This paper delivers a ruthless critique of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Ghana, with IMANI-Center for Policy and Education as the focal point. While NGOs parade as think tanks, many operate as neo-colonial Trojan horses—fronted by Black elites who serve foreign interests and perpetuate dependency (Mawdsley, 2012; Mamdani, 1996). These organizations, far from promoting genuine accountability, often act as conduits for international agendas, wielding influence through media manipulation and donor-driven research (Obadare, 2014; Nkrumah, 1965). Their leaders, eager for photo-ops with Western benefactors, reinforce the optics of subservience and are complicit in sustaining Africa’s—and specifically Ghana’s—political and economic stagnation (Mkandawire, 2005).
IMANI and its ilk thrive on funding that prioritizes foreign policy interests over local empowerment, planting divisive narratives and entrenching a culture of perpetual beggary (Hearn, 2007). Their professed mission of government accountability masks a deeper, more insidious project: the reproduction of coloniality under the guise of reform (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). These organizations are not agents of African renaissance—they are instruments of foreign control, undermining true sovereignty and self-determination.
Building on this historical warning, Kwame Nkrumah, in his prophetic frustration, warned that Africa—and Ghana in particular—would remain trapped in perpetual subjugation unless its intellectual elite broke free from the ideological stranglehold of neo-colonialism (Nkrumah, 1965; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). He saw aid, development promises, and foreign-funded NGOs as the new weapons of control, designed to destabilize resistant postcolonial states and keep them in a state of dependency (Mamdani, 1996; Mkandawire, 2005). Today’s NGOs, masquerading as think tanks, serve foreign interests by relentlessly peddling politically charged accusations—often with little expertise—on media platforms, manipulating public opinion and undermining sovereign governance (Hearn, 2007; Mawdsley, 2012). This relentless external interference, disguised as reform, is a continuation of the colonial project and a direct threat to African autonomy and progress.
Despite IMANI’s polished image as a research-driven think tank devoted to national progress, its opaque funding sources scream of deep-seated duplicity. Nowhere on its official site does IMANI disclose where its substantial financial backing originates or which foreign interests are underwriting its agenda (Hearn, 2001; Obadare, 2014). This lack of transparency is not a trivial oversight but a glaring marker of neocolonial subterfuge—foreign-funded NGOs have long served as Trojan horses, advancing donor interests under the guise of “policy reform” while eroding African agency (Mkandawire, 2005; Banks et al., 2015).
In an era where “there is no free lunch,” every grant and partnership is a potential sheath for a dagger, poised to dismantle the hard-won gains of African self-determination (Nkrumah, 1965; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). The persistent refusal to answer basic questions about funding betrays IMANI’s complicity in perpetuating neocolonial control—subverting sovereignty in favour of donor-driven priorities. African civil society deserves better than foreign-fed “serpents” masquerading as saviours.
IMANI’s parading of leadership photos, advisory board rosters, and self-congratulatory rankings fails to answer the central question: Who funds this operation, and what strings are attached? No matter how many glossy images or “top think tank” accolades are posted online, the organization’s refusal to disclose its financial backers—especially Western sources with postcolonial interests—exposes damning suspicions about its true allegiances (Hearn, 2001; Banks et al., 2015; Mkandawire, 2005). In the U.S., IMANI would be compelled by the Foreign Agents Registration Act to register as a foreign agent or face legal consequences (Robinson, 2020).
While IMANI may have started as a legitimate advocate for national development, it has devolved into a political echo chamber, opportunistically shifting criticism based on which party is in power and who is funding its activities (Obadare, 2014; Mawdsley, 2012). Its recent critiques of the Mahama administration are tepid, couched in soft language that glosses over real failures (IMANI Africa, 2025). Most of IMANI’s workshops and reports are little more than funded exercises in policy restatement—burning donor money to demonstrate activity rather than delivering actionable solutions (Banks et al., 2015). This is not independent policy analysis; it is window dressing for a neo-colonial agenda.
Franklin Cudjoe, CEO of IMANI, has abandoned any pretense of think tank integrity, devolving into a partisan commentator hurling sensational accusations and personal grievances at the Akufo-Addo administration (Lawson Wood, 2024; CoverGhana, 2024). In his self-aggrandizing exposé, Cudjoe denounces the government’s economic management, accuses it of “crookish multi-million dollar procurement scams,” and lambasts the catastrophic handling of illegal mining and the GENSER and Aker oil deals. His tirades are a far cry from the standards of reputable international think tanks like the MacKenzie Institute or the Carnegie Endowment, which maintain scholarly rigour and refrain from such public mudslinging (Stone & Denham, 2004; Abelson, 2009).
Cudjoe’s public theatrics are not about policy reform but about constructing an image of moral superiority and anti-corruption activism to secure continued funding from foreign donors and local elites (Banks et al., 2015; Hearn, 2001). This behaviour reduces IMANI to a tool of political manipulation, undermining the credibility of policy research in Ghana and reinforcing the perception that so-called think tanks are little more than self-serving political actors masquerading as independent analysts (Mkandawire, 2005; Obadare, 2014).
In January 2026, Franklin Cudjoe launched a scathing attack on the Akufo-Addo administration, accusing it of systematically dismantling good governance, eroding accountability, and gutting the rule of law (Mkandawire, 2005; Hearn, 2001). Cudjoe branded the government as synonymous with corruption, claiming, “the last government sequestered rational, respectful freedom of speech and the rule of law from accountable governance” (Ghanapoliticsonline.com, 2026). With brazen partisanship, Cudjoe absurdly pinned the government’s failures solely on Ken Ofori-Atta, calling him a “high-profile absconder, a fugitive from the law,” while lavishing praise on Mahama’s leadership as “humane, humble, thoughtful and competent” (Ghanapoliticsonline.com, 2026). This is not analysis—it is naked bias, masquerading as policy critique (Obadare, 2014; Banks et al., 2015). Cudjoe further accused Akufo-Addo’s supporters of clinging to power for selfish gain, labelling the administration as a den of pillagers (Ghanapoliticsonline.com, 2026). Yet, he refuses to apply the same scrutiny to Mahama’s government, exposing IMANI’s descent into a partisan echo chamber rather than a credible think tank (Banks et al., 2015; Mawdsley, 2012).
Cudjoe’s recent outbursts expose him as a consummate ranter, utterly devoid of scholarly objectivity or professional restraint. His abusive language and lack of reflexivity reveal not a serious researcher, but a political opportunist seeking favour with the NDC and foreign donors (Banks et al., 2015; Mkandawire, 2005). Like the Chichidodo in Armah’s The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born, Cudjoe claims to despise corruption while thriving on its byproducts—classic behaviour of Ghana’s new breed of non-governmental mercenaries masquerading as anti-corruption crusaders (Armah, 1968; Obadare, 2014). His conduct strips IMANI of any remaining credibility and reduces it to a tool of political and financial extortion.
For argument’s sake, let’s momentarily accept Cudjoe’s self-styled anti-corruption credentials—credentials that collapse under scrutiny. When the Court of Appeal overturned Sedina Tamakloe Attionu’s 10-year jail sentence, Cudjoe’s response was tepid at best: he called it “two steps forward, four steps backwards,” a limp reaction compared to his vitriolic attacks on Ofori-Atta (Nartely, 2026; Gyimah-Boadi, 2017). When Attionu returned under dubious circumstances, with conflicting reports about her supposed imprisonment, Cudjoe defaulted to his trademark equivocation, demanding vague “clarity” rather than the investigative rigour he reserves for political adversaries (GhanaWeb, 2026; Banks et al., 2015).
Cudjoe’s selective outrage and evasive “X-talk” betray a deep bias—offering sympathy and obfuscation for political allies, but unleashing harsh indictments on opponents. This is not justice; it is partisan opportunism, masking as activism (Obadare, 2014; Mkandawire, 2005). Cudjoe’s activism is little more than performative posturing, devoid of the consistency and courage that true anti-corruption work demands.
In conclusion, IMANI’s reckless rhetoric and shadowy finances expose it as a partisan front, not a genuine think tank. By refusing transparency on its funding and the forces steering its research agenda, IMANI embodies the very Trojan horse Nkrumah warned against—an institution carrying political operatives and foreign interests under the guise of expertise. No nation should entrust its future to a body that hides its backers and dances to the tune of external masters. Until IMANI publicly declares its funders, audit trails, and true leadership, it remains a mouthpiece for outside agendas, not a guardian of Ghana’s public good. Cry, the beloved country.
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