Wearing a suit, donning plastic eyeglasses, and stringing together a few sentences in English does not confer communication expertise—contrary to the image the New Patriotic Party (NPP) would have the nation accept. Sometimes, silence is wisdom; failure to heed this turns otherwise promising leaders into public spectacles of incompetence. In contemporary Ghanaian politics, “dimwittism” has become political capital, with the NPP currently leading and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) close behind, both competing in a race to the bottom in public discourse. The decline is rapid and unmistakable.
In this commentary, I take direct aim at Kwesi Botchway, the New Patriotic Party’s (NPP) communicator, for his claim that Kojo Bamba’s election as First Vice Chairman is a cause for celebration. Bamba, notorious for his reputation as a landguard and political thug, now holds a top position in a party that self-righteously claims to embody the rule of law (Gyampo, 2021). The spectacle of his elevation is less political strategy than comic farce—an insult to the NPP’s own foundational ideals and to the intelligence of the Ghanaian electorate (Arthur, 2015).
This is not an outlier but a pattern. The NPP’s embrace of figures with violent pasts exposes the party’s descent into a culture of expediency, where power is prioritized over principle and impunity is rewarded (Boateng & Darko, 2016; Transparency International, 2022). As ever, the NPP remains the gift that keeps giving—delivering fresh insults to the rule of law and the nation’s democratic aspirations.
On MetroTV, 5 October 2026, Botchway asserted that Bamba’s elevation to NPP national leadership was the “strongest signal ever” to the NDC, claiming, “the election of Bamba… has sent a clear and unmistakable signal… NDC is in a panic mode” (GhanaWeb, 2026). This is pure bluster. Bamba is a notorious thug, not a disciplined tactician—he is neither a US Marine nor a Russian Spetsnaz. The notion that an infamous vigilante, recently rehabilitated for public consumption, could intimidate seasoned political opponents is absurd. His history with the NPP’s Delta Forces—a vigilante group with a record of lawlessness—disqualifies any effort to lionize him as a political asset (Boateng & Darko, 2016; Gyampo, 2021). Ghana’s constitution is unequivocal: it rejects the valorization of criminality and will not tolerate the elevation of thuggery to political virtue (Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Art. 41; Transparency International, 2022). Let Bamba “find out” where law and order truly reside.
Botchway’s assertion that the NPP is a “national party . . . that belongs to every single Ghanaian” is a hollow charade, contradicted by the party’s elitist and exclusionary history (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015). The NPP’s founding and leadership have long been dominated by elites who advanced an ethnocentric “ye gye ye man” (we are reclaiming our nation) mentality, elevating one ethnic group as the gold standard and relegating others to the margins (Boafo-Arthur, 2007; Daily Graphic, 2024).
The party’s so-called inclusivity is a political myth; its ranks are rife with parochialism and resistance to genuine diversity. The bitter opposition to Dr. Alhaji Mahamudu Bawumia’s presidential ambitions—rooted not in merit, but in his identity as a Northerner and Muslim—exposes the NPP’s true face. Heavyweights like Kennedy Agyapong and Alan Kyeremanteng have openly challenged Bawumia’s legitimacy, reinforcing the party’s legacy of exclusion and ethnopolitics (Joy News, 2024; Modern Ghana, 2024). Such hypocrisy shatters the narrative of upward mobility, confirming the NPP’s reputation as an elitist enclave, not a party of national unity.
Botchway is correct to highlight the inconsistency of the NDC in glorifying Chief Sofo Azorka while denigrating Bamba. Both Azorka and Bamba have notorious records of political violence and should not be celebrated by any serious party (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015). Chief Azorka’s orchestration of the harassment of Obed Asamoah at the Eredec Hotel, coupled with his ongoing involvement in violent party activities despite his age, is a stain on the NDC’s reputation. The NDC must be held fully accountable for enabling and legitimizing such conduct (Daily Graphic, 2024; Modern Ghana, 2024). Tolerating violence, regardless of the perpetrator’s party affiliation, is an affront to decency and a blight on Ghana’s democratic aspirations
Botchway’s portrayal of Bamba as a “grassroots politician” and champion of youth interests is unsubstantiated and intellectually lazy. His claim is devoid of specifics, a hallmark of political spin and half-truths (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015). Where is the evidence of Bamba’s concrete achievements or positions within the NPP? What measurable impact has he had on youth empowerment? The label “youth” is cynically misapplied—Bamba is no young man, but a political operative. Such vague characterizations insult the intelligence of the electorate and perpetuate the culture of empty sloganeering that plagues Ghanaian politics (Osei, 2017; Joy News, 2024).
Botchway’s claim that Bamba’s credentials as a “professional auto mechanic” and first-degree holder” qualify him as a politician is intellectually bankrupt. There is no inherent connection between mechanical skills or academic credentials and political leadership or vision (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015). Ghana’s persistent habit of inflating irrelevant or transient attributes as qualifications for high office has contributed directly to national stagnation and mediocrity (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016; Osei, 2017). Leadership demands demonstrated capacity for transformative outcomes, not the shallow celebration of basic achievements. This culture of unwarranted praise is a central obstacle to Ghana’s development and sovereignty.
Let me remind Botchway that, by both legal and ethical standards, convicts and criminals are unfit as leaders or role models in any society (Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Art. 94). In 2017, members of the Delta Force—a vigilante group nurtured by the NPP and with Bamba as a prominent figure—brazenly escaped lawful custody at a Kumasi circuit court. This act violated Section 226 of Ghana’s Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29), which criminalizes escaping lawful custody and prescribes severe penalties for offenders. In addition, charges including conspiracy to commit crime (Section 23), assault on a public officer (Section 205), and causing unlawful damage (Section 172) were reduced to a mere fine of GHC 31,200, a gross miscarriage of justice and a mockery of Ghana’s legal standards (Daily Graphic, 2017; Joy News, 2017; Arthur, 2015; Ayee, 2020). In any robust democracy, such crimes would attract far stiffer penalties, not a token fine. Can Bamba, with this criminal record, be trusted with public office? The answer is clear.
Botchway’s admonition for the NDC to “respect the decision” of NPP delegates who elected Bamba is both intellectually feeble and politically irresponsible. The NDC has not contested Bamba’s internal election—what is at stake is the corrosive effect of Ghana’s monetized, vote-buying politics, which routinely elevates individuals with criminal records to the corridors of power (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Modern Ghana, 2024). Ghana’s Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) and Article 94(2)(c)(i) of the 1992 Constitution explicitly disqualify convicted criminals from parliamentary office, a principle echoed in foreign jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom’s Representation of the People Act, 1981 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Richardson v. Ramirez (1974), which allows states to bar felons from public office (Constitution of Ghana, 1992; Representation of the People Act, 1981; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 1974).
By defending the elevation of convicts, Botchway and his cohort risk turning politics into a haven for “useful idiots”—easily manipulated assets for those with hostile intentions, as political science literature on infiltration and state capture makes clear (Gyimah-Boadi, 2017; Transparency International, 2022). Such myopia not only mocks the rule of law but also undermines the very foundation of democratic governance.
In conclusion, Botchway’s shallow, two-line soundbites are an insult to public discourse and a testament to the intellectual poverty gripping the NPP grassroots. What more can be expected from a cadre willing to trade integrity for political scraps, echoing the blind fervour of Roman plebeians manipulated by Marcus Junius Brutus and Gaius Cassius Longinus in their pursuit of a “better Rome” (Gyampo, 2021; Arthur, 2015)? Bamba’s own campaign pitch—“vote for two educated candidates with Bamba as the Macho man to do the heavy lifting”—lays bare the party’s embrace of muscle over merit, elevating a convicted thug to the pantheon of redeemers, all in the hope of restoring the NPP’s fading fortunes. The evidence for this “calvary” is as elusive as a credible policy in a manifesto full of empty promises.
Such sycophantic defence of the indefensible has polluted Parliament with figures like Kwame Asare Obeng (A-Plus), whose unrivalled vulgarity has turned the chamber into a pigsty where genuine debate is drowned out by the snorts of political swine, as Orwell so aptly warned (Orwell, 1945; Osei, 2017). Allowing these “proverbial lunatics” to take over the asylum, while the rest of us remain silent for fear of losing favour, is tantamount to signing Ghana’s death warrant. As an African and a friend of Ghana, I refuse to be complicit in this national farce.
References
Arthur, J. (2015). Political corruption and public accountability in Ghana. African Journal of Public Affairs, 8(2), 34-48.
Ayee, J. R. A. (2020). Political economy of rule of law in Ghana. African Affairs, 119(475), 557-577.
Boateng, F. D., & Darko, I. N. (2016). Corruption in Ghana: Trends, causes, and consequences. African Security Review, 25(2), 151-166.
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), Art. 41.
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), Art. 94.
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), Art. 94(2)(c)(i).
Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) (Ghana).
Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29), Sections 23, 172, 205, 226 (Ghana).
Daily Graphic. (2024, March 21). Azorka Boys: Violence and impunity in Ghanaian politics. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/azorka-boys-violence-and-impunity-in-ghanaian-politics.html
Daily Graphic. (2017, April 7). Delta Force escape: Security lapses at Kumasi court exposed. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/delta-force-escape-security-lapses-at-kumasi-court-exposed.html
GhanaWeb. (2026, October 5). Bamba’s election sends NDC into panic mode – Botchway. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Bamba-election-sends-NDC-into-panic-mode-Botchway-2026
Gyampo, R. (2021). Political leadership and the decline of public trust. Ghana Journal of Politics, 12, 88-104.
Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2017). Corruption in Ghana: Trends, causes, and consequences. Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
Modern Ghana. (2024, March 25). Kojo Bamba and Chief Azorka: Twin faces of political thuggery. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1305007/kojo-bamba-and-chief-azorka-twin-faces-of-political-thuggery.html
Modern Ghana. (2024, March 17). NPP’s “national party” claim rings hollow amid Bawumia backlash. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1304679/npps-national-party-claim-rings-hollow-amid-bawumia-backlash.html
Joy News. (2024, March 16). NPP members divided over Kojo Bamba’s vice-chairmanship. https://www.myjoyonline.com/npp-members-divided-over-kojo-bambas-vice-chairmanship/
Joy News. (2017, April 6). Delta Force members fined for escaping lawful custody. https://www.myjoyonline.com/delta-force-members-fined-for-escaping-lawful-custody/
Orwell, G. (1945). Animal Farm. Secker & Warburg.
Osei, M. (2017). Gender, media, and politics in Ghana: The case of female politicians. Journal of African Media Studies, 9(2), 265-279.
Representation of the People Act, 1981 (UK).
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
Transparency International. (2022). Corruption Perceptions Index 2022: Ghana. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/gha
