantimes.com.gh/floods-choked-drains-and-governments-yearly-ritual-of-blame/
Gyimah-Boadi, E., & Prempeh, H. K. (2012). Oil, politics, and Ghana’s emerging democracy. Journal of Democracy, 23(3), 94-108.
Joy Business. (2024, March 10). Mahama’s 24-Hour Economy: Vision or mirage? https://www.myjoyonline.com/business/mahamas-24-hour-economy-vision-or-mirage/
JoyNews. (2024, February 17). Mahama’s prayer rally raises eyebrows. https://www.myjoyonline.com/mahamas-prayer-rally-raises-eyebrows/
Modern Ghana. (2024, January 12). Campaign promises vs. reality: The 24-hour economy in question. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1292448/campaign-promises-vs-reality-the-24-hour-economy-in-question.html
Modern Ghana. (2024, January 12). Election campaign rhetoric: Promises, prayers, and the politics of spectacle. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1292448/election-campaign-rhetoric-promises-prayers-and-the.html
Ofori-Atta, K. (2022). Political elitism and rural neglect: Ghana’s development paradox. African Affairs, 121(482), 128-146.
Owusu, G. (2023). Electoral populism and the hollowing out of policy in Ghana. Journal of African Elections, 22(2), 41-56.
The Chronicle. (2024, March 5). Mahama’s 24-hour economy: Promise or pipe dream? https://thechronicle.com.gh/mahamas-24-hour-economy-promise-or-pipe-dream/
Whitfield, L. (2018). Economies after Colonialism: Ghana and the Struggle for Power. Cambridge University Press.
The entrenched fraud and waste at Ghana’s Scholarship Secretariat is a national scandal, perpetuated by politicians, policymakers, and the elite who exploit the system for personal gain (Asante & Ayee, 2021; MyJoyOnline, 2023). Party loyalty has blinded many Ghanaians to the blatant siphoning of public funds to educate the offspring and associates of those in power, while genuinely deserving students from poor backgrounds are sidelined or, if fortunate, sent abroad under dubious arrangements (Daily Graphic, 2023; GhanaWeb, 2022). Regardless of ideological posturing, both the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party merely await their turn at the trough—dispensing scholarships to their inner circles while publicly preaching equity (Asante & Ayee, 2021; Modern Ghana, 2021). This hypocrisy undermines meritocracy and erodes public trust in the state’s ability to support upward mobility.
This essay critically examines the history and current state of Ghana’s Scholarship Secretariat. I foreground Kwame Nkrumah’s original vision: to develop Ghana’s intellectual capital and build a robust postcolonial leadership and civil service (Asante, 2012; Rooney, 2007). Nkrumah’s policies were transformative, aiming to democratize access to higher education and drive national development. Today, however, the Secretariat stands as a corrupt shell of its former self—riddled with nepotism, elite capture, and partisan abuse (Asante & Ayee, 2021; Daily Graphic, 2023; GhanaWeb, 2022).
This rot demands urgent action. I challenge the current NDC government—and all future administrations—to fundamentally review the scholarship disbursement process, if not dissolve the entire scheme. It is unconscionable for a privileged minority to exploit public funds for the exclusive benefit of their families and associates while deserving students are left behind (Modern Ghana, 2021; Ayee, 2000). Only radical reform will restore integrity and equity to a system that has lost its way.
Against this historical backdrop, the Ghana Scholarship Secretariat was established in 1960 under the Office of the President with a mandate to administer scholarships to brilliant but needy students (Ghana Scholarship Secretariat, n.d.). Nkrumah envisioned the Secretariat as a cornerstone for building Ghana’s human capital and fostering Pan-African solidarity, extending scholarships even to citizens from colonial territories and Southern Africa’s frontline states (Rooney, 2007; Asante, 2012). For Nkrumah, genuine independence meant an education system that Africanized its recipients while equipping them for global engagement—a vision that propelled Ghana’s early leadership in fields such as science, medicine, and engineering.
In its early years, the Secretariat prioritized national and international training, sending students to the Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc, Cuba, Western Europe, and North America to cultivate expertise in critical disciplines (Ayee, 2000; Rooney, 2007). This approach produced leaders who spearheaded advancements in education, healthcare, research, industry, and aviation.
However, by the 1980s, the Secretariat’s expansion into postgraduate and specialized training was marred by growing politicization and patronage (Ayee, 2000; Asante, 2012). The last decade has seen the Secretariat mired in allegations of corruption, nepotism, and opacity—now incentivizing elite capture rather than merit-based advancement (Daily Graphic, 2023; GhanaWeb, 2022). The original vision of empowering Ghana’s brightest has been replaced by a system that too often rewards political loyalty over excellence.
Building on the Secretariat’s descent into lawlessness, the appointment of Mr. Kwaku Asafo-Agyei as Registrar in January 2025 exposed egregious malfeasance at the Ghana Scholarship Secretariat. Asafo-Agyei’s investigations revealed that his predecessor, Dr. Kingsley Agyeman, was implicated in the issuance of fraudulent scholarship award letters—including documents signed and dated after Agyeman had left office, bearing inconsistent letterheads and lacking official seals (GhanaWeb, 2025; JoyNews, 2025). The institutional rot ran so deep that staff could no longer distinguish genuine Secretariat letterhead, forcing an overhaul of official stationery.
The damage was not confined to paperwork. Asafo-Agyei alleged that staff travelled abroad on fake scholarships, saddling Ghana with over £40 million in debt to UK institutions and $10 million to U.S. schools. St. George’s University even threatened legal action over a $1 million debt (Daily Graphic, 2025). The forgery and unauthorized endorsements at the Secretariat reveal systemic breakdown—unauthorized personnel issued awards, and staff extorted unapproved fees from applicants, a blatant violation of government regulations and a hallmark of organized crime (Asante & Ayee, 2021; MyJoyOnline, 2025). This is not an isolated incident but the visible tip of a sprawling, criminal iceberg.
Mr. Asafo-Agyei’s revelations expose a flagrant breach of contract: scholarship beneficiaries routinely refuse to return to Ghana, thereby denying the country the expertise their foreign education was meant to secure, while compounding national debt (GhanaWeb, 2025; Asante & Ayee, 2021). Even more egregious, many absconders continue to collect stipends and financial support from the Ghanaian government, exemplifying institutional decay driven by corruption and the normalization of public sector looting (Boateng & Darko, 2016; Daily Graphic, 2025). This systemic failure not only undermines the purpose of the scholarship scheme but perpetuates a cycle of elite impunity and squandered national resources (Adu-Gyamfi & Osei-Assibey, 2016).
Transitioning from these revelations, it is essential to recognize that corruption at the Ghana Scholarship Secretariat is a bipartisan disease. While an NDC-appointed Registrar’s exposé may sound sensational, corruption in scholarship allocation is not the exclusive domain of the NPP. Under NDC administrations, scholarships were routinely awarded to government officials and their families through opaque processes, reinforcing a patronage system that privileges elite networks over merit (Adu-Gyamfi & Osei-Assibey, 2016; Asante & Ayee, 2021).
Both major parties have exploited the Secretariat as a vehicle for distributing patronage, particularly in a society where Western credentials are fetishized as gateways to power and mobility (Arthur, 2015; Daily Guide Network, 2023). Even minimal certificate programs—often unworthy of state funding in Western countries—secured financial backing in Ghana, courtesy of insider connections and directives from above (Modern Ghana, 2021). The result is a system where mediocre beneficiaries are catapulted into privileged positions, perpetuating a cycle of credential inflation and elite capture at the nation’s expense (Boateng & Darko, 2016; Adu-Gyamfi & Osei-Assibey, 2016).
While the Secretariat was founded with noble intentions—to secure Ghana’s post-independence future through education—its persistent exploitation has rendered it a tool for political patronage and elite self-enrichment (Adu-Gyamfi & Osei-Assibey, 2016; Asante & Ayee, 2021). Over the last two decades, the Secretariat has devolved into a partisan battleground, with scholarships routinely funnelled to cronies of both major parties, while truly needy students, especially those seeking foreign education, are sidelined (Daily Guide Network, 2023; Modern Ghana, 2021). Female applicants are especially vulnerable, often preyed upon by predatory officials who exploit their lack of recourse (Osei, 2017).
The Secretariat, in its current form and absent meaningful reform, has outlived its usefulness and must be dissolved. Funds earmarked for foreign scholarships should instead be redirected to basic education in deprived communities, where children still learn under trees and sit on bare floors (UNICEF, 2022). My Western education underscored that higher education is a merit-based investment, not a political favour. Worthy students, especially at reputable institutions, routinely earn scholarships and assistantships based on merit, not political connection (Altbach, Reisberg, & Rumbley, 2009). Wholly funding the foreign education of unqualified, politically connected students—many of whom never return to serve—is a reckless waste of public resources and a policy dead end (Asante & Ayee, 2021; Adu-Gyamfi & Osei-Assibey, 2016).
To conclude, change remains alien to both the NDC and NPP. Neither party has demonstrated the will to eradicate the entrenched corruption at the Scholarship Secretariat—a sanctuary for party loyalists and corrupt officials who plunder public resources with impunity, while ordinary Ghanaians continue to suffer in silence.
References
Adu-Gyamfi, S., & Osei-Assibey, E. (2016). The political economy of scholarship allocation in Ghana. Journal of African Political Economy & Development, 1(2), 40-54.
Altbach, P. G., Reisberg, L., & Rumbley, L. E. (2009). Trends in Global Higher Education: Tracking an Academic Revolution. UNESCO.
Arthur, J. (2015). Political corruption and public accountability in Ghana. African Journal of Public Affairs, 8(2), 34-48.
Asante, F. A. (2012). Education and Human Capital Development in Ghana. International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow, 1(4), 1-7.
Asante, F. A., & Ayee, J. R. A. (2021). Public sector corruption in Ghana: Trends and policy responses. African Affairs, 120(479), 543-563.
Ayee, J. R. A. (2000). Corruption and the Future of the Public Service in Africa. African Futures, 25-36.
Boateng, F. D., & Darko, I. N. (2016). Corruption in Ghana: Trends, causes, and consequences. African Security Review, 25(2), 151-166.
Daily Guide Network. (2023, May 2). NDC, NPP: Scholarship abuse is bipartisan. https://dailyguidenetwork.com/ndc-npp-scholarship-abuse-is-bipartisan/
Daily Graphic. (2025, March 25). Secretariat’s fake scholarships push Ghana into £40m debt. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/scholarship-secretariat-fake-scholarships-push-ghana-into-debt.html
Daily Graphic. (2023, May 19). Scholarship Secretariat embroiled in nepotism scandal. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/scholarship-secretariat-embroiled-in-nepotism-scandal.html
Ghana Scholarship Secretariat. (n.d.). About Us. https://www.scholarships.gov.gh/about-us
GhanaWeb. (2025, April 2). Registrar blows lid on fake award letters, massive fraud at Scholarship Secretariat. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Registrar-blows-lid-on-fake-award-letters-massive-fraud-at-scholarship-secretariat-1876543
GhanaWeb. (2022, October 10). Exposé: How political elites hijack Ghana’s scholarships. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Expose-How-political-elites-hijack-Ghana-s-scholarships-1625478
JoyNews. (2025, March 28). Scholarship Secretariat faces legal action over $1m St. George’s University debt. https://www.myjoyonline.com/scholarship-secretariat-faces-legal-action-over-1m-debt/
MyJoyOnline. (2025, April 5). Fake awards, unauthorized endorsements: Scholarship Secretariat scandal grows. https://www.myjoyonline.com/fake-awards-unauthorized-endorsements-scholarship-secretariat-scandal-grows/
Modern Ghana. (2021, September 29). Scholarship awards and political patronage in Ghana. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1100286/scholarship-awards-and-political-patronage-in-ghan.html
MyJoyOnline. (2023, February 12). Calls intensify for reform at Ghana Scholarship Secretariat. https://www.myjoyonline.com/calls-intensify-for-reform-at-ghana-scholarship-secretariat/
Osei, M. (2017). Gender, media, and politics in Ghana: The case of female politicians. Journal of African Media Studies, 9(2), 265-279.
Rooney, D. (2007). Kwame Nkrumah: Vision and Tragedy. Sub-Saharan Publishers.
UNICEF. (2022). Ghana: Education. https://www.unicef.org/ghana/education
In her incisive article, “The First Lady’s job is to serve the people, not to pass an English examination” (GhanaWeb, 2026), Victoria Hammah rightly asserts that Lordina Mahama’s primary duty is national service—not linguistic prowess. This exposes a toxic national obsession: equating fluency in colonial languages with brilliance and competence. I argue that this fetish for English fluency, while disparaging mastery of indigenous languages, is a lingering symptom of (neo)colonialism—one that perpetuates the fallacy that intelligence is measured by proficiency in the colonizer’s tongue (Bamgbose, 2011; Prah, 2018). Such a standard not only undermines local identity but also continues the colonial project of intellectual subjugation.
In contemporary Ghana, an incurable linguistic insecurity grips the elite—politicians, policymakers, and even ordinary citizens—who contort themselves to croak in English, often butchering syntax and diction in a misguided pursuit of colonial approval (Prah, 2018; Bamgbose, 2011). This obsession reached new comedic heights when Stephen Amoah (“Sticka”), MP for Nhyiaeso, boasted that his European education granted him “phonetics” prowess, despite his pronounced accent (GhanaWeb, 2023). Such episodes, whether intended as humour or not, lay bare the deep-seated inferiority complex that plagues Ghana’s elite. The compulsion to showcase English proficiency—no matter how fractured—reveals a nation still shackled by colonial linguistic standards, where broken English is performed to a mesmerized but ultimately subjugated audience.
Building on Nkrumah’s legacy, it is clear that accent or limitations in speaking a colonial language are not intellectual deficits. Nkrumah insisted that Black intellectual freedom and sovereignty are not measured by colonial fluency but by the ability to connect with and mobilize one’s people in their own languages—languages that carry the collective spirit, values, and responsibilities of the community (Nkrumah, 1961; Prah, 2018).
In a country grappling with poverty, disease, escalating living costs, and rising teenage pregnancy, the insistence that Lordina Mahama—or any Ghanaian leader—must address the nation in the Queen’s English is both misplaced and elitist (Bamgbose, 2011; Ansre, 1979). True leadership demands engagement in local languages, fostering genuine dialogue with those most affected by national crises (Prah, 2018; Bamgbose, 2011). In Ghana’s context, the power to inspire and lead lies in cultural authenticity, not linguistic mimicry of former colonial masters.
Would Lordina Mahama’s critics apply the same linguistic standards to European leaders’ wives who lack English fluency? Unlikely. This double standard exposes a deep-rooted colonial mentality among many Ghanaians and, more broadly, Africans who continue to valorize everything Western while disparaging African identity and linguistic heritage (Bamgbose, 2011; Prah, 2018; Mazrui, 2003). The insidious effects of colonial education persist, producing generations trained to think, speak, and even eat “White,” while rejecting African authenticity and agency (Ansre, 1979; Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, 1986).
Nowhere is this self-loathing more evident than in the resistance to elevating Twi—spoken by a majority of Ghanaians—to official status, or in the pride some Ghanaian diaspora parents take in depriving their children of African languages and culture, despite the children’s own interest (Prah, 2018; Bamgbose, 2011). Such attitudes reinforce racist stereotypes of Africans as peripheral to history and human achievement, perpetuating the myth that African contributions are merely nominal (Mazrui, 2003; Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, 1986). Until this colonial hangover is confronted, true African renaissance and self-determination will remain elusive.
Hammah’s robust defence of Lordina Mahama is a critical intervention in Ghana’s toxic political landscape. It exposes the nation’s corrosive political culture—one driven by shadowy financiers and lacking substantive policy discourse, especially regarding the role and impact of the First Lady (Osei, 2017; Tamale, 2020). More importantly, Hammah’s stance is a clarion call to decolonize Ghanaian feminism and reject the tired, patriarchal notion that women like Lordina Mahama should be confined to domestic roles and excluded from public life (Bamgbose, 2011; Prah, 2018; Tamale, 2020).
The evidence is clear: women in Ghana, as globally, have been pillars of national progress—excelling in public office, shaping transformative policies, and driving socioeconomic advancement (Tsikata, 2009; Adomako Ampofo, 2010). Lordina Mahama’s contributions to free education, youth employment, and programs for girls and young women mark her as a force for much-needed policy reform in a country grappling with urgent social challenges. Dismissing her activism is not just regressive—it is a disservice to Ghana’s future.
In conclusion, the personal attacks on Lordina Mahama are not only deeply sexist but also corrosive to Ghana’s national character. Demeaning the First Lady to score political points or tarnish the country’s image is intellectually dishonest and reflects a broader malaise in Ghanaian political discourse (Bamgbose, 2011; Tamale, 2020). Rather than engaging in substantive, evidence-based critique of public service, critics have resorted to ad hominem slander, dragging Ghana’s reputation through the mud (Ansre, 1979; Osei, 2017). This toxic culture of fabrication and personal vilification, unchecked by meaningful accountability, undermines the very fabric of a society once respected for its civility and democratic values. Freedom of expression does not license character assassination or gendered abuse (Republic of Ghana, 1992, Art. 21). If Ghana is to reclaim its standing as a model in African democracy, it must reject such base tactics and restore dignity to national debate. Lordina Mahama, like any public servant, deserves critique rooted in facts and respect—not insults, however veiled.
References
Adomako Ampofo, A. (2010). Female leadership and democratic development in Africa: Ghana in perspective. African and Asian Studies, 9(2), 217-241.
Ansre, G. (1979). Four rationalizations for maintaining the European languages in education in Africa. African Languages, 5(2), 10-17.
Bamgbose, A. (2011). African languages today: The challenge of and prospects for empowerment under globalization. In E. G. Bokamba et al. (Eds.), Selected Proceedings of the 40th Annual Conference on African Linguistics (pp. 1-14). Cascadilla Proceedings Project.
GhanaWeb. (2026, September 25). The First Lady’s job is to serve the people, not to pass an English examination. https://www.ghanaweb.com
GhanaWeb. (2023, May 19). Sticka’s phonetics: The MP’s latest comedy on the floor of parliament. https://www.ghanaweb.com
Mazrui, A. A. (2003). The language of Africa and the politics of translation. Journal of Modern African Studies, 41(1), 1-20.
Nkrumah, K. (1961). I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology. Heinemann.
Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o. (1986). Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. Heinemann.
Osei, M. (2017). Gender, media, and politics in Ghana: The case of female politicians. Journal of African Media Studies, 9(2), 265-279.
Prah, K. K. (2018). The Language of Instruction Conundrum in Africa. CASAS Book Series.
Republic of Ghana. (1992). Constitution of the Republic of Ghana.
Tamale, S. (2020). Decolonization and Afro-Feminism. Daraja Press.
Tsikata, D. (2009). Women’s organizing in Ghana since the 1990s: From individual organizations to three coalitions. Development, 52(2), 185-192.
In this paper, I take a polemical stance to expose the absurdity and danger of narco-politics in Ghana, fueled by whataboutism and false moral equivalency over which government—National Democratic Congress (NDC) or New Patriotic Party (NPP)—interdicted more cocaine shipments (Daily Graphic, 2023; Citi Newsroom, 2024). This political theatre, perpetuated by politicians addicted to reckless, juvenile rhetoric, has turned Ghanaian politics into a comic farce. Politicians, well-compensated and privileged, trivialize grave national threats by reducing the cocaine crisis to partisan scorekeeping, while the true cancer—unchecked drug trafficking—remains untreated and metastasizes (Boateng, 2022; Owusu, 2020).
This paper is not a defence of any party; both the NDC and NPP have delivered mediocre results and bear collective blame. The spectacle of lawmakers rationalizing the indefensible and engaging in childish blame games is not only reprehensible, it is a betrayal of public trust and legislative responsibility (Gyimah-Boadi & Prempeh, 2012). Ghana’s descent into narco-politics is a terminal threat demanding radical policy intervention, not the hollow soundbites of self-serving politicians.
In September 2026, South Dayi Member of Parliament Rockson-Nelson Dafeamekpor ignited controversy with his X (formerly Twitter) post: “NPP cannot win cocaine debate in Ghana” (JoyOnline, 2026). His statement exposed a disturbing trend—political elites from both the NDC and NPP locked in a grotesque contest over which party is least complicit in Ghana’s burgeoning cocaine trade. Dafeamekpor cataloged cocaine interceptions from 2017 to 2024 under the Akufo-Addo administration and cited a 2009 U.S. Department of State report labelling Ghana a major transshipment hub for cocaine and heroin (US Department of State, 2009; MyJoyOnline, 2026).
Dafeamekpor’s rhetoric is emblematic of a political class schooled in neocolonial blame-shifting, eager to weaponize international reports for partisan gain while absolving themselves of responsibility. Dafeamekpor’s call for a “national approach” to drug trafficking rings hollow; the real scandal is that both parties have used the drug crisis as a political football, rather than formulating radical, coordinated policy responses (Aning & Kwarkye, 2022; Alhassan & Tankebe, 2021). Until politicians abandon self-serving games and confront the narco-menace head-on, Ghana’s international reputation and internal stability will remain at risk.
Continuing this pattern of partisan amnesia, Dafeamekpor’s sanctimonious statements reek of hypocrisy. Like so many of his colleagues—whom the late Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings famously dubbed “babies with sharp teeth” for their unruly, partisan attacks—Dafeamekpor is quick to condemn the NPP but silent on his own party’s failures (Graphic Online, 2018; Modern Ghana, 2021). While in opposition, he and his peers—Sammy Gyamfi, Felix Ofosu-Kwakye, Sam Nartey George—relentlessly attacked Nana Akufo-Addo’s administration, often with allegations rooted in political mischief and slander (Citi Newsroom, 2023).
Yet, since the NDC took office in January 2025, Ghana’s status as a cocaine hub remains unchanged. Dafeamekpor and his cohort of partisan apologists have either lapsed into silence or twisted narratives to shirk responsibility, exposing a profound deficit in political integrity and public accountability. (Daily Guide Network, 2014; Modern Ghana, 2021). Dafeamekpor’s current stance is a transparent attempt to deflect from the NDC’s own complicity in the transshipment of narcotics through Ghana, exposing the bipartisan rot at the core of Ghana’s narco-politics (Aning & Kwarkye, 2022). Such selective outrage and rhetorical gymnastics do nothing to address the systemic failures enabling Ghana’s descent into a trafficking hotspot.
This brings us to a fundamental question for Dafeamekpor and his ilk: Why did the electorate oust Akufo-Addo’s government? The prevailing assumption was that returning the NDC to power offered a superior alternative. Yet this belief is tenuous, given Ghana’s continued drift and the enduring cocaine crisis (JoyNews, 2024; Citi Newsroom, 2023). Dafeamekpor’s whataboutism and appeals to moral equivalency are intellectually bankrupt, akin to a serial killer arguing mitigation because his crimes are marginally fewer or less gruesome than another’s (Aning & Kwarkye, 2022; Modern Ghana, 2021). The central issue is not which party presided over more drug seizures or trafficking scandals; it is that both parties have presided over systemic rot and remain complicit in Ghana’s narco-politics. This bipartisan complicity is a public menace, demanding condemnation—not partisan point-scoring.
The party of Rawlings, once a beacon of hope and discipline despite its own human rights failings, has devolved into a clique of self-satisfied elites obsessed with status and style—mistaking privilege for competence, while the critical public sees through the charade (Graphic Online, 2022; Gyampo, 2021). The NDC must urgently reclaim its revolutionary legacy: genuine public service and an unyielding stance against crime, as Rawlings once embodied in his relentless crackdown on financial corruption and violent crime during the PNDC era (Gyimah-Boadi & Prempeh, 2012; Aning, 2016).
Until the NDC rediscovers fiscal discipline, frugality, and the courage to confront the drug menace with real resolve, it stands indistinguishable from the NPP it so loudly condemns. Dafeamekpor and his colleagues’ opportunistic appeals to public sentiment, especially when under scrutiny, are symptomatic of a party that has lost its way and now panders to narco-interests (Daily Guide Network, 2023; Aning & Kwarkye, 2022). Public confidence in Ghanaian leadership is eroding; if this trajectory continues, the consequences will be dire for the country’s stability and sovereignty.
References
Aning, K. (2016). Organized crime in West Africa: Options for response. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Policy Brief, 8, 1-6.
Aning, K., & Kwarkye, S. (2022). Ghana’s struggle with drug trafficking: The challenges of enforcement and governance. African Security Review, 31(1), 46-60.
Alhassan, S., & Tankebe, J. (2021). Corruption, trust, and criminal justice in Ghana. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 66, 100497.
Boateng, F. D. (2022). Corruption and law enforcement in Ghana: Implications for security and justice. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 70, 100514.
Citi Newsroom. (2024, February 28). Ghana ranked among top West African countries for cocaine trafficking. https://citinewsroom.com/2024/02/ghana-ranked-among-top-west-african-countries-for-cocaine-trafficking/
Citi Newsroom. (2023, November 9). NDC, NPP trade jabs over cocaine seizures. https://citinewsroom.com/2023/11/ndc-npp-trade-jabs-over-cocaine-seizures/
Daily Graphic. (2023, November 14). Political parties trade blame over cocaine seizures. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/political-parties-trade-blame-over-cocaine-seizures.html
Graphic Online. (2022, November 2). Public confidence in political parties waning. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/public-confidence-in-political-parties-waning.html
Daily Guide Network. (2023, March 5). NDC, NPP: Which party is really fighting drugs? https://dailyguidenetwork.com/ndc-npp-which-party-is-really-fighting-drugs/
Gyampo, R. (2021). Political leadership and the decline of public trust. Ghana Journal of Politics, 12, 88-104.
Gyimah-Boadi, E., & Prempeh, H. K. (2012). Oil, politics, and Ghana’s emerging democracy. Journal of Democracy, 23(3), 94-108.
JoyOnline. (2026, September 5). NPP cannot win cocaine debate in Ghana – Dafeamekpor. https://www.myjoyonline.com/npp-cannot-win-cocaine-debate-in-ghana-dafeamekpor
JoyNews. (2024, January 15). Why voters rejected Akufo-Addo’s government. https://www.myjoyonline.com/why-voters-rejected-akufo-addos-government/
MyJoyOnline. (2026, September 6). NDC, NPP trade blame over drug trafficking claims. https://www.myjoyonline.com/ndc-npp-trade-blame-over-drug-trafficking-claims
Modern Ghana. (2021, October 15). Ghana’s cocaine politics: A tale of hypocrisy. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1111245/ghanas-cocaine-politics-a-tale-of-hypocrisy.html
Owusu, G. (2020). The politics of crime and security in Ghana: Understanding the role of the state. African Affairs, 119(475), 41-63.
US Department of State. (2009). International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. 1: Drug and Chemical Control. https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2009/vol1/index.htm
This essay interrogates whether Ghanaian police possess constitutional authority to search a suspect’s phone without a court warrant. The debate pivots on the presumption of innocence and the balance between law enforcement imperatives and constitutional rights. While Oliver Barker-Vormawor asserts that police must always obtain a court order to access seized phone data—a position grounded in the Ghanaian Constitution’s protection of privacy (Constitution of Ghana, 1992, art. 18)—the law is far from absolute. There exist notable exceptions, both in Ghanaian and comparative jurisprudence, that require rigorous scholarly scrutiny.
British and American case law illustrate that warrantless searches may be justified in exigent circumstances—such as imminent threats to public safety or the risk of evidence destruction. In the United States, Riley v. California (2014) held that police generally require a warrant to search a mobile phone, but recognized exceptions for exigent circumstances (Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 2014). Similarly, British courts have accepted that immediate searches can be justified to prevent crime or protect the public (see R v. Grant [2005] UKHL 2; R v. Khan [1997] AC 558). Ghanaian courts have echoed these principles. In Republic v. Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & Others (2018), the Supreme Court of Ghana recognized that privacy rights are not absolute and may be lawfully abridged in the interest of public order or crime prevention.
Thus, while the default rule demands judicial oversight, the Constitution and relevant case law acknowledge that exceptions exist where immediate action is necessary to avert crime or threats to public order. The legal landscape is clear: a blanket prohibition on warrantless searches is intellectually unsound and constitutionally incomplete.
The gap in Vormawor’s submission is its overgeneralization—a common shortcoming among Ghanaian elites and scholars who often present incomplete legal arguments, leaving audiences confused and ill-informed. Such generic claims, especially in the context of legal education, do little to advance substantive discourse or clarify the nuanced realities of constitutional law (Amegatcher, 2020; Nyarko, 2022).
Jurisprudence from Ghana, the UK, and the US makes clear that while warrants are generally required to search suspects’ phones, critical exceptions exist. Republic v. Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & Others (2018) acknowledges that constitutional privacy rights are not absolute in Ghana. British law, as in R v. Grant [2005] UKHL 2, and American law, as in Riley v. California (2014), both recognize exigent circumstances where immediate searches are lawful. Legal analysis requires specificity, not sweeping generalization. Scholars must engage with the complex interplay of rights and exceptions or risk perpetuating legal confusion.
In law enforcement, time is paramount. A police officer with reasonable grounds to suspect imminent criminal activity—especially when involving a phone as a potential instrument of crime—is fully empowered under Ghanaian, British, and American law to act without a warrant in exigent circumstances. The collective right to public safety outweighs the individual’s right to privacy when national security, homicide, or the prevention of serious crime is at stake (Republic v. Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & Others, 2018; R v. Grant [2005] UKHL 2; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 2014).
Insisting that police must always obtain a court warrant before searching a suspect’s phone is a legal fiction that undermines effective policing and public safety (Nyarko, 2022). No competent law enforcement officer would allow bureaucratic delays to jeopardize lives or national security. The law is clear: public interest and the prevention of crime justify immediate action, and legal systems worldwide recognize this necessity.
Alternatively, when a police officer determines that a suspected crime poses no imminent threat to national security, the community, or individuals, procedure dictates that the officer seek a court warrant before searching a suspect’s phone. In such cases, where time is not of the essence and the anticipated crime is not imminent, judicial oversight is both practical and required (Criminal Procedure Code Act 30, Ghana; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 1983; R v. Chief Constable of Lancashire, ex parte Parker [1993] QB 519). Ghanaian law and international best practices demand this balance between effective policing and constitutional protections (Mensah-Bonsu, 2018; Kwarteng, 2021).
It must be said, however, that Vormawor’s broad assertion on phone searches is undermined by its failure to distinguish between urgent and non-urgent circumstances. His critique appears less a good-faith legal argument than a sweeping indictment of the Ghana Police Service—a force not without fault, but one that operates within a legal system that recognizes both the necessity of judicial warrants and the reality of exceptions (Republic v. Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & Others, 2018; United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 1984; R v. Chief Constable of Lancashire, ex parte Parker [1993]). Rather than a personal attack, my analysis offers a rigorous, critical reconstruction of the issue, underscoring the need for nuance and fidelity to legal frameworks.
For rigorous debate, Vormawor’s position requires a more nuanced engagement with comparative constitutional law. The U.S. Fourth Amendment generally protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, while the Fifth guards against self-incrimination. Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court in Riley v. California (2014) held that police “generally” need a warrant to search cell phones, but recognized exceptions—such as exigent circumstances, probable cause, or voluntary consent (Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 2014; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 1973; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 1973).
Moreover, American courts have upheld warrantless searches during emergencies or when evidence is at risk of destruction (Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 2011). Law enforcement may seize phones while seeking a warrant and can use technological tools to access data, further eroding the notion of absolute privacy (Smith & Chin, 2021). These exceptions are disproportionately applied to marginalized communities, notably African American men, raising civil liberties concerns (Carbado, 2017).
British law echoes these principles. Under R v. Grant [2005] UKHL 2 and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), police may conduct searches without a warrant under reasonable suspicion or in emergencies, especially in cases involving serious crimes or public safety threats (Fenwick, 2017).
Ghana’s 1992 Constitution protects privacy and due process but allows for exceptions in the interest of national security or crime prevention (Mensah-Bonsu, 2018). Ghanaian law, like its American and British counterparts, recognizes that absolute rights yield in the face of compelling state interests—leaving the door open to both judicial oversight and necessary exceptions.
Legal rights are not a one-way street; they exist within a labyrinth of judicial interpretation and practical exceptions. The balance between individual liberties and collective security is a battle fought in every legal system, and seasoned counsel know how to exploit its twists and turns. I invite critical feedback and further scholarly engagement on this evolving terrain.
References
Amegatcher, Y. (2020). The Ghana Legal System. Accra: Advanced Legal Publications.
Carbado, D. W. (2017). From Stop and Frisk to Shoot and Kill: Terry v. Ohio at Fifty. Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 15, 61-85.
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992). Accra: Government Printer.
Fenwick, H. (2017). Civil Liberties and Human Rights. Routledge.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011).
Kwarteng, A. (2021). Search and seizure in Ghana: Constitutional and statutory perspectives. Ghana Law Journal, 53, 71-92.
Mensah-Bonsu, H. J. A. N. (2018). Criminal justice and constitutional rights in Ghana. African Journal of Legal Studies, 11(1), 55-70.
Nyarko, M. G. (2022). Privacy and Digital Evidence in Ghanaian Criminal Procedure. Journal of African Law, 66(1), 103-125.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), UK.
Republic v. Eugene Baffoe-Bonnie & Others, Supreme Court of Ghana, [2018] GHASC 20.
R v. Chief Constable of Lancashire, ex parte Parker [1993] QB 519 (UK).
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
R v. Grant [2005] UKHL 2.
R v. Khan [1997] AC 558.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
Smith, R., & Chin, A. (2021). Digital privacy and law enforcement: Forensics, encryption, and the law. International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 29(1), 1-23.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).